James G. Norton

This is a trial ruling excluding proposed expert opinion evidence from a forensic accountant (Ivor Gottschalk) on quantification of lost rental revenue after a 2010 explosion and fire.

The court held the evidence failed the necessity requirement and the expert lacked independence and an investigative mindset; the gatekeeping cost-benefit analysis also favoured exclusion.

The ruling was made after a voir dire held Feb 19–20, 2025, and reasons were issued Feb 27, 2025.

This endorsement addresses three motions in a long-standing negligence action stemming from a 2010 explosion.

The Plaintiffs brought motions to strike the Defendants' pleadings for alleged non-disclosure of settlement agreements and for the recusal of the case management and trial judge due to a perceived apprehension of bias.

The Defendants brought a motion for directions concerning the scope of damage claims, specifically challenging a new "reinvestment claim" advanced by the Plaintiffs.

The court dismissed both of the Plaintiffs' motions, finding no change in the litigation landscape requiring disclosure of the agreements and no reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court granted the Defendants' motion for directions, ruling that the Plaintiffs' new reinvestment theory of damages was unpleaded, untimely, and would cause non-compensable prejudice to the Defendants.

The moving parties sought to review an order from a single judge of the Court of Appeal that dismissed their motion for a stay of two interlocutory orders from a Superior Court case management judge.

The interlocutory orders had vacated pre-trial and trial dates and allowed a motion for directions.

The Court of Appeal panel dismissed the review motion, finding no factual or legal errors by the motion judge, who correctly applied the RJR-MacDonald test for a stay.

The panel also noted that the stay motion was moot as the vacated dates were long past and the disputed motions had already been heard and were under reserve.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their motion to amend their statement of claim to advance personal claims for damages and increase the prayer for relief, stemming from an explosion in an apartment building they previously owned through a numbered company.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's decision.

The court found the motion to amend was brought too late, would cause presumed non-compensable prejudice to the defendants by materially altering the factual framework and requiring new evidence, and that the proposed personal claims by shareholders lacked a proper legal foundation as they did not demonstrate a personal cause of action separate from the company's claims.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to amend their Statement of Claim to increase the prayer for relief from $7.5 million to $57.5 million and to specifically plead personal damage claims on behalf of the individual plaintiffs arising from the forced sale of an apartment building following an explosion.

The defendants opposed the motion, arguing prejudice and that the individual plaintiffs, as shareholders of holding companies, had no personal cause of action under the rule in Foss v. Harbottle.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the significant delay in seeking the amendment resulted in presumed prejudice that was not rebutted, and that the proposed amendments failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The appellants, plaintiffs in the underlying action, brought a motion before a single judge of the Court of Appeal seeking an order to compel the Regional Senior Judge to set an expedited four-week trial date.

This motion followed a previous Court of Appeal order that had set aside a partial summary judgment and directed the action to be restored to the trial list on an expedited basis.

The appellants argued that the action had not been restored as ordered.

The motion judge, assuming jurisdiction without deciding the *functus officio* argument, dismissed the motion.

The judge found that the previous order had not been breached and emphasized the inappropriateness of interfering with the trial judge's ongoing case management, who was actively preparing the case for trial.