COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO
Cronk, Gillese and Brown JJ.A.
BETWEEN
Gary David Brown, a.k.a. Gary David Robert Brown,
Station Attendant Emeritus
Plaintiff/Appellant on Appeal
and
Lloyd’s of London Insurance Market and/or its agents for Ontario Granite Global Solutions LP and/or Granite Claims Solutions formerly known as “McLarens Canada” (“Lloyd’s”), Law Society of Upper Canada (“L.S.U.C.”), Lawyers’ Professional Indemnity Company (“Law Pro”), University of Toronto (“U of T”), Toronto Dominion Bank Group (“TD Bank”), City of Toronto (“Toronto”), Canada Post Corporation (“Canpost”), West Neighbourhood House (“WestNH”), Police Association of Ontario (“P.A.O.”), Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario (“Ontario”), Former Landlord of the Plaintiff Mr. A. Esden-Tempski and any and all past and present officers, directors, assigns, agents and, where applicable, such syndicates, partners, practitioners, licensees, etc., therefor and, but without limitation, such successors, heirs and estates of same
Defendants/Respondents on Appeal
Gary David Brown, In Person
R. Lee Akazaki, for the respondent, Granite Global Solutions LP and/or Granite Claims Solutions formerly known as McLarens Canada
George Benchetrit, for the respondent, Lloyd’s of London Insurance Market
Susan M. Sack, for the respondent, the Law Society of Upper Canada
Debra Eveleigh, for the respondent, Lawyers’ Professional Indemnity Company
William M. Pepall and Lucas E. Lung, for the respondent, University of Toronto
Jonathan A. Odumeru, for the respondent, Toronto-Dominion Bank Group
Kevin A. McGivney and Jonathan Chen, for the respondent, City of Toronto
Sebastian Schmoranz and Aaron S. Murray, for the respondent, Canada Post Corporation
Kate Findlay, for the respondent, West Neighbourhood House
Joanna Birenbaum, for the respondent, Police Association of Ontario
Fatema Dada, for the respondent, Her Majesty the Queen in right of Ontario
A. Esden-Tempski, In Person
Heard in writing: March 9, 2015
On motion under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, for consideration of the appeal from the order of Justice Frederick L. Myers of the Superior Court of Justice, dated January 5, 2015.
ENDORSEMENT
1By Notice of Appeal dated February 2, 2015, the appellant, Gary David Brown, a.k.a. Gary David Robert Brown “Station Attendant Emeritus”, appealed from the order of Myers J. of the Superior Court of Justice, dated January 5, 2015, dismissing the appellant’s action under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, as against all defendants except the defendant A. Esden-Tempski, the appellant’s former landlord, on the basis that the action was frivolous and vexatious and “[could not] possibly succeed.”
2On February 18, 2015, the Registrar of this court notified the appellant that his appeal may be stayed or dismissed pursuant to Rule 2.1, on similar grounds. The appellant delivered written submissions responding to the Registrar’s Rule 2.1 notice.
3Under Rule 2.1, this court may stay or dismiss a proceeding that appears on its face to be frivolous or vexatious or otherwise an abuse of the process of the court. Having reviewed the appellant’s submissions and those of the respondent, the Toronto-Dominion Bank, as well as the appellant’s pleading and the motion judge’s reasons, we are satisfied that the appellant’s appeal is frivolous and vexatious or otherwise an abuse of the court’s process and, therefore, that it should be dismissed on the authority of Rule 2.1.
4The motion judge held that: i) the appellant’s statement of claim contains “no intelligible claims” against any of the defendants “except possibly his former landlord [the defendant, A. Esden-Tempski]”; and ii) apart from the claims concerning Mr. Esden-Tempski, the incidents pleaded and the relief sought in relation to them concern the “redesign [of] the social welfare and legal services systems of Ontario”. The motion judge therefore held that “it is self-evident on the face of the claim that it is frivolous and vexatious and cannot possibly succeed as against all of the defendants except, possibly, Mr. Esden-Tempski.”
5Accordingly, the motion judge dismissed the appellant’s action as against all defendants, except Mr. Esden-Tempski, and struck the appellant’s statement of claim in its entirety, with leave to the appellant to deliver an amended statement of claim within 60 days “limited to claiming relief known to law against his former landlord”.
6We agree with the motion judge’s characterization of the appellant’s action and with his assessment of the appellant’s pleading. With the possible exception of the claims sought to be advanced against Mr. Esden-Tempski, the allegations in the appellant’s pleading, to the extent that they are discernable, and the associated relief claimed are either non-justiciable or fail to disclose a reasonable cause of action within the meaning of the Rules.
7In his Notice of Appeal, the appellant advances two grounds of appeal from the motion judge’s order: i) complaints of alleged procedural irregularities, for example, that several defendants, having filed Notices of Intent to Defend the appellant’s action, failed to deliver Statements of Defence or to respond to his offer to settle; and ii) that the motion judge “erred, trivialized or wantonly misquoted” the appellant in his reasons.
8In his written submissions responding to the Registrar’s Rule 2.1 notice in this court, the appellant further alleges that: i) Rule 2.1 should be repealed or revoked; ii) one or more of the defendants may seek to cause him future harm; iii) the appellant is being denied access to justice; and iv) other homeless people in Ontario have endured sufferings similar to those experienced by the appellant.
9None of the matters raised by the appellant in his Notice of Appeal and responding submissions, described above, constitutes a ground of appeal tenable at law from the motion judge’s ruling. The appellant’s complaints either misconstrue the requirements of the Rules, mischaracterize the motion judge’s reasons, or raise speculative and/or bald assertions of past or future alleged injury to himself or others.
10Like the motion judge, we conclude that while one might empathize with some of the appellant’s concerns and suggested experiences, they do not disclose actionable complaints, as pleaded. Nor do they afford a viable ground of appeal from the motion judge’s order.
11In these circumstances, the appellant’s appeal must be dismissed under Rule 2.1. Both the appellant’s underlying action and his proposed appeal are so devoid of potential merit as to be frivolous and vexatious and an abuse of the court’s process on their face, save only with respect to the appellant’s proposed claims against Mr. Esden-Tempski. There can be no reasonable expectation that, should the appeal proceed, the appellant could obtain the relief he seeks.
12For these reasons, this is an appropriate case for invocation of Rule 2.1 in relation to the appellant’s proposed proceeding in this court. The appellant’s appeal is therefore dismissed.
13This is not an appropriate case for any award of costs in relation to this Rule 2.1 motion. The court dispenses with the need for the respondents to seek the appellant’s approval as to the form and content of this court’s order.
“E.A. Cronk J.A.”
“E.E. Gillese J.A.”
“David Brown J.A.”
