Susan Bridget Keenan

The applicant, Valero Energy Inc., brought a motion in its application for judicial review seeking an order to compel the respondents to produce a further record of proceedings, including internal Cabinet and Ministerial documents.

The underlying application challenges a regulation imposing domestic renewable content requirements for fuels.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the Judicial Review Procedure Act does not require a record of proceedings for a challenge to a regulation, as making a regulation is not a 'statutory power of decision'.

The court declined to exercise its inherent jurisdiction to order production, noting that judicial review of a regulation is a limited exercise in statutory interpretation and does not afford a right to documentary discovery.

Following the allowance of the appeal, the Court of Appeal requested submissions on costs for the motion, which had not been addressed at the hearing.

The parties reached an agreement on costs.

The court ordered the plaintiffs to pay the appellant $4,000 all-inclusive, in accordance with the parties' agreement.

The plaintiffs brought a constitutional challenge against provisions of the Insurance Act, alleging the Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) lacked adjudicative independence.

They obtained a motion judge's order under Rule 30.10 requiring the LAT to produce hundreds of internal records.

The LAT appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred in her application of Rule 30.10.

The records were not relevant to a material issue because adjudicative independence in a specific case does not impact the constitutional validity of the tribunal's jurisdiction under s. 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867, nor does it engage s. 7 or s. 15 of the Charter.

The Court also clarified that deliberative secrecy applies to administrative tribunals to the same extent as courts.

The appellant, an independent health facility operator, appealed a decision of the Health Services Appeal and Review Board upholding the Minister of Health's order to repay nearly $300,000 in facility fees for limited pelvic ultrasounds.

The Board found the appellant improperly billed for these ultrasounds because they were not requested by a referring physician or radiologist and their medical necessity was not adequately documented.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board correctly determined its hearing was de novo, the process was procedurally fair, and the appellant failed to meet the statutory documentation requirements for reimbursement.

In a constitutional compliance review arising from Robinson-Superior Treaty augmentation litigation, the moving parties challenged both the Crown's engagement process and the compensation amount set after negotiations failed.

The court held that although aspects of engagement, including late disclosure of reliance on per-capita benchmarking against a related treaty settlement, caused serious relational harm, the reviewing role required deference to a range of honourable discretionary outcomes.

Applying a sui generis review framework grounded in honour of the Crown and reconciliatory justice, the court concluded the Crown's ultimate compensation determination of $3.6 billion plus agreed costs was justified in the legal and factual context.

The court therefore declined to intervene in the compensation decision while also addressing allocation issues between federal and provincial Crown responsibility in the reasons.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal the decision of the lower court judge.

The Divisional Court granted the motion for leave to appeal, with costs reserved to the panel hearing the appeal.

The moving parties brought motions to quash part of an application for judicial review for lack of jurisdiction and to strike out certain expert evidence.

The underlying application challenged a decision by the Minister of Natural Resources regarding the Abitibi River Water Management Plan and sought a declaration that the Lakes and Rivers Improvement Act regime is unconstitutional for failing to trigger the duty to consult.

The Divisional Court held that it lacked jurisdiction under the Judicial Review Procedure Act to hear the broad constitutional challenge and transferred that portion of the application to the Superior Court.

The motion to strike evidence was adjourned to the panel hearing the judicial review.

The applicants sought judicial review to quash O. Reg. 382/19, which amended transitional rules for planning appeals before the Ontario Land Tribunal, arguing it was ultra vires its enabling statute.

The regulation reimposed a more restrictive procedural regime on third-party appeals of municipal planning decisions.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Attorney General had broad, express statutory authority under s. 43.1 of the Local Planning Appeal Tribunal Act, 2017 to make the transitional regulation.

The court held the regulation was consistent with the enabling statute and did not improperly deprive the applicants of vested substantive rights.

The court also declined to address procedural fairness issues, finding them premature as they should be raised in the applicants' pending motion for leave to appeal.

The applicants sought judicial review of the Solicitor General's decision to build a new correctional facility in Kemptville, alleging violations of the Planning Act.

The respondents brought a motion to dismiss the application for delay, as it was commenced almost two years after the decision was announced, well beyond the 30-day limitation period under the Judicial Review Procedure Act.

The Divisional Court granted the motion and dismissed the application, finding that the applicants had sufficient information to commence proceedings much earlier but chose to pursue political avenues instead.

The court also found that the government suffered substantial prejudice due to the delay, having spent millions of dollars and two years of effort on the project.

The applicants brought a motion to compel the Ministry of the Solicitor General to add several categories of documents to the Record of Proceeding in an application for judicial review.

The underlying application challenges the decision to build a new correctional facility on a site in Kemptville, alleging violations of the Planning Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the applicants were seeking impermissible documentary discovery and that the requested documents related to core policy decisions regarding site selection, rather than the justiciable legal issue of whether the decision violated the Planning Act.

The Regional Municipality of York brought an application for judicial review seeking mandamus after the Minister failed for several years to make a decision on its environmental assessment for a wastewater project.

After the application was commenced, the Ontario legislature passed legislation that effectively repealed the requirement for a decision and mandated a different wastewater solution, rendering the application moot.

The Divisional Court declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot constitutional and administrative law issues.

However, due to the government's 'reprehensible' delay and 'egregious' conduct in covertly passing legislation to bypass the environmental assessment process, the court relieved the applicant from a prior agreement to waive costs and awarded the applicant its costs on a full indemnity basis.

The respondents (moving parties) brought a motion to dismiss the applicants' application for judicial review of a decision to build a correctional facility in Kemptville, arguing the application was filed beyond the 30-day limitation period under the Judicial Review Procedure Act.

The applicants opposed the motion and sought an extension of time, arguing the decision was only communicated via a press release and town hall meeting without formal reasons.

The court found it was not plain and obvious that the application should be dismissed for delay, noting the unique circumstances, lack of formal reasons, and potential non-compliance with the Provincial Policy Statement regarding agricultural land.

The motion to dismiss was adjourned to be heard by a full panel of the Divisional Court.

The Attorney General of Ontario sought the forfeiture of $270,313 as proceeds of crime under the Civil Remedies Act, 2001, following a police seizure during an investigation into an illegal gambling operation.

The money was found in the bedroom of Dimitri Kellesis, who contended it comprised his parents' life savings and his legitimate earnings.

The court found Kellesis's explanation for his presence at the gambling location and the source of most of the funds not credible.

However, it accepted that $75,000 of the seized amount represented legitimate savings belonging to his mother.

The court also ruled that police opinion evidence, without expert qualification, was inadmissible for proving proceeds of crime on a balance of probabilities.

The application for forfeiture was allowed in part, with the non-Canadian currency returned to Kellesis and $75,000 returned to his mother, while the remaining funds were forfeited.

The moving party defendants in a proposed class proceeding related to the 'Freedom Convoy' sought access to $200,000 of frozen escrow funds to retain counsel.

The funds were originally frozen by a Mareva injunction and a criminal restraint order, and were raised through crowdfunding platforms to support convoy participants.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the funds were not the personal assets of the defendants and that the moving parties failed to provide full and frank financial disclosure to demonstrate impecuniosity or an inability to defend the action without access to the frozen funds.

The Attorney General of Ontario brought a motion to approve a settlement under s. 18.1 of the Civil Remedies Act regarding $195,110 in seized currency.

The currency was seized from a safe during a drug trafficking investigation.

The parties agreed to a settlement where $39,022 would be paid to the respondent's mother, and the remainder forfeited to the Crown.

The court found the currency was likely the proceeds of unlawful activity and approved the settlement as a reasonable compromise in the interests of justice.

The proposed intervenor, WIFN, brought a motion for leave to intervene as a party in an application between HDI and Ontario.

WIFN sought to intervene to contest HDI's claimed rights under the Nanfan Treaty, arguing that any court acknowledgment of such rights could prejudice WIFN's interests in future proceedings.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that WIFN had no interest in the substantive outcome of the procedural application and that adding WIFN would substantially delay and broaden the scope of the proceedings.

The court noted that WIFN's concerns were mitigated by HDI's voluntary amendment of its notice of application.

This endorsement addresses multiple motions related to a Mareva injunction in a class proceeding concerning the 'Freedom Convoy' funds.

The court extended the Mareva injunction with modifications, adjourned motions to dissolve the injunction and amend the statement of claim, and granted a Toronto Dominion Bank interpleader motion to transfer funds to an escrow agent.

The decision also clarified the interplay between the civil Mareva injunction and criminal restraint orders, and addressed issues concerning cryptocurrency seized by police and funds held by a third-party fundraising platform, GiveSendGo LLC.

The court emphasized the importance of keeping separate proceedings distinct while managing related matters.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a decision of the Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs Appeal Tribunal, which found it had no jurisdiction to consider his appeal regarding the classification of his property in the Farm Property Class.

The Divisional Court denied leave to appeal, finding that the moving party failed to follow the mandatory statutory procedure of requesting a reconsideration from the Administrator before appealing.

The court concluded there was no reason to doubt the legal correctness of the Tribunal's decision.

The applicant sought payment for mileage expenses incurred by her service providers who travelled to her home for treatment sessions.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal found that the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule, the Professional Services Guideline, and the Transportation Expense Guideline do not provide for the reimbursement of a service provider's mileage expenses.

The application was dismissed.

The Insurer, having been wholly successful at arbitration and on appeal regarding the Applicant's claims for statutory accident benefits, sought its expenses of the proceeding.

The Insurer claimed over $36,000 in legal fees and disbursements.

The Arbitrator reviewed the criteria under the FSCO Dispute Resolution Practice Code and found that while the dispute was legitimate, the Insurer was entitled to its reasonable expenses.

After reducing excessive claims for photocopies and expert witness fees, the Arbitrator fixed the expenses payable by the Applicant to the Insurer at $10,000.00, inclusive of fees, disbursements, and taxes.