Christine G. Carter

The court considered a motion by LLF Lawyers LLP to dismiss the action against them on the basis that the statement of claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

The plaintiffs alleged that confidential information was disclosed by an LLF employee to her spouse, who then defamed the plaintiff.

The court found that the statement of claim, as supplemented by particulars, disclosed a cause of action in favour of Michael Kelsey against LLF Lawyers LLP, and dismissed the motion as against him.

The action by The House Consulting Group Inc. was dismissed for not pleading a lawyer-client relationship or disclosure of its confidential information.

This is a trial ruling excluding proposed expert opinion evidence from a forensic accountant (Ivor Gottschalk) on quantification of lost rental revenue after a 2010 explosion and fire.

The court held the evidence failed the necessity requirement and the expert lacked independence and an investigative mindset; the gatekeeping cost-benefit analysis also favoured exclusion.

The ruling was made after a voir dire held Feb 19–20, 2025, and reasons were issued Feb 27, 2025.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment dismissing their action against the Township of Wainfleet for the destruction of a diseased apple orchard under the Weed Control Act.

They sought damages for negligence, misfeasance, trespass, and nuisance, and declarations that the Township's bylaw was passed in bad faith, not in the public interest, improperly targeted them, and was ultra vires.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's conclusions that the bylaw was valid, the Township followed proper procedures including public notice, and the appellants were not targeted.

The appeal was dismissed.

This endorsement addresses three motions in a long-standing negligence action stemming from a 2010 explosion.

The Plaintiffs brought motions to strike the Defendants' pleadings for alleged non-disclosure of settlement agreements and for the recusal of the case management and trial judge due to a perceived apprehension of bias.

The Defendants brought a motion for directions concerning the scope of damage claims, specifically challenging a new "reinvestment claim" advanced by the Plaintiffs.

The court dismissed both of the Plaintiffs' motions, finding no change in the litigation landscape requiring disclosure of the agreements and no reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court granted the Defendants' motion for directions, ruling that the Plaintiffs' new reinvestment theory of damages was unpleaded, untimely, and would cause non-compensable prejudice to the Defendants.

The moving parties sought to review an order from a single judge of the Court of Appeal that dismissed their motion for a stay of two interlocutory orders from a Superior Court case management judge.

The interlocutory orders had vacated pre-trial and trial dates and allowed a motion for directions.

The Court of Appeal panel dismissed the review motion, finding no factual or legal errors by the motion judge, who correctly applied the RJR-MacDonald test for a stay.

The panel also noted that the stay motion was moot as the vacated dates were long past and the disputed motions had already been heard and were under reserve.

The moving parties sought a stay of interlocutory orders made by a case management/trial judge, which had set aside a pre-trial date and vacated a trial date to allow a motion for directions to proceed.

The moving parties had previously been denied leave to appeal these orders by the Divisional Court and were now seeking leave to appeal that denial to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the stay motion, finding that the moving parties failed to meet any prong of the RJR-MacDonald test, particularly noting that their motion for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal was unlikely to succeed as the Divisional Court had not mistakenly declined jurisdiction.

This is an amended costs endorsement following a successful appeal by the respondents.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario awarded costs of the appeal to the respondents Burns Hubley LLP, Paul Gribilas, and J+W Foods Inc., inclusive of disbursements and interest, payable by the appellants.

The appellants, William Fehr Sr. and Dorothey Fehr, appealed a lower court order that permanently stayed their professional negligence action against Paul Gribilas (lawyer) and Burns Hubley LLP (accounting firm) based on a "no-claims-over" provision in a mutual release.

The release settled previous disputes, including the Fehrs' purported interest in J+W Foods Inc. The professional negligence action alleged that Gribilas and Burns Hubley LLP failed to protect the Fehrs' shareholdings.

The motions judge found the action to be an abuse of process because it contravened the no-claims-over clause, which prevented claims against parties who might seek contribution from the releasees (J+W Foods Inc., William Fehr Jr., Steven Trougakos).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Fehrs' appeal, affirming that the motions judge had the inherent authority to stay the action as an abuse of process and that the defendants had a viable claim over, thereby triggering the no-claims-over provision.

The cross-appeal by Gribilas and Burns Hubley LLP was dismissed as moot.

Following the dismissal of an appeal, the Court of Appeal for Ontario considered the appellant's claim for costs on a substantial indemnity scale.

The court found no exceptional circumstances to justify substantial indemnity costs and instead fixed the appellant's costs on a partial indemnity scale in the inclusive sum of $15,000.

Sase Aggregate Ltd. appealed a lower court decision that largely dismissed its claims against Michelle Langdon, wife of a former pit manager who defrauded Sase of over $2.1 million.

Sase sought a constructive trust over the proceeds of sale of a property owned by Langdon, alleging knowing receipt, knowing assistance, and unjust enrichment.

The application judge found Langdon had no knowledge of the fraud and that Sase failed to properly trace its funds into the property, except for an admitted amount of $177,632.38.

The Court of Appeal dismissed Sase's appeal, upholding the application judge's findings that Sase failed to establish the elements for knowing receipt, knowing assistance, or to properly trace the bulk of the funds into the property, and that Langdon's legitimate sources of funds were adequately explained.

The plaintiffs, Li Ma, Yumei Zhang, and Homeland Trading Ltd., brought an action against the Township of Wainfleet seeking general and punitive damages, and declarations that a municipal bylaw (Bylaw No. 028-2013) and a subsequent order to destroy their orchard were void.

The bylaw designated diseased fruit trees as "local weeds" under the Weed Control Act.

The plaintiffs alleged the bylaw was passed in bad faith, improperly targeted them, and violated their natural justice rights.

The court dismissed Homeland Trading Ltd.'s claim for lack of standing and failure to plead pecuniary loss.

For Li Ma and Yumei Zhang, the court found the bylaw valid, within the Township's statutory authority, and not passed in bad faith or targeting the plaintiffs.

The court also found that the plaintiffs had ample notice and opportunity to appeal the order through the statutory appeal route, which they failed to utilize.

Consequently, all claims for damages and declarations were dismissed.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their motion to amend their statement of claim to advance personal claims for damages and increase the prayer for relief, stemming from an explosion in an apartment building they previously owned through a numbered company.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's decision.

The court found the motion to amend was brought too late, would cause presumed non-compensable prejudice to the defendants by materially altering the factual framework and requiring new evidence, and that the proposed personal claims by shareholders lacked a proper legal foundation as they did not demonstrate a personal cause of action separate from the company's claims.

The appellants, holding unsatisfied judgments against a disbarred lawyer, appealed the dismissal of their motion to compel payment from the lawyer's insurer (LawPRO).

The core issues were the interpretation of the insurance policy's aggregate limit for dishonest lawyer coverage and whether LawPRO reasonably expended funds on defence and investigation, thereby exhausting the limit.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings that the $500,000 limit was an aggregate limit and that LawPRO's expenditures were reasonable, dismissing the appeals.

The applicant sought a constructive trust over $2.3 million in proceeds from the sale of the respondent's property, alleging the respondent's husband, a former employee, stole the funds and funneled them into joint accounts to purchase and renovate the property.

The court dismissed the claims for knowing receipt and knowing assistance, finding no evidence the respondent knew of the alleged theft or received the funds for her own benefit.

The respondent proved the majority of the property funds came from legitimate sources.

However, the court found unjust enrichment for $177,632.28 that was directly traced from the husband's company account to the property, awarding that amount to the applicant and releasing the balance to the respondent.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to amend their Statement of Claim to increase the prayer for relief from $7.5 million to $57.5 million and to specifically plead personal damage claims on behalf of the individual plaintiffs arising from the forced sale of an apartment building following an explosion.

The defendants opposed the motion, arguing prejudice and that the individual plaintiffs, as shareholders of holding companies, had no personal cause of action under the rule in Foss v. Harbottle.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the significant delay in seeking the amendment resulted in presumed prejudice that was not rebutted, and that the proposed amendments failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The appellants, plaintiffs in the underlying action, brought a motion before a single judge of the Court of Appeal seeking an order to compel the Regional Senior Judge to set an expedited four-week trial date.

This motion followed a previous Court of Appeal order that had set aside a partial summary judgment and directed the action to be restored to the trial list on an expedited basis.

The appellants argued that the action had not been restored as ordered.

The motion judge, assuming jurisdiction without deciding the *functus officio* argument, dismissed the motion.

The judge found that the previous order had not been breached and emphasized the inappropriateness of interfering with the trial judge's ongoing case management, who was actively preparing the case for trial.

This is a costs decision following the permanent stay of the plaintiffs' main action and third-party proceedings.

The defendants, Paul Gribilas and Peter Gribilas, and the third party, J+W Foods Inc., sought costs as successful parties on dispositive motions.

The plaintiffs argued against costs, claiming a miscarriage of justice given the prior ruling that there were genuine issues for trial.

The court found no miscarriage of justice and applied the normal rule that costs follow the outcome, awarding partial indemnity costs to the Gribilas defendants and full indemnity costs to J+W Foods Inc. based on a contractual provision in a release.

The plaintiffs sued the defendant lawyer and accountant for professional negligence, alleging they failed to protect the plaintiffs' ownership interest in a corporation.

The defendants brought third-party claims against the corporation and its principals.

The defendants and third parties moved for summary judgment to stay the action, relying on a general release previously signed by the plaintiffs in a settlement with the corporation.

The court granted the motions, finding that although the defendants were not parties to the release, allowing the action to proceed would trigger third-party claims against the released parties, violating the no-claims-over provision.

The main action and third-party proceedings were permanently stayed as an abuse of process.

The appellants appealed a partial summary judgment dismissing their action against Enbridge Inc. and Enbridge Solutions Inc. The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred by allowing the summary judgment motion to proceed on the eve of a scheduled ten-week trial, causing unnecessary delay and expense.

Furthermore, the Court held that the motion judge erred in concluding there was no genuine issue requiring a trial regarding Enbridge Inc.'s direct duty of care to the appellants, particularly concerning its public statements and policies on supervising its subsidiaries and contractors.

The appeal was allowed, the summary judgment and costs order were set aside, and the action was restored for trial.

This is a consolidated appeal from two summary judgments and a costs order.

The appellants sought to hold a law firm liable for the actions of a lawyer who shared office space, alleging he was either a partner or held out as one.

The motion judge found the lawyer was not a partner and not held out as such, dismissing the claims against the firm.

The motion judge also issued a "boomerang" summary judgment in favour of the firm.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings, concluding there was no palpable and overriding error in determining the lawyer was not a partner and that the appellants did not subjectively rely on any "holding out." The Court also affirmed the motion judge's authority to issue a boomerang order and her discretion regarding costs, including declining a Sanderson order.