Kevin Andrew McGivney

This five-judge appeal reconsidered the common law governing non-disclosure of partial settlement agreements in multi-party civil litigation.

The court held that the prior rule mandating an automatic finding of abuse of process and an automatic stay, without proof of prejudice or regard to proportionality, was wrongly decided and should be overruled.

The proper approach requires a contextual and discretionary abuse of process analysis focused on unfairness, prejudice, oppression, harm to the administration of justice, and a proportionate remedy, with r. 49.14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure reinforcing that framework.

Applying that approach, the court allowed two appeals and remitted those matters, while dismissing two others where the record was sufficient to determine the result.

The plaintiffs sought to certify a class action against the Toronto Police Services Board and several Chiefs of Police regarding the practice of 'carding' or street checks.

The plaintiffs alleged that the practice disproportionately targeted Black and Indigenous individuals, violating their Charter rights and constituting systemic negligence and intrusion upon seclusion.

The court found that the plaintiffs met all the criteria for certification under section 5(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, including establishing a valid cause of action, an identifiable class, common issues, preferable procedure, and suitable representative plaintiffs.

The motion for certification was granted.

The appellant, a former police officer, was investigated for corruption and bribery.

Police obtained a wiretap authorization based on an affidavit that deliberately misdescribed a police agent as a confidential informant.

The appellant was charged criminally based on intercepted communications, but the charges were eventually withdrawn by the Crown due to anticipated Charter breaches regarding the wiretap.

The appellant then sued the investigators and police board for malicious prosecution, negligent investigation, and other civil wrongs.

The trial judge dismissed the action, admitting the wiretap evidence and finding that the police had reasonable and probable grounds to lay the charges.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the wiretap evidence was properly admitted in the civil trial to establish the truth of the grounds for the charges, and that the trial judge made no error in finding that the investigators had both subjective and objective reasonable and probable grounds.

The respondent, a retired teacher, commenced a defamation action against the school board and its chair after the chair stopped her presentation at a public meeting and subsequently made media statements characterizing her comments as transphobic and questioning the right of trans people to exist.

The appellants brought an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the action.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, allowing the defamation claim to proceed.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that while the motion judge erred in his weighing analysis by failing to consider the public interest in the appellants' speech, a fresh weighing demonstrated that the harm suffered by the respondent outweighed the public interest in the chair's speech, which had mischaracterized her actual remarks.

The appeal was dismissed.

The defendants brought a motion to dismiss a class action for delay pursuant to section 29.1(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

The plaintiff had issued a Notice of Action in September 2020 and a Statement of Claim in October 2020, serving it in March 2021.

However, since serving the Statement of Claim, the plaintiff's counsel had taken no steps to advance the action, nor had they communicated with the defendants' counsel or responded to the dismissal motion.

The court found that none of the statutory requirements for advancing the proceeding (such as filing a certification record or agreeing to a timetable) had been met by the first anniversary of the proceeding's commencement.

Consequently, the court dismissed the action for delay, also dispensing with the requirement for public notice of dismissal due to the existence of a parallel class action with similar claims.

The Corporation of the City of Kawartha Lakes moved to stay or dismiss the action against it, alleging abuse of process due to the plaintiffs' delayed disclosure of a cooperation agreement with co-defendants.

The plaintiffs concurrently moved for court approval of this agreement.

The court examined the disclosure obligations for partial settlement agreements that alter the litigation landscape.

It found that while immediate disclosure is generally required, the moving party had sufficient prior knowledge of the agreement's essential terms to avoid "litigation by ambush." Consequently, the motion to stay was dismissed, and the plaintiffs' motion to approve the cooperation agreement was granted.

A separate consent motion to dismiss the action against The Dominion of Canada General Insurance Company and John Doe was also granted.

The applicant, a school board trustee, sought judicial review of the school board's decision finding he breached its Code of Conduct and imposing sanctions.

The applicant argued he was denied procedural fairness due to in camera meetings and alleged bias of the Chair, and that the decision unreasonably infringed his freedom of expression.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the applicant was afforded adequate procedural fairness, the in camera meetings were statutorily permitted due to related litigation, and the board reasonably balanced the applicant's Charter rights with its statutory obligations.

The applicant sought judicial review of a school board's decision to stop her presentation at a public meeting.

The applicant had been approved to speak about transparency in a library review process but digressed to critique specific books discussing gender identity.

The chair stopped her presentation on the basis that it could violate human rights legislation and board policies.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the board's decision was reasonable, did not breach procedural fairness, and did not raise a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court held that the board reasonably balanced the applicant's freedom of expression with its statutory objectives and policies regarding equity and inclusion.

The plaintiff, a retired teacher, brought an action for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional suffering against a school board and its chairman after she was stopped from presenting at a board meeting and the chairman subsequently made public comments characterizing her presentation as transphobic and hateful.

The defendants brought an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the action.

The court dismissed the motion regarding the defamation claim, finding it had substantial merit, there were no valid defences, and the harm to the plaintiff outweighed the public interest in protecting the chairman's expression.

The claim for intentional infliction of mental suffering was dismissed.

The appellants, a newspaper publisher and his company, appealed the dismissal of their defamation and other tort claims against city councillors, school trustees, and media entities under Ontario's anti-SLAPP legislation (s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act).

The appellants had published articles critical of the Toronto Catholic District School Board's LGBTQ2S+ policies, using derogatory language.

The respondents, in turn, took action to have the City of Toronto cease advertising in the appellants' newspaper, alleging the articles promoted homophobia and transphobia.

The motion judge dismissed the action, finding the respondents' expressions related to a matter of public interest and that the appellants failed to show their claims had substantial merit or that the respondents had no valid defence (specifically, fair comment).

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, agreeing that the fair comment defence was viable, and that the appellants' constitutional arguments regarding freedom of expression and religious protection were without merit.

The appeal on costs was also dismissed.

The plaintiff, a former Toronto police officer, sued the defendants for malicious prosecution, negligent investigation, misfeasance in public office, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and Charter breaches following his arrest and prosecution for corruption and other offences.

The criminal charges were ultimately stayed or withdrawn.

The court dismissed the action, finding that the plaintiff failed to prove the absence of reasonable and probable grounds for the charges, which was fatal to the malicious prosecution and negligent investigation claims.

The court also found no evidence of malice, deliberate unlawful conduct intended to harm, or conduct calculated to cause mental suffering.

The claim for Charter damages was also dismissed.

The plaintiff, a nightclub operator, brought an action against the City of Toronto and a city councillor for misfeasance in public office, abuse of public office, unlawful interference with economic relations, and conspiracy to defame and injure.

The plaintiff alleged the defendants conspired with the Toronto Police Service to target the nightclub with searches and inspections to force its closure.

The court dismissed the action, finding no evidence of a conspiracy, bad faith, or unlawful conduct by the defendants.

The court held that the city councillor's statements were protected by qualified privilege and statutory immunity, and that the City was not liable for the actions of the police.

Following the successful dismissal of the plaintiffs' defamation action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act, the moving party defendants sought their costs.

The plaintiffs argued that the court should apply the appropriateness exception under s. 137.1(7) to award partial indemnity costs instead of the presumptive full indemnity costs.

The court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments, finding no basis to depart from the full indemnity presumption, and awarded the defendants their costs on a full indemnity basis (and substantial indemnity for one defendant on a pro bono retainer), totaling over $383,000.

The plaintiffs, a newspaper publisher and his company, brought an action for defamation, misfeasance in public office, inducing breach of contract, and wrongful interference with economic relations against several city councillors, school board trustees, and a media company.

The action arose from statements made by the defendants criticizing articles published by the plaintiffs as homophobic and transphobic, and advocating for the cessation of city advertising in the plaintiffs' newspaper.

The defendants brought motions under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the action as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP).

The court granted the motions, finding that the defendants' expressions related to matters of public interest.

While the defamation claim had substantial merit, the plaintiffs failed to establish that the other claims had merit, and failed to show that the defendants had no valid defences, including fair comment, qualified privilege, and responsible communication.

Furthermore, the court found that the public interest in protecting the defendants' expression outweighed any harm suffered by the plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs appealed case conference orders directing that the defendants' liability be determined by summary judgment motions involving viva voce cross-examination of five expert witnesses.

The Divisional Court held that while a case conference judge has jurisdiction to make orders involving powers under Rule 20.04, such jurisdiction should be exercised sparingly.

The court found the case conference judge erred in principle by making the orders without an evidentiary record and by inverting the proper analysis.

The appeal was allowed, the orders were set aside, and the liability case against the Eaton Centre defendants was directed to proceed to trial.

The representative plaintiffs in two class actions against the Toronto Police Services Board for wrongful arrest and detention during the 2010 G20 Summit sought court approval for a proposed settlement and class counsel fees.

The settlement included up to $16.5 million in financial compensation, a public acknowledgement of wrongdoing, commitments to reform policing of public demonstrations, and expungement of arrest records.

The court found the settlement to be fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class, noting the significant non-monetary components and the risks of proceeding to trial.

The court also approved class counsel's legal fees, which amounted to approximately 28 percent of the recovery, as fair and reasonable.

Following a successful appeal where the appellant was awarded $500 in Charter damages, the parties made written submissions on costs for the proceeding below.

The appellant sought substantial indemnity costs, arguing his action was public interest litigation.

The court rejected this argument, finding the action did not meet the criteria in Carter.

However, the court found that applying the strict costs consequences of Rule 49.10(2) would result in the successful appellant paying costs to the respondent, which would be a harsh result for enforcing constitutional rights.

The court departed from the rule in the interests of justice and awarded the appellant $25,000 in costs.

The appellant challenged the Toronto Police Services' (TPS) authority to impose bag searches as a condition of entry into Allan Gardens during the 2010 G20 summit, alleging tortious conduct and Charter breaches.

The Court of Appeal found that the TPS lacked legal authority, as agents of the City under the Trespass to Property Act, to create such a condition.

The court held that the police conduct infringed the appellant's freedom of expression (s. 2(b)), right against arbitrary detention (s. 9), and right against unreasonable search and seizure (s. 8) under the Charter.

The appeal was allowed, and the appellant was awarded modest Charter damages.

The plaintiffs brought an action for negligent investigation and defamation against various police defendants following a search warrant execution and a press conference.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the action.

The court upheld the search warrant, finding ample evidence for its issuance, thereby dismissing the negligent investigation claim.

The court also dismissed the defamation claim, concluding that the statements made at the press conference were not defamatory in context, were substantially true (justification), and were protected by qualified privilege.

A claim for negligent misstatement was also dismissed as a "dressed up" defamation claim.

Police officers sued Crown Attorneys for negligent legal advice provided during a "Mr. Big" undercover investigation that led to the plaintiff's arrest and eventual acquittal.

The police crossclaimed against the Crown Attorneys for contribution and indemnity.

The Court of Appeal held that prosecutorial immunity barred the crossclaim and that Crown Attorneys do not owe a duty of care to police in respect of legal advice provided.

The court emphasized the separate and independent roles of police and Crown Attorneys in the administration of justice and rejected arguments that immunity should not apply to pre-charge conduct or claims by police.