Adam C. Pantel

The decision grants summary judgment to the plaintiffs, who were defrauded of $2.65 million in a real estate investment scheme involving a solicitor’s law firm, his office manager/mother, and an in-house mortgage broker.

The court finds the solicitor and his firm liable for breach of trust, negligence, and fiduciary duty, and holds the property company and its principals jointly and severally liable.

The court awards compensatory and punitive damages, as well as substantial indemnity costs.

This decision addresses a Rule 2.1.01 motion concerning multiple proceedings commenced by the plaintiff, Aynoush Biniaz-Sarabi, arising from a motor vehicle accident and subsequent denial of accident benefits.

The court reviews the history of related litigation, including prior decisions by the Licence Appeal Tribunal and Divisional Court, and considers whether the current and related actions are frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

Several actions are dismissed under Rule 2.1.01, and the court declines to declare the plaintiff a vexatious litigant without a formal motion.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed a civil action brought by Stephen Massey, purportedly also on behalf of his two daughters (J.M. and C.M.), against 31 defendants including the Children's Aid Society, the Office of the Children's Lawyer, various lawyers, and his ex-wife.

The claim, a collateral attack on prior family law proceedings that concluded in 2016, alleged child abuse and professional misconduct.

The court dismissed the action against Mr. Massey with prejudice due to his failure to attend case conferences, non-compliance with court orders, and the action being frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, largely barred by the limitation period.

The claim on behalf of J.M. and C.M. was dismissed without prejudice, acknowledging potential discoverability issues and the uncertainty of their authorization.

The court imposed a leave requirement for Mr. Massey to initiate future proceedings against these defendants and awarded costs against him.

The plaintiffs, developers of two condominium buildings, sought an extension of time to serve statements of claim against the respective condominium corporations for unpaid promissory notes related to guest suites.

The statements of claim were issued in March 2020 but not served until July 2022, past the extended deadline of March 2021.

The delay was attributed to counsel's inadvertence.

The defendants opposed, arguing abandonment and prejudice due to witness unavailability and changes in unit ownership.

The court, applying the principles from Chiarelli v Wiens, found that the plaintiffs intended to pursue the actions and that the delay was due to inadvertence.

The court rejected the defendants' claims of prejudice, noting their early notice of the claims and that any alleged prejudice was not caused by the delay or was speculative.

The motions for extension of time were granted.

The appellants, lien claimants in a condominium development bankruptcy, appealed a motion judge's decision regarding the quantum of their priority under section 78(2) of the Construction Act.

They argued for a 20% priority due to two building mortgages, while the receiver contended it was a single 10% holdback deficiency.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal, finding the statutory interpretation issue important.

On the merits, the Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's interpretation, affirming that the priority is limited to the single 10% holdback deficiency, regardless of the number of building mortgages.

The appeal was dismissed.

The plaintiff sued her former lawyer for negligence regarding a construction contract.

The plaintiff's new lawyer accepted an offer to settle the action for a dismissal without costs.

The plaintiff subsequently filed a Notice of Intention to Act in Person and claimed she never instructed her lawyer to settle.

The defendant moved to enforce the settlement under Rule 49.09.

The court granted the motion, finding no basis to refuse enforcement, as the agreement was clear and entered into by counsel with ostensible authority.

The respondent law firm brought a motion to quash a Registrar's Order for Delivery and Assessment obtained by its former client.

The client had certified in a requisition that he had requested the firm's accounts but had not received them.

The court found that the firm had in fact delivered all accounts to the client at or about the dates they were rendered.

Because the requisition was factually incorrect, the court quashed the Registrar's Order, without prejudice to the client bringing an Application for an order directing the assessment of the accounts under section 4 of the Solicitors Act.

The plaintiff, Jinzhong Miao, sued his lawyer, Dheeraj Bhatia, and his firm, Madamser Law, for negligence and breach of contract concerning a real estate transaction.

The plaintiff sought to extricate himself from an Agreement of Purchase and Sale for a residential property, alleging the lawyer provided negligent advice by assuring him he could exit the deal.

The court found that the lawyer did not provide such a guarantee and that the plaintiff's credibility was compromised by his admitted misrepresentations about his financial circumstances.

The court concluded that the lawyer's conduct did not fall below the required standard of care and was not causative of any loss to the plaintiff.

The plaintiff's claim was dismissed.

The Plaintiffs brought a motion for summary judgment.

Prior to the hearing, the parties advised the court that the action had tentatively settled and requested an adjournment of the motion sine die.

The court granted the adjournment on consent, noting that if the settlement was not completed, the parties would need to obtain a new date and timetable at Civil Practice Court.

The judge was not seized of the matter, and no costs were awarded for the attendance.

The applicant lawyer sought an order declaring the self-represented respondent a vexatious litigant under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The respondent had commenced four previous actions against the applicant, all of which were summarily dismissed as frivolous or vexatious, and had recently commenced a fifth.

The court found the respondent's actions against the applicant to be vexatious but declined to make a global order, limiting the restriction to proceedings against the applicant so as not to foreclose her ability to pursue other unrelated claims regarding alleged domestic and sexual abuse.

The appellants appealed an order striking out their action under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as an abuse of process.

The appellants had previously failed to set aside a default judgment obtained against them and subsequently brought a new action claiming damages and alleging fraud regarding the service of the original claim.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the new action was an attempt to relitigate issues already decided and dismissed the appeal.

The self-represented plaintiff brought an action against a supermarket for a slip and fall, and also sued his former lawyers, the Law Society of Ontario, LawPRO, and the Crown in Right of Ontario.

The non-supermarket defendants brought motions to strike the statement of claim and dismiss the actions against them.

The court granted the motions, finding the claims disclosed no reasonable cause of action, lacked material facts, and were frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The claims against the moving defendants were struck without leave to amend, and costs of $800 were awarded to each moving defendant.

The defendants brought a motion to dismiss the action for delay under Rule 24.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, citing the plaintiffs' two years of inaction and failure to respond to correspondence.

The plaintiffs argued the defendants were in default for not delivering affidavits of documents and offered an explanation for their delay.

The court found the defendants were not in default due to rule amendments and rejected the plaintiffs' explanation as incredible.

However, the court declined to dismiss the action, noting that "contumelious" delay typically requires serial violations of court orders, which was not present.

The motions were dismissed without prejudice, but the plaintiffs were ordered to pay $11,000 in costs to the defendants and to deliver their affidavit of documents within 30 days, with defendants to follow 30 days thereafter.

This case management endorsement addresses multiple ongoing proceedings involving a vexatious litigant, Nadire Atas.

The court made several orders and directions, including confirming the open court principle for case management conferences, dismissing numerous actions against Peoples Trust and other defendants due to the litigant's failure to comply with "Chavali requests" (orders to demonstrate intent to continue litigation), and setting deadlines for filing defence and bringing a motion for a stay of summary judgment proceedings.

The court also addressed the litigant's repeated allegations of bias and jurisdictional challenges, dismissing them as meritless and vexatious.

Directions were given regarding outstanding costs orders and the process for appealing interlocutory rulings.

This endorsement addresses multiple motions and provides case management directions for Nadire Atas, who has been declared a vexatious litigant.

The court dismissed Ms. Atas's motion for recusal of the case management judge, finding no merit in her arguments regarding functus officio or apprehended bias.

The court also dismissed Ms. Atas's claims against the Chavalis and her counterclaims in the defamation proceedings due to her persistent failure to make required "Chavali requests" to advance them.

However, the court set aside the notings in default against Ms. Atas in the defamation proceedings to allow her to defend on the merits.

Further directions were given for motions for summary judgment in the defamation proceedings, dismissal motions by Peoples Trust and LawPro Defendants, and an interlocutory injunction motion.

The court emphasized the need for Ms. Atas to comply with case management orders to move the litigation forward, despite her ongoing appeals of the vexatious litigant declaration.

This case management endorsement addresses multiple procedural issues in complex litigation involving a litigant previously declared vexatious by the HRTO.

The court denied the litigant's last-minute adjournment request, clarified requirements for fee waivers, and rejected a request to bring a stand-alone motion for recusal, directing that bias allegations be raised within an existing interlocutory injunction motion.

The endorsement also set strict deadlines for the litigant's compliance with previous orders and responding materials, emphasizing the court's role in preventing vexatious conduct and ensuring proportional and reasonable litigation.

The defendants moved to set aside a default judgment, arguing that their former counsel's negligence, including undisclosed Law Society suspensions and failure to attend to the action, led to the default.

The plaintiffs contended the defendants were aware or should have been aware of their lawyer's issues and lacked an arguable defence.

The court applied the Chitel test, finding the motion was brought without delay, the default was adequately explained by counsel's negligence, and the defendants presented an arguable defence regarding the renovation contract.

The court emphasized that clients should not be irrevocably jeopardized by counsel's neglect and that allowing the judgment to stand would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The default judgment and a prior order striking the defence were set aside, and garnished funds were ordered returned as no exceptional circumstances for a freezing order were shown.

The appellant law firm appealed an order of the motion judge that set aside a report and certificate of assessment.

The motion judge had ruled that the assessment officer erred by refusing to grant an adjournment when the respondent client failed to attend the first day of a scheduled five-day hearing due to a communication error by court staff, thereby depriving the respondent of procedural fairness.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the assessment officer's decision to refuse the adjournment was reasonable and that the motion judge failed to give adequate deference to that decision.

The court considered the respondent's prior conduct, including failure to provide required documentation, cancellation of mediation, and late retention of counsel, in determining that the assessment officer properly balanced the circumstances in the interests of justice.

The respondent disputed fees charged by the appellant accountants for services rendered in respect of three transactions, including the structuring of a butterfly transaction.

A fees action was settled and the parties executed a broadly worded release in 2008 referring to all claims existing up to that time arising from any and all services provided through to the end of 2007.

In 2011, the respondent learned that the butterfly transaction could be subject to an income tax liability of more than $1 million instead of being tax free as intended.

The respondent sued for damages for negligence.

The motion judge and Divisional Court dismissed the appellant's motion for summary judgment, finding the release did not bar the claim because the negligence only came to light in 2011.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the release clearly and unequivocally covered all claims arising from services provided through December 31, 2007, including unknown claims.

The defendants, Garry Shapiro and Kaveh Najafi, brought motions to dismiss the plaintiff's claim.

Shapiro sought to set aside a noting of default and dismiss the action as an abuse of process and statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, based on a prior dismissed action from 2011.

Najafi sought to strike the statement of claim, arguing it was statute-barred.

The court found that the 2015 action was not an abuse of process as the prior action was not decided on its merits.

Regarding the limitation period, the court applied Section 11 of the Limitations Act, 2002, finding that the family law proceedings between the plaintiff and Najafi, which resulted in a Family Order in 2014, suspended the limitation period.

The Family Order also created new rights and obligations, giving rise to fresh causes of action.

The court also noted the potential applicability of the Real Property Limitations Act, which provides a ten-year limitation period.

Consequently, the defendants failed to establish that the 2015 action was statute-barred.

The motions to dismiss were largely dismissed, with the exception of setting aside the noting in default against Shapiro by consent.