Andrea Plumb

The infant plaintiff suffered a severe and permanent brachial plexus injury during birth after encountering shoulder dystocia.

The plaintiffs brought a medical negligence action against the delivering obstetrician, alleging he applied excessive downward traction.

The defendant argued the injury was caused by maternal propulsive forces.

The court found that the defendant breached the standard of care by applying more than gentle downward traction, which caused the injury.

The court awarded $811,564 in total damages, including non-pecuniary damages, future care costs, future loss of income, and Family Law Act damages for the family.

The plaintiffs brought a medical malpractice action against a general practitioner and a specialist surgeon following complications from bowel surgery that resulted in a severe necrotizing soft tissue infection.

The plaintiffs alleged the specialist failed to follow up on PET scan results and the general practitioner failed to accurately communicate those results.

The court found that while the specialist breached the standard of care by failing to follow up, the plaintiffs failed to establish causation, as the patient's history of seeking alternative treatments and rejecting medical advice indicated he would not have complied with the recommended treatment plan.

The court found the general practitioner met the standard of care.

The action was dismissed.

The plaintiffs brought a medical malpractice action against the defendants after their newborn son developed kernicterus and suffered severe brain damage due to untreated hyperbilirubinemia.

The action against the physicians was settled, and the trial proceeded against the hospital and the nurse who cared for the infant overnight.

The court found that the nurse breached the standard of care by failing to report her observation of the infant's jaundice to a physician.

Applying a robust and pragmatic approach to causation, the court concluded that but for the nurse's negligence, a physician would have ordered a bilirubin test and initiated phototherapy in time to prevent the infant's injuries.

The hospital was held vicariously liable.

During a medical malpractice trial involving a newborn who developed kernicterus from untreated jaundice, the plaintiffs sought to qualify a registered nurse as an expert in perinatal nursing.

The defendants objected, arguing she lacked specific recent experience in tertiary hospital nurseries and was a 'roaming expert.' The court applied the Mohan and White Burgess frameworks, finding the proposed expert possessed the requisite specialized knowledge and experience in newborn care and jaundice assessment.

The court admitted the expert evidence, concluding its probative value outweighed any potential prejudice.

A medical malpractice action arising from the treatment of a young patient presenting with neurological symptoms at a rural hospital.

The physician failed to recognize the possibility of stroke, lowered the patient’s blood pressure aggressively, and delayed consultation with a tertiary neurology centre.

The court held that the physician breached the standard of care by failing to include stroke in the differential diagnosis, lowering blood pressure despite neurological signs, and delaying transfer for specialist assessment.

Applying the “but for” causation test from Clements v. Clements, the court found that the precipitous blood pressure reduction and delayed administration of heparin promoted clot formation which caused the catastrophic stroke.

The plaintiffs established causation on a balance of probabilities and were awarded damages.

During a medical malpractice trial, the defendants brought a motion under s. 12 of the Ontario Evidence Act seeking leave to call more than three expert witnesses.

The case involved allegations that an emergency room physician negligently failed to recognize stroke symptoms and delayed transfer for specialized care, allegedly resulting in quadriplegia.

The court considered factors relating to duplication, fairness between parties, necessity of additional expert evidence, and litigation cost.

Finding that the issues concerned only standard of care and causation and that three experts were sufficient to address them, the court concluded that allowing additional experts would create unnecessary duplication and disadvantage the plaintiffs.

Leave to call more than three medical experts was therefore refused.