Erin H. Durant

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed a civil action brought by Stephen Massey, purportedly also on behalf of his two daughters (J.M. and C.M.), against 31 defendants including the Children's Aid Society, the Office of the Children's Lawyer, various lawyers, and his ex-wife.

The claim, a collateral attack on prior family law proceedings that concluded in 2016, alleged child abuse and professional misconduct.

The court dismissed the action against Mr. Massey with prejudice due to his failure to attend case conferences, non-compliance with court orders, and the action being frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, largely barred by the limitation period.

The claim on behalf of J.M. and C.M. was dismissed without prejudice, acknowledging potential discoverability issues and the uncertainty of their authorization.

The court imposed a leave requirement for Mr. Massey to initiate future proceedings against these defendants and awarded costs against him.

The plaintiff sought to amend her statement of claim to add TQ Landscapes as a defendant, alleging she slipped on ice in a parking lot.

TQ Landscapes argued the claim was statute-barred due to the expiration of the limitation period.

The court found the plaintiff subjectively discovered her claim against TQ Landscapes on March 5, 2019, when she received documents identifying TQ as the snow removal contractor.

However, the court was unable to determine the date a reasonable person would have discovered the claim, thus allowing the amendment but permitting TQ Landscapes to plead a limitation defence.

The defendant brought a threshold motion seeking a declaration that the plaintiff, Catherine McNamee's, claims for non-pecuniary general loss and health care expenses were barred under the Insurance Act, as her injuries did not meet the "permanent serious impairment of an important physical, mental or psychological function" threshold.

The court, after hearing evidence at trial, focused on the issue of causation.

The plaintiff had a significant pre-accident history of alcohol use disorder, depression, and chronic pain.

The court found Ms. McNamee's evidence regarding the severity of the accident and the resolution of her prior injuries to be unreliable.

Preferring the defendant's expert opinion, the court concluded that Ms. McNamee's injuries from the motor vehicle accident had resolved by Fall 2014 and that her subsequent decline in functioning and mental health issues were primarily due to unrelated life stressors and her pre-existing conditions, not the accident.

Therefore, the plaintiff failed to establish causation, and her claims did not meet the statutory threshold.

The defendant's motion was granted.

This endorsement rules on which questions regarding damages claims (future treatment costs, medication, income loss) for Catherine and John McNamee will be put to the jury.

The court found insufficient evidence to support several of the plaintiffs' claims for future care costs and income loss, declining to put those specific questions to the jury.

The ruling emphasizes the need for precise evidence and medical justification for future care costs and a clear evidentiary foundation for income loss claims to avoid speculation.

The Plaintiffs sought leave under s. 12 of the Evidence Act to call more than three expert witnesses at trial and an order to abridge time for service of their expert reports.

The Defendant opposed, citing late service and duplication of expert evidence.

The court applied factors for granting leave, emphasizing the "gatekeeper" role of the trial judge and the policy behind s. 12 of the Evidence Act, which applies to all experts offering opinion evidence, including participant experts.

The court found significant duplication among the proposed psychiatric, psychological, and occupational therapy experts and that several reports were served late without adequate justification.

The motion was largely denied, limiting the Plaintiffs to one expert per specialty for opinion evidence and restricting the scope of a physiotherapist's testimony to observations rather than future recommendations for litigation purposes.

The plaintiff was catastrophically injured in a motor vehicle accident and sued the defendants for damages.

The jury found the defendants 62% liable and awarded damages of approximately $2.6 million, including $2.2 million for future care costs.

The trial judge made a conditional assignment order of the plaintiff's future statutory accident benefits (SABs) to the defendants' insurers under section 267.8(12)(a)(ii) of the Insurance Act.

The plaintiff appealed, arguing that the assignment violated strict matching principles and was premature.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the conditional assignment order and rejecting the strict matching approach in favour of a "silo" approach.

The court also denied leave to appeal the trial judge's substantial reduction of the plaintiff's costs award, which was reduced from $795,616.09 to $375,000 due to the plaintiff's counsel's conduct regarding a settlement offer, the lack of material benefit in proceeding to trial, and conduct that unnecessarily extended the trial.

The plaintiff, having succeeded in a wrongful dismissal summary judgment motion, sought costs against the corporate defendant.

The court assessed the reasonableness of the plaintiff's claimed legal fees and disbursements, considering factors such as hourly rates, delegation of work, and the necessity of certain tasks.

While acknowledging the plaintiff's entitlement to costs, the court found some claimed hours and hourly rates to be excessive, leading to a reduction in the total award.

The appellant commenced an action in small claims court for breach of contract and subsequently filed a duplicative claim in superior court with additional claims.

The trial judge struck out the entire superior court action as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process under Rule 2.1, finding that the appellant had not followed proper procedure to transfer the small claims action and was attempting to litigate the same matters in two courts simultaneously.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no error in the trial judge's decision.

This decision addresses a costs award and ancillary matters following a jury verdict in a personal injury action.

The jury found the defendants 62% liable, awarding substantial damages for pain and suffering, future care costs, and family law damages.

The court ruled on four key issues: ordering an assignment of accident benefits, limiting the McEwens' personal liability to insurance policy limits due to their bankruptcy, applying a 5% pre-judgment interest rate for non-pecuniary damages (finding the relevant statutory amendment not retrospective), and applying the new statutory deductible of $18,270.00 to the Family Law claim.

Despite the jury verdict exceeding some settlement offers, the court significantly reduced the plaintiffs' requested costs from $795,616.09 to $375,000, citing the plaintiffs' conduct, including late expert reports, changing their position on calling the plaintiff, and engaging in "sharp practice" by attempting to enforce a settlement offer while simultaneously initiating a bad faith claim against an insurer.

The plaintiff, Beate Nkunda-Batware, was awarded $418,330 by a jury in a motor vehicle personal injury action.

The defendants brought a threshold motion, arguing that the plaintiff's injuries did not meet the statutory exceptions under subsections 267.5(3) and (5) of the Insurance Act, requiring a "permanent, serious impairment of an important, physical, mental or psychological function." The court found that the plaintiff, a "thin skull" individual with a pre-existing predisposition to depression, suffered whiplash injuries that evolved into a chronic pain syndrome directly caused by the accident.

The court preferred the plaintiff's medical experts and concluded that the plaintiff's impairments were permanent and serious, substantially interfering with her employment and daily functioning.

The defendants' threshold motion was dismissed.