Kelly C. Tranquilli

This motion concerned the amendment of a statement of claim for statutory accident benefits (SABs) to include claims for medical and rehabilitation benefits denied post-issuance and a declaration of catastrophic impairment.

The action was commenced prior to 2016 amendments to the Insurance Act which removed the right to bring actions for SABs disputes, redirecting them to the Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT).

The court granted the amendment, finding that the proposed changes constituted a particularization of claims already broadly pleaded in the original statement of claim, rather than new disputes arising after the statutory amendments.

The court emphasized the policy against multiplicity of proceedings and the potential for inconsistent findings if claims were bifurcated between the Superior Court and the LAT.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board not to proceed with a review of his complaint against his niece, a physician.

The Board had found the complaint to be frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, as it arose from ongoing family litigation and was essentially the same as a previous complaint that had been dismissed.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Board's decision reasonable and concluding there was no breach of procedural fairness.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination and reprisal by a hospital and two doctors regarding the treatment of her son in 2011, and alleging she lost her job in 2016 due to a disability caused by one of the respondents.

The Tribunal held a summary hearing to determine if the application should be dismissed for delay and lack of reasonable prospect of success.

The Tribunal found no good faith reason for the five-year delay in filing the application regarding the 2011 events, noting the applicant had pursued other proceedings during that time.

The Tribunal also dismissed the employment allegation as having no reasonable prospect of success, as the respondent doctor was not the applicant's employer.

The application was dismissed in its entirety.

The plaintiffs (Moles) and defendant (Manwell) brought cross-motions regarding the admissibility and number of expert witnesses in a medical negligence case.

The Moles sought to restrict Manwell to one expert, while Manwell sought to preclude the Moles' expert (Schatzker) from testifying on a novel surgical technique or, alternatively, to allow all three of his experts to testify if Schatzker's evidence was admitted.

The court found Schatzker's novel evidence on the modified surgical technique to have sufficient threshold reliability for admission.

Consequently, the Moles' motion to restrict Manwell's experts was dismissed, and Manwell was permitted to call all three of his proposed expert witnesses.

The plaintiff, The Roman Catholic Episcopal Corporation of the Diocese of London in Ontario, moved to strike the jury notice served by the defendant, AXA Insurance Canada, pursuant to sections 108(2) and 108(3) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court determined that the core of both the plaintiff's claim and the defendant's counterclaim was for declaratory and/or other equitable relief, specifically concerning the validity and coverage of an insurance policy.

As claims for declaratory or equitable relief are mandated to be tried without a jury under section 108(2) of the Act, the court granted the motion and struck the jury notice.

The court also noted that while complexity was not argued, it would not have struck the jury notice on the discretionary grounds of mixed fact and law at this early stage without more evidence.

Following dismissal of a motion for production of documents, the successful defendants sought costs.

The court considered allegations made by the moving party against opposing counsel and a physician defendant, including claims of document alteration and misleading the court.

The court found the allegations unsupported and characterized them as serious and scurrilous.

Applying the principles governing costs under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court held that such unfounded allegations justified substantial indemnity costs.

Costs were awarded against the plaintiff in favour of the physician defendant on a substantial indemnity basis and modest costs to another defendant.

The plaintiff brought a motion for leave to appeal an interlocutory order to the Divisional Court under Rule 62.02(4)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that another Superior Court decision created a conflicting authority warranting appellate review.

The court reviewed the alleged conflicting endorsement and the earlier motion decision and found no inconsistency in the legal principles applied.

The earlier endorsement addressed specific refusals on discovery and did not determine the threshold legal issue considered in the impugned decision.

The court held that the requirement of a “conflicting decision” was not met and therefore it was unnecessary to consider whether leave was desirable.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed, with commentary emphasizing counsel’s duty to disclose relevant authorities to the court.

In an action concerning an alleged conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff of her share of her late father's estate, the plaintiff moved for further production of pre-2004 medical records from the defendant doctor and the federal government regarding her father's shock therapy in 1969 or 1970.

The defendant Birch also moved to compel the plaintiff to answer a refusal to obtain records from Bell Canada regarding an alleged wiretap.

The court dismissed all motions, finding the plaintiff's production requests lacked relevance and violated the principle of proportionality, and that Birch's motion for Bell Canada records was also disproportionate given the minimal relevance and alternative remedies available.

Following reasons granting summary judgment and dismissing the action, the court determined the issue of costs.

The successful defendant sought $5,000 in partial indemnity costs despite incurring substantially higher expenses in defending the action and bringing the summary judgment motion.

The self-represented plaintiff sought $65,000 in costs despite losing the motion and the action.

The court reiterated that costs generally follow the event and serve an indemnity function while encouraging settlement.

The court fixed costs payable to the defendant at $5,000.

The self-represented plaintiff sued a psychiatrist for medical malpractice and lack of informed consent regarding medication side effects.

The defendant moved for summary judgment and a vexatious litigant order.

The court granted summary judgment, dismissing the action because the plaintiff failed to adduce any expert medical evidence to support her claims, which is required in medical malpractice cases.

The court also declared the plaintiff a vexatious litigant under section 140 of the Courts of Justice Act, noting her history of persistently instituting unsuccessful and abandoned proceedings against various healthcare providers without reasonable grounds.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his medical negligence and battery action against a surgeon and hospital defendants.

The Court of Appeal found no genuine issue requiring a trial, noting the appellant gave informed consent to the surgery and failed to provide expert evidence establishing a breach of the standard of care.

The court also held the hospital was not vicariously liable for the surgeon, who was not an employee.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant insurer appealed a motion judge's approval of an infant settlement between the plaintiffs and the individual defendants for the limits of the defendants' insurance policy.

The appellant argued the settlement affected its subrogation rights and that there was insufficient evidence regarding the defendants' assets.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the merits, finding the motion judge properly exercised his discretion based on the evidence.

However, the court allowed the appeal regarding costs, holding that the appellant should only be liable for the additional costs caused by its objections, not the entire costs of the motion to approve the infant settlement.

The plaintiff was injured by a crank while attempting to connect his transport truck to a tomato wagon owned by the defendant in a farmer's field.

The defendant appealed a motion judge's finding that the tomato wagon was not an 'automobile' under s. 267.1(1) of the Insurance Act, which would have precluded the plaintiff's action for damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that because the tomato wagon was not being operated on a public highway at the time of the accident, it was not required to be insured under the Compulsory Automobile Insurance Act, and therefore did not fall within the expanded definition of 'automobile' in the Insurance Act.