Kevin Andrew McGivney

The defendants brought a motion to dismiss a class action for delay pursuant to section 29.1(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

The plaintiff had issued a Notice of Action in September 2020 and a Statement of Claim in October 2020, serving it in March 2021.

However, since serving the Statement of Claim, the plaintiff's counsel had taken no steps to advance the action, nor had they communicated with the defendants' counsel or responded to the dismissal motion.

The court found that none of the statutory requirements for advancing the proceeding (such as filing a certification record or agreeing to a timetable) had been met by the first anniversary of the proceeding's commencement.

Consequently, the court dismissed the action for delay, also dispensing with the requirement for public notice of dismissal due to the existence of a parallel class action with similar claims.

The Corporation of the City of Kawartha Lakes moved to stay or dismiss the action against it, alleging abuse of process due to the plaintiffs' delayed disclosure of a cooperation agreement with co-defendants.

The plaintiffs concurrently moved for court approval of this agreement.

The court examined the disclosure obligations for partial settlement agreements that alter the litigation landscape.

It found that while immediate disclosure is generally required, the moving party had sufficient prior knowledge of the agreement's essential terms to avoid "litigation by ambush." Consequently, the motion to stay was dismissed, and the plaintiffs' motion to approve the cooperation agreement was granted.

A separate consent motion to dismiss the action against The Dominion of Canada General Insurance Company and John Doe was also granted.

The appellants, a newspaper publisher and his company, appealed the dismissal of their defamation and other tort claims against city councillors, school trustees, and media entities under Ontario's anti-SLAPP legislation (s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act).

The appellants had published articles critical of the Toronto Catholic District School Board's LGBTQ2S+ policies, using derogatory language.

The respondents, in turn, took action to have the City of Toronto cease advertising in the appellants' newspaper, alleging the articles promoted homophobia and transphobia.

The motion judge dismissed the action, finding the respondents' expressions related to a matter of public interest and that the appellants failed to show their claims had substantial merit or that the respondents had no valid defence (specifically, fair comment).

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, agreeing that the fair comment defence was viable, and that the appellants' constitutional arguments regarding freedom of expression and religious protection were without merit.

The appeal on costs was also dismissed.

The appellant challenged the Toronto Police Services' (TPS) authority to impose bag searches as a condition of entry into Allan Gardens during the 2010 G20 summit, alleging tortious conduct and Charter breaches.

The Court of Appeal found that the TPS lacked legal authority, as agents of the City under the Trespass to Property Act, to create such a condition.

The court held that the police conduct infringed the appellant's freedom of expression (s. 2(b)), right against arbitrary detention (s. 9), and right against unreasonable search and seizure (s. 8) under the Charter.

The appeal was allowed, and the appellant was awarded modest Charter damages.

The plaintiffs brought an action for negligent investigation and defamation against various police defendants following a search warrant execution and a press conference.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the action.

The court upheld the search warrant, finding ample evidence for its issuance, thereby dismissing the negligent investigation claim.

The court also dismissed the defamation claim, concluding that the statements made at the press conference were not defamatory in context, were substantially true (justification), and were protected by qualified privilege.

A claim for negligent misstatement was also dismissed as a "dressed up" defamation claim.

Police officers sued Crown Attorneys for negligent legal advice provided during a "Mr. Big" undercover investigation that led to the plaintiff's arrest and eventual acquittal.

The police crossclaimed against the Crown Attorneys for contribution and indemnity.

The Court of Appeal held that prosecutorial immunity barred the crossclaim and that Crown Attorneys do not owe a duty of care to police in respect of legal advice provided.

The court emphasized the separate and independent roles of police and Crown Attorneys in the administration of justice and rejected arguments that immunity should not apply to pre-charge conduct or claims by police.

The plaintiff, Luke Stewart, sued the Toronto Police Services Board for alleged violations of his Charter rights (freedom of expression and peaceful assembly, arbitrary detention, unreasonable search and seizure) during the 2010 G20 summit.

Stewart was briefly detained and his backpack searched after he breached a police perimeter at Allan Gardens, which had been established with a condition of entry requiring bag inspections for weapons due to security concerns.

The court found that the police acted lawfully and reasonably under the Trespass to Property Act and their common law powers to maintain public safety.

It concluded that Stewart's Charter rights were not infringed, and even if they were, such infringements were reasonable and demonstrably justified in the unique circumstances of the G20 protest demonstrations.

The action was dismissed.

A plaintiff, unsuccessfully prosecuted for murder, sued police investigators and Crown attorneys for various torts.

The motion judge dismissed the plaintiff's claim against the Crown due to prosecutorial immunity and struck a cross-claim for contribution, but allowed a cross-claim for indemnity based on negligent legal advice to proceed.

The Crown defendants sought leave to appeal this decision.

Leave to appeal was granted, as the motion judge failed to adequately consider policy reasons against recognizing a duty of care from Crown attorneys to police, which raised doubts about the correctness of the order.

The plaintiff's action against police defendants, alleging Charter breaches, negligent investigation, falsified evidence, and assault, was dismissed after a lengthy trial where the plaintiff failed to prove any allegations and was found to be an incredible witness.

The defendants, as the successful parties, sought partial indemnity costs.

The court, applying Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, considered the seriousness of the plaintiff's unsubstantiated allegations and his conduct in forcing a lengthy trial.

The court awarded the defendants partial indemnity costs in the amount of $367,704.87, finding the request fair and reasonable.

The defendants brought a motion under Rule 21.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike a statement of claim alleging negligence, breach of s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and misfeasance in public office arising from a drive‑by shooting committed by a third party.

The plaintiffs alleged that police had prior intelligence about the shooter and owed a private law duty of care to protect a narrow class of potential victims.

The court held that the pleadings did not establish a special relationship of proximity between the police and the victim sufficient to create a private law duty of care, distinguishing the case from Doe v. Metropolitan Toronto Commissioners of Police.

The Charter claim failed because the Charter does not impose a positive obligation on police to prevent harm, and the pleadings did not establish the elements of misfeasance in public office.

The Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim was struck with leave to amend.

Following the dismissal of a motion to certify a class proceeding related to policing during the G20 Summit, the court determined the costs payable to a successful defendant.

The plaintiff argued that no costs should be ordered because the case raised novel legal issues and matters of public interest.

The court held that although the action involved issues of public interest, the certification motion was seriously flawed and the novelty argument was unfounded.

Applying the governing principles for class proceeding costs and considering comparable certification cost awards, the court concluded that a reduced costs award was appropriate.

Costs were fixed at $200,000 in fees plus disbursements and applicable taxes, payable by the plaintiff and indemnified by the Class Proceedings Fund.