Colin Kirk Boggs

The respondent suffered injuries after slipping and falling on ice in a parking lot while reaching for his vehicle's door handle.

He received statutory accident benefits (SABs) after a LAT adjudicator found the incident was an 'accident' under the SABs Schedule.

He subsequently sued the parking lot owner and winter maintenance provider for occupiers' liability.

The appellants moved to determine whether any damages awarded must be reduced by the SABs received under s. 267.8 of the Insurance Act, and whether OHIP's subrogated claim was barred under s. 30(5) of the Health Insurance Act.

The motion judge found the tort claim did not arise directly or indirectly from the use or operation of an automobile, meaning the statutory deductions and subrogation bars did not apply.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's substantive approach or her conclusion that the context and purpose of the LAT proceeding differed from the tort action, precluding abuse of process or issue estoppel.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiffs' action for damages arising from an explosion and fire, the defendants sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The court found that the plaintiffs engaged in egregious and abusive conduct, including advancing unfounded and shifting damages theories, failing to produce relevant documents, and relying on concocted evidence.

The court awarded the defendants costs on a partial indemnity scale up to the date of their reasonable offer to settle, and on a substantial indemnity scale thereafter.

The plaintiffs were also held liable for the costs of the third and fourth parties, as their involvement was a natural and inevitable consequence of the litigation.

Total costs and disbursements were fixed at $2,339,433.08.

The appellants sought to place a political advertisement on City-owned transit shelters defining a woman as an 'adult female'.

The City rejected the advertisement, concluding it posed a tangible risk to its statutory objective of providing a safe and welcoming transit system, particularly for transgender individuals.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appellants' application for judicial review.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the Divisional Court's decision, finding that the City's process was procedurally fair and its decision was reasonable under the Doré/Loyola framework, as it appropriately balanced the appellants' freedom of expression with the City's statutory objectives.

The plaintiffs sought over $16 million in consequential economic losses following a natural gas explosion and fire in the laundry room of their apartment building.

They claimed the explosion caused high vacancy rates, prevented rent increases, and diminished the building's value upon its sale five years later.

The court dismissed the action, finding the plaintiffs failed to prove the hypothetical losses were caused by the explosion rather than their own business decisions, such as a disruptive elevator modernization project.

The court assessed the actual diminution in value and economic loss at $156,631, which was fully offset by $162,457.81 already paid by the plaintiffs' insurer.

The appellants, small and mid-size businesses, appealed a class action decision regarding business interruption insurance claims stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic.

They sought coverage for revenue losses, arguing that the presence of SARS-CoV-2 or civil authority orders constituted "physical loss or damage" to their property under their insurance policies.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that neither the virus's presence nor the civil authority orders met the "physical loss or damage" criteria for business interruption coverage.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondents.

This endorsement addresses three motions in a long-standing negligence action stemming from a 2010 explosion.

The Plaintiffs brought motions to strike the Defendants' pleadings for alleged non-disclosure of settlement agreements and for the recusal of the case management and trial judge due to a perceived apprehension of bias.

The Defendants brought a motion for directions concerning the scope of damage claims, specifically challenging a new "reinvestment claim" advanced by the Plaintiffs.

The court dismissed both of the Plaintiffs' motions, finding no change in the litigation landscape requiring disclosure of the agreements and no reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court granted the Defendants' motion for directions, ruling that the Plaintiffs' new reinvestment theory of damages was unpleaded, untimely, and would cause non-compensable prejudice to the Defendants.

A police officer and her children sued the Durham Regional Police Service (DRPS) and several officers, as well as a lawyer designated to prosecute her, for civil conspiracy, misfeasance in public office, negligence, defamation, and abuse of non-criminal proceedings.

The DRPS defendants moved to dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction, arguing the dispute fell under the exclusive jurisdiction of labour arbitration due to a collective agreement.

The lawyer defendant (Johnstone) moved to strike the claim against him for failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action, among other grounds.

The court dismissed the DRPS defendants' motion, finding that the essential character of the dispute, involving alleged police misconduct targeting the plaintiff and her family in their private capacities, transcended the collective agreement.

However, the court granted Johnstone's motion to strike, finding the pleadings against him did not disclose a reasonable cause of action and refused leave to amend.

The moving parties sought to review an order from a single judge of the Court of Appeal that dismissed their motion for a stay of two interlocutory orders from a Superior Court case management judge.

The interlocutory orders had vacated pre-trial and trial dates and allowed a motion for directions.

The Court of Appeal panel dismissed the review motion, finding no factual or legal errors by the motion judge, who correctly applied the RJR-MacDonald test for a stay.

The panel also noted that the stay motion was moot as the vacated dates were long past and the disputed motions had already been heard and were under reserve.

The plaintiffs brought eight proposed class actions against various long-term care (LTC) home owners and operators in Ontario, alleging systemic negligence and gross negligence in their response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court considered whether the claims met the certification criteria under section 5(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, particularly in light of the statutory immunity provided by the Supporting Ontario's Recovery Act (SORA).

The court certified six of the actions against the main corporate groups, finding that the pleadings disclosed a viable cause of action in gross negligence and that a class action was the preferable procedure.

However, the court dismissed the certification motions against independently owned homes and municipalities due to the lack of a collective enterprise and missing representative plaintiffs.

The moving parties sought a stay of interlocutory orders made by a case management/trial judge, which had set aside a pre-trial date and vacated a trial date to allow a motion for directions to proceed.

The moving parties had previously been denied leave to appeal these orders by the Divisional Court and were now seeking leave to appeal that denial to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the stay motion, finding that the moving parties failed to meet any prong of the RJR-MacDonald test, particularly noting that their motion for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal was unlikely to succeed as the Divisional Court had not mistakenly declined jurisdiction.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a lower court order dated August 1, 2023.

The Divisional Court granted the motion for leave to appeal, with costs reserved to the panel hearing the appeal.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal the orders of the motion judge dated October 3 and 5, 2023.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the respondents jointly in the amount of $10,000.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their motion to amend their statement of claim to advance personal claims for damages and increase the prayer for relief, stemming from an explosion in an apartment building they previously owned through a numbered company.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's decision.

The court found the motion to amend was brought too late, would cause presumed non-compensable prejudice to the defendants by materially altering the factual framework and requiring new evidence, and that the proposed personal claims by shareholders lacked a proper legal foundation as they did not demonstrate a personal cause of action separate from the company's claims.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to amend their Statement of Claim to increase the prayer for relief from $7.5 million to $57.5 million and to specifically plead personal damage claims on behalf of the individual plaintiffs arising from the forced sale of an apartment building following an explosion.

The defendants opposed the motion, arguing prejudice and that the individual plaintiffs, as shareholders of holding companies, had no personal cause of action under the rule in Foss v. Harbottle.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the significant delay in seeking the amendment resulted in presumed prejudice that was not rebutted, and that the proposed amendments failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The appellants, plaintiffs in the underlying action, brought a motion before a single judge of the Court of Appeal seeking an order to compel the Regional Senior Judge to set an expedited four-week trial date.

This motion followed a previous Court of Appeal order that had set aside a partial summary judgment and directed the action to be restored to the trial list on an expedited basis.

The appellants argued that the action had not been restored as ordered.

The motion judge, assuming jurisdiction without deciding the *functus officio* argument, dismissed the motion.

The judge found that the previous order had not been breached and emphasized the inappropriateness of interfering with the trial judge's ongoing case management, who was actively preparing the case for trial.

The plaintiff municipality sought a declaration that its insurers had a duty to defend it in relation to a Director's Order issued by the Ministry of the Environment and Climate Change regarding environmental contamination.

The defendant insurers brought a Rule 21 motion to determine whether the Director's Order constituted a 'civil action' under their respective liability policies.

The court held that a regulatory proceeding, including an appeal of a Director's Order to the Environmental Review Tribunal, is not a 'civil action' as defined by the Rules of Civil Procedure or the Courts of Justice Act.

Consequently, the insurers had no duty to defend the municipality.

The defendants, former legal counsel for the plaintiff, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's professional negligence action.

The plaintiff alleged the defendants breached the standard of care during an underlying personal injury trial by failing to advise him about an updated loss of income report and abandoning his future loss of income claim without instructions.

The court granted summary judgment, finding no genuine issue for trial.

The evidence demonstrated the plaintiff was aware of the supplementary report, understood the significant risks of proceeding to trial, and insisted on proceeding despite his lawyers' advice to settle or dismiss the action without costs.

The appellant landlord appealed a summary judgment finding it liable for injuries sustained by the respondent motorcyclist, who collided with donkeys that had escaped from the appellant's tenanted property.

The motion judge found the landlord negligent for failing to inspect or repair fences and for permitting an unlocked gate.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the liability finding, noting the landlord had admitted responsibility for the condition of the fence.

However, the Court found the motion judge erred by granting judgment without determining the issue of contributory negligence.

The appeal was allowed in part, and the issue of contributory negligence was remitted to trial along with damages.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their negligence actions arising from a fire that destroyed an historic mansion shortly after a plumber repaired a leaking pipe using a blowtorch.

At trial, the appellants did not call expert evidence on the standard of care, arguing the plumber's conduct was egregious.

The trial judge found the plumber's conduct was not egregious and that expert evidence was required to establish the standard of care for soldering.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding no error in the conclusion that the appellants failed to discharge their burden of proving a breach of the standard of care without expert evidence.

The mother of a severely disabled adult plaintiff brought a motion to be appointed as his litigation guardian and to be permitted to represent him without legal counsel in an action against a residential care facility.

The defendants brought a cross-motion to dismiss the action as a nullity because it was commenced by a non-lawyer, or alternatively to appoint the Public Guardian and Trustee.

The court held that commencing the action without a lawyer was an irregularity, not a nullity, and refused to dismiss the claims.

However, the court found the mother could not act as litigation guardian because she failed to retain counsel as required by the Rules of Civil Procedure, failed to file the requisite affidavit, and lacked the necessary indifference to the outcome of the litigation.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer was appointed as litigation guardian.