Brodie Michael White Noga

In a constitutional compliance review arising from Robinson-Superior Treaty augmentation litigation, the moving parties challenged both the Crown's engagement process and the compensation amount set after negotiations failed.

The court held that although aspects of engagement, including late disclosure of reliance on per-capita benchmarking against a related treaty settlement, caused serious relational harm, the reviewing role required deference to a range of honourable discretionary outcomes.

Applying a sui generis review framework grounded in honour of the Crown and reconciliatory justice, the court concluded the Crown's ultimate compensation determination of $3.6 billion plus agreed costs was justified in the legal and factual context.

The court therefore declined to intervene in the compensation decision while also addressing allocation issues between federal and provincial Crown responsibility in the reasons.

This appeal concerned a property dispute between neighbours over a two-foot wide strip of land.

The application judge had declared a prescriptive easement over a driveway portion and ownership by adverse possession over a backyard portion in favour of the respondents (original applicants).

The Court of Appeal found that the application judge made palpable and overriding errors.

Specifically, the court determined that the alleged prescriptive easement over the driveway was not "reasonably necessary" for the better enjoyment of the dominant tenement, but rather a personal convenience.

For the adverse possession claim, the court found the application judge misapprehended evidence regarding the true owner's exclusion from the backyard portion.

The appeal was allowed, setting aside the lower court's judgment and declaring the appellants' title unencumbered.

This is an appeal concerning an insurance claim for recoverable depreciation following a fire that destroyed a commercial building.

The insured, Champion, and insurer, Intact, had a settlement agreement with a 24-month replacement deadline and an automatic forfeiture clause for recoverable depreciation if not met.

A subsequent agreement conditionally waived this deadline, contingent on Champion closing a specific property purchase.

Champion failed to close that purchase and sought to substitute another property.

The motion judge found Intact had waived Champion's failure to close and granted summary judgment.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that forfeiture was automatic and Intact was not required to give notice.

The Court found Intact did not waive Champion's default and dismissed Champion's cross-appeal for relief from forfeiture or damages, as Champion had not completed replacement.

A teenage plaintiff was catastrophically injured when she deliberately jumped from a moving school bus on the last day of Grade 8 as part of an informal tradition among graduating students.

The bus operator had received prior reports of students jumping from buses but failed to report these incidents to the school as required by its own handbook.

A jury found the defendant 75 per cent liable and the plaintiff 25 per cent contributorily negligent, awarding substantial damages.

The defendant appealed on grounds of improper jury charge regarding causation and contributory negligence, erroneous removal of the mitigation issue from the jury, and failure to deduct statutory accident benefits.

The Court of Appeal upheld the jury verdict on causation and contributory negligence, found the trial judge erred in removing mitigation from the jury but determined no miscarriage of justice resulted, and remitted the statutory accident benefits deduction issue to the Superior Court for determination.

Appeal from a motion judge's decision ordering release of a cryopreserved in vitro embryo to the respondent ex-wife for her reproductive use.

The motion judge applied contract and property law principles to conclude the embryo should be released based on the parties' prior contractual agreement.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Assisted Human Reproduction Act and its regulations establish a consent-based model, not a contract-based model.

The parties remain "donors" under the regulations despite divorce, and the appellant retained the right to withdraw his consent under section 14(3) of the Consent Regulations.

The court found that consent cannot be frozen in time and that the statutory protections cannot be contracted away.