Kevin Andrew McGivney

The defendants appealed a motion judge's decision refusing to strike the plaintiffs' claim for breach of informant privilege under Rule 21.

The defendants argued the claim was barred by absolute privilege, which protects statements made in the course of judicial proceedings.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the law is unsettled and it is not plain and obvious that a claim for breach of informant privilege cannot form an exception to absolute privilege.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's action for alleged Charter breaches, the parties made written submissions on costs.

The plaintiff argued for no costs on the basis that the case was pursued in the public interest.

The defendant sought a modest costs award, noting the plaintiff's decision to traverse the action from Small Claims Court to the Superior Court and his rejection of two Rule 49 offers to settle.

The court awarded the defendant $25,000 in costs, inclusive of HST and disbursements, taking into account the early offers to settle and the plaintiff's assumption of risk.

The plaintiff, Luke Stewart, sued the Toronto Police Services Board for alleged violations of his Charter rights (freedom of expression and peaceful assembly, arbitrary detention, unreasonable search and seizure) during the 2010 G20 summit.

Stewart was briefly detained and his backpack searched after he breached a police perimeter at Allan Gardens, which had been established with a condition of entry requiring bag inspections for weapons due to security concerns.

The court found that the police acted lawfully and reasonably under the Trespass to Property Act and their common law powers to maintain public safety.

It concluded that Stewart's Charter rights were not infringed, and even if they were, such infringements were reasonable and demonstrably justified in the unique circumstances of the G20 protest demonstrations.

The action was dismissed.

The plaintiff was acquitted of murder following a 'Mr. Big' sting and sued the police for negligent investigation, as well as the Crown attorneys who provided legal advice to the police.

The police defendants cross-claimed against the Crown attorneys for contribution and indemnity based on negligent legal advice.

The Crown attorneys moved to strike the cross-claim under Rule 21.

The motion judge declined to strike the cross-claim, finding it was not plain and obvious that prosecutorial immunity applied to claims by police.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and struck the cross-claim, holding that Crown attorneys enjoy absolute immunity from civil suits in negligence arising from the exercise of their official functions, including providing legal advice to police during an investigation.

A plaintiff, unsuccessfully prosecuted for murder, sued police investigators and Crown attorneys for various torts.

The motion judge dismissed the plaintiff's claim against the Crown due to prosecutorial immunity and struck a cross-claim for contribution, but allowed a cross-claim for indemnity based on negligent legal advice to proceed.

The Crown defendants sought leave to appeal this decision.

Leave to appeal was granted, as the motion judge failed to adequately consider policy reasons against recognizing a duty of care from Crown attorneys to police, which raised doubts about the correctness of the order.

The plaintiff's action against police defendants, alleging Charter breaches, negligent investigation, falsified evidence, and assault, was dismissed after a lengthy trial where the plaintiff failed to prove any allegations and was found to be an incredible witness.

The defendants, as the successful parties, sought partial indemnity costs.

The court, applying Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, considered the seriousness of the plaintiff's unsubstantiated allegations and his conduct in forcing a lengthy trial.

The court awarded the defendants partial indemnity costs in the amount of $367,704.87, finding the request fair and reasonable.

The plaintiff sued the police and Crown Attorneys for negligent investigation, unlawful arrest, and intentional infliction of mental suffering following an acquittal on a murder charge that involved a 'Mr. Big' operation.

The Crown Attorneys moved to strike the plaintiff's claim and a crossclaim brought by the police for negligent legal advice.

The court struck the plaintiff's claim against the Crown Attorneys, finding it barred by absolute common law immunity, which only allows claims for malicious prosecution.

However, the court refused to strike the police crossclaim for negligent legal advice, finding it was not plain and obvious that Crown Attorneys do not owe a duty of care to police when providing legal advice during an investigation.

The court also held that statutory immunity under s. 8 of the Ministry of the Attorney General Act applied to the plaintiff's claim but not the crossclaim.

The plaintiff sued the police for negligent investigation, assault and battery, misfeasance of public office, and conversion of property following his arrest on drug trafficking charges that were later stayed.

The plaintiff alleged the police relied on fabricated information to obtain wiretap authorizations and used excessive force during his arrest, causing severe injuries including deep vein thrombosis.

The court dismissed the action in its entirety, finding the wiretap authorizations were validly issued based on reasonable grounds and the police did not breach their duty of care.

The court also rejected the plaintiff's claims of excessive force, finding his injuries were minor, his testimony lacked credibility, and his severe medical issues were pre-existing.

The plaintiffs sued the police for negligence after the plaintiff was severely injured in a drive-by shooting, alleging the police knew he was a likely target but failed to warn him or arrest the known shooter.

The defendants appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing their motion to strike the claim.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the amended statement of claim pleaded sufficient material facts to establish a relationship of proximity analogous to the recognized duty of care in Jane Doe, and it was not plain and obvious that the claim would fail.

The plaintiff brought a proposed class action against the Toronto Police Services Board for mass detentions and arrests during the 2010 G20 summit.

After the motion judge dismissed the certification motion, the plaintiff narrowed her claims on appeal.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and certified two separate class actions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the defendant's appeal, upholding the certification of the location-based subclasses and the detention centre class, finding that the narrowed claims met the certification criteria under the Class Proceedings Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the plaintiff's cross-appeal on costs, increasing the costs award for the certification motion to $315,000 to reflect the legislative goal of access to justice.

The defendants sought leave to appeal an order dismissing their motion to strike the plaintiffs' statement of claim.

The plaintiffs sued the police for negligence, Charter breaches, and public misfeasance after being victims of a drive-by shooting, alleging the police failed to arrest the known shooter.

The court granted leave to appeal, finding conflicting decisions between two judges on similar pleadings and reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's novel approach to determining police liability.

Following a successful motion by the defendants to strike out the plaintiffs' statement of claim, the defendants sought partial indemnity costs of $15,419.95.

The plaintiffs argued there should be no order as to costs because the defendants had refused to mediate and the case was a matter of public interest.

The court rejected these arguments, finding no reason to depart from the normal rule that costs follow the event, and awarded the defendants their requested costs payable in any event of the cause.

During the 2010 G20 summit in Toronto, the appellant and his friends were walking down a public street intending to demonstrate in support of animal rights.

They were stopped by police officers who demanded to search their bags as a condition of proceeding further.

The appellant refused and was grabbed and pushed by an officer.

The Court of Appeal held that the police conduct was not authorized by the common law ancillary powers doctrine, as it was not reasonably necessary to preserve the peace.

The court found that the police violated the appellant's common law right to travel unimpeded and his freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter.

The court also held that the officer committed the tort of battery, as he lacked lawful authority and the contact was unnecessary.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing her action against the police for negligent investigation.

The appellant alleged the police negligently failed to send a needle for communicable disease testing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis for a negligence claim because uncontroverted evidence showed that testing the needle was impossible or unreliable, meaning no damages flowed from the failure to test.

Police officer plaintiffs commenced a civil action alleging negligence, defamation, malicious investigation, racial discrimination, and abuse of process arising from internal discipline proceedings under the Police Services Act following a public complaint.

The defendants moved to strike the claim on the basis that the dispute fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the labour relations regime governing police discipline and grievance arbitration.

Applying the principles from Weber v. Ontario Hydro and subsequent jurisprudence, the court held that the essential character of the dispute concerned workplace discipline governed by the collective agreement and the Police Services Act, thereby ousting the court’s jurisdiction.

However, the court held it was possible that a properly pleaded claim for misfeasance in public office could fall outside the labour relations scheme if it alleged intentional abuse of public authority.

The statement of claim was struck against most defendants with leave granted to amend solely to plead misfeasance in public office.

The applicant sought declarations that police actions during the 2010 G20 summit violated his Charter rights to liberty, freedom of expression, and peaceful assembly, and alleged battery by an officer after he refused to permit a search of his backpack near the G20 security perimeter.

Police prevented him from proceeding southbound toward the summit site unless he permitted a search.

The court held that the police conduct was authorized under common law ancillary police powers and the Police Services Act duty to preserve the peace, given the heightened security context following violent riots the previous day.

Applying the Waterfield test and Supreme Court jurisprudence on investigative detention and security measures, the court found the interference with liberty minimal and justified.

The application was dismissed and the battery claim rejected as de minimis and protected under statutory authority.

Following a successful motion by the plaintiffs for non-party production of investigative materials from the Special Investigations Unit under Rule 30.10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court addressed costs.

Although the plaintiffs obtained the production order, the court declined to award costs.

The court held that the SIU reasonably opposed the motion given its public policy mandate, confidentiality assurances to witnesses, and status as a non-party to the litigation.

The evidence and submissions from the SIU assisted the court in determining whether the exceptional remedy of non-party production should be granted.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing a civil claim alleging negligent police investigation and failure to test the contents of a needle that punctured the plaintiff while she was working at a women’s shelter.

The plaintiff alleged the police negligently failed to lay criminal charges and failed to arrange testing of the needle’s blood contents, causing prolonged anxiety about possible infection with communicable diseases.

The court held there was no genuine issue requiring a trial and applied the summary judgment framework articulated in Hryniak v. Mauldin.

The evidence demonstrated the police had consulted Crown attorneys who advised there were no reasonable grounds to prosecute, and the police had no authority under the Mandatory Blood Testing Act, 2006 to compel testing.

Any failure to obtain testing was attributable to the plaintiff’s own inaction rather than negligence by the defendants.

The applicant filed a police misconduct complaint arising from a stop and search during the G20 summit.

The OIPRD investigated and directed the Chief of Police to hold a disciplinary hearing.

Because more than six months had passed, the Chief applied to the Police Services Board for an extension of time.

The Board denied the extension without notifying the applicant, allowing him to make submissions, or providing reasons for its decision.

On judicial review, the Divisional Court quashed the Board's decision, holding that the Board breached its duty of procedural fairness by failing to provide the applicant with notice, an opportunity to be heard, and reasons for its decision.

The defendants brought a motion under Rule 21.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike a statement of claim alleging negligence, breach of s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and misfeasance in public office arising from a drive‑by shooting committed by a third party.

The plaintiffs alleged that police had prior intelligence about the shooter and owed a private law duty of care to protect a narrow class of potential victims.

The court held that the pleadings did not establish a special relationship of proximity between the police and the victim sufficient to create a private law duty of care, distinguishing the case from Doe v. Metropolitan Toronto Commissioners of Police.

The Charter claim failed because the Charter does not impose a positive obligation on police to prevent harm, and the pleadings did not establish the elements of misfeasance in public office.

The Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim was struck with leave to amend.