Kelly C. Tranquilli

This motion concerned the amendment of a statement of claim for statutory accident benefits (SABs) to include claims for medical and rehabilitation benefits denied post-issuance and a declaration of catastrophic impairment.

The action was commenced prior to 2016 amendments to the Insurance Act which removed the right to bring actions for SABs disputes, redirecting them to the Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT).

The court granted the amendment, finding that the proposed changes constituted a particularization of claims already broadly pleaded in the original statement of claim, rather than new disputes arising after the statutory amendments.

The court emphasized the policy against multiplicity of proceedings and the potential for inconsistent findings if claims were bifurcated between the Superior Court and the LAT.

The plaintiffs (Moles) and defendant (Manwell) brought cross-motions regarding the admissibility and number of expert witnesses in a medical negligence case.

The Moles sought to restrict Manwell to one expert, while Manwell sought to preclude the Moles' expert (Schatzker) from testifying on a novel surgical technique or, alternatively, to allow all three of his experts to testify if Schatzker's evidence was admitted.

The court found Schatzker's novel evidence on the modified surgical technique to have sufficient threshold reliability for admission.

Consequently, the Moles' motion to restrict Manwell's experts was dismissed, and Manwell was permitted to call all three of his proposed expert witnesses.

The plaintiff, The Roman Catholic Episcopal Corporation of the Diocese of London in Ontario, moved to strike the jury notice served by the defendant, AXA Insurance Canada, pursuant to sections 108(2) and 108(3) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court determined that the core of both the plaintiff's claim and the defendant's counterclaim was for declaratory and/or other equitable relief, specifically concerning the validity and coverage of an insurance policy.

As claims for declaratory or equitable relief are mandated to be tried without a jury under section 108(2) of the Act, the court granted the motion and struck the jury notice.

The court also noted that while complexity was not argued, it would not have struck the jury notice on the discretionary grounds of mixed fact and law at this early stage without more evidence.

Following dismissal of a motion for production of documents, the successful defendants sought costs.

The court considered allegations made by the moving party against opposing counsel and a physician defendant, including claims of document alteration and misleading the court.

The court found the allegations unsupported and characterized them as serious and scurrilous.

Applying the principles governing costs under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court held that such unfounded allegations justified substantial indemnity costs.

Costs were awarded against the plaintiff in favour of the physician defendant on a substantial indemnity basis and modest costs to another defendant.

In an action concerning an alleged conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff of her share of her late father's estate, the plaintiff moved for further production of pre-2004 medical records from the defendant doctor and the federal government regarding her father's shock therapy in 1969 or 1970.

The defendant Birch also moved to compel the plaintiff to answer a refusal to obtain records from Bell Canada regarding an alleged wiretap.

The court dismissed all motions, finding the plaintiff's production requests lacked relevance and violated the principle of proportionality, and that Birch's motion for Bell Canada records was also disproportionate given the minimal relevance and alternative remedies available.

Following reasons granting summary judgment and dismissing the action, the court determined the issue of costs.

The successful defendant sought $5,000 in partial indemnity costs despite incurring substantially higher expenses in defending the action and bringing the summary judgment motion.

The self-represented plaintiff sought $65,000 in costs despite losing the motion and the action.

The court reiterated that costs generally follow the event and serve an indemnity function while encouraging settlement.

The court fixed costs payable to the defendant at $5,000.

The self-represented plaintiff sued a psychiatrist for medical malpractice and lack of informed consent regarding medication side effects.

The defendant moved for summary judgment and a vexatious litigant order.

The court granted summary judgment, dismissing the action because the plaintiff failed to adduce any expert medical evidence to support her claims, which is required in medical malpractice cases.

The court also declared the plaintiff a vexatious litigant under section 140 of the Courts of Justice Act, noting her history of persistently instituting unsuccessful and abandoned proceedings against various healthcare providers without reasonable grounds.