James A. Round

The plaintiff brought a motion under Rule 59.06 to set aside a consent order that struck her claims and required her to reconstitute them within 30 days.

The plaintiff's former lawyer had failed to inform her of the order or comply with the deadline due to health reasons.

The court found that the defendants failed to demonstrate prejudice that could not be compensated by costs, and that the prejudice to the plaintiff in losing her substantive rights outweighed any prejudice to the defendants.

The motion was granted, the order was set aside, and the three related actions were consolidated.

The Plaintiffs moved to appoint Janina Gal as litigation guardian for Andrzej Gal, who was mentally incapable.

The Defendants opposed, arguing Janina had an adverse interest and was not indifferent to the outcome.

The court found Janina had a conflict of interest, as the litigation's success would result in properties forming part of Andrew's estate, which would then be transferred solely to Janina under Andrew's will, conflicting with Andrew's stated intention to divide properties equally among his daughters.

Furthermore, Janina was not indifferent to the outcome, as she stood to gain financially and had an acrimonious relationship with another daughter involved in the dispute.

The motion to appoint Janina as litigation guardian was dismissed, and the Plaintiffs were ordered to appoint a new, unconflicted litigation guardian or move to appoint the Public Trustee and Guardian.

The appellant municipality appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent approximately $995,000 in damages plus $921,508 in costs for injuries sustained while riding a bicycle on a recreational path.

The respondent's bicycle struck an exposed metal bracket from a removed bollard, causing her to fall and sustain a brain injury.

The trial judge found the municipality solely liable under the Occupiers' Liability Act and awarded damages for lost income.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, rejecting arguments regarding misinterpretation of the Act, failure to apply the but-for test, lack of jurisdiction regarding lost income damages, and failure to find contributory negligence.

The court also denied leave to appeal the costs award.

The plaintiff, Wanda Labanowicz, sought costs and interest following a successful three-week trial against the Corporation of the Town of Fort Erie, where she was awarded $894,839.72 in damages for a bicycle accident.

The court considered the plaintiff's pre-trial offers, which she surpassed, the defendant's "scorched earth" defence, the case's complexity, and the parties' reasonable expectations.

The court found the defendant's offers to be 'nuisance' value and criticized its unreasonable and unsupported defences.

While largely granting costs to the plaintiff on a partial indemnity basis to the date of her May 2016 offer and substantial indemnity thereafter, the court reduced the plaintiff's proposed Bill of Costs by $35,000 for pre-May Offer costs and made further reductions for post-May Offer costs and costs submissions due to duplication from multiple law firms and excessive clerk/student time.

Disbursements and OHIP claims were largely upheld, and full interest was awarded to the plaintiff.

The plaintiff sustained a brain injury after her bicycle struck an empty bollard housing on a municipal recreational trail.

She sued the municipality under the Occupiers' Liability Act.

The court found the municipality 100% liable, holding that leaving an unpainted, unlocked, and easily removable bollard housing exposed on the trail amounted to reckless disregard for the safety of cyclists.

The court rejected arguments of contributory negligence and found the accident caused the plaintiff's post-concussion syndrome, rendering her competitively unemployable in her previous field.

Damages for past and future income loss were awarded in the amount of $737,339.72.

Following earlier rulings on motions involving Mareva injunctions, fraudulent conveyance allegations, and summary judgment on promissory notes, the court determined the appropriate costs awards among multiple parties across two related actions.

Certain defendants who were unsuccessful targets of fraud allegations sought substantial indemnity costs after the claims against them were dismissed.

The court held that allegations of fraud justified substantial indemnity costs where the plaintiffs failed to establish the claims.

In the Klein action, the court balanced mixed success by awarding costs to both sides and setting them off.

In the Finkelstein action, substantial indemnity costs were awarded to certain defendants in the cause.

The plaintiffs brought motions arising from an ATM business dispute, unpaid unsecured promissory notes, and allegations that mortgages granted on a matrimonial home were fraudulent conveyances.

Applying the summary judgment framework, the court held there was no genuine issue requiring a trial on the promissory note claim or the fraudulent conveyance claim.

The court dissolved Mareva injunctions in both actions, finding the record did not satisfy the stringent test for pre-judgment asset-freezing relief.

The court granted summary judgment for $710,000 plus interest on the promissory notes against the business partners and their business entities, dismissed the fraudulent conveyance claims, and refused a certificate of pending litigation.

The plaintiff brought a motion under Rule 25.11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike portions of the defendants’ statement of defence, counterclaim and crossclaim.

The impugned pleadings alleged that the action was brought for abusive tactical purposes to suppress competition and also included allegations regarding the plaintiff’s reputation for unfair business practices.

The court held that the abuse of process allegations failed to plead the required material facts establishing a collateral purpose and a distinct overt act beyond the litigation itself.

The court further found that the reputational allegations were irrelevant and inserted solely to attack character.

The impugned paragraphs were struck as frivolous, vexatious, and scandalous, with leave granted to amend.

Costs determination following a motion for injunctive relief relating to access to data and the payment of invoices between commercial parties.

The court considered the parties’ relative success at different stages of the proceedings.

The defendant succeeded on the initial hearing by requiring the plaintiff to comply with its payment obligations before obtaining equitable relief, while the plaintiff succeeded on the return of the motion by challenging the legitimacy of post-order invoices.

Given the divided success, the court declined to award costs to either party.

The defendants moved for leave under Rule 25.01(5) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to deliver a rejoinder responding to the plaintiffs’ Reply.

The court considered the restrictive test governing when pleadings may continue beyond a reply, emphasizing that leave should only be granted where the reply introduces new and important matters that could not reasonably have been anticipated in the statement of defence.

The motion arose in complex litigation concerning family disputes over corporate, trust, and estate arrangements involving a real estate business and charitable structures.

The court concluded that several allegations raised in the reply—including claims regarding mistaken transfers of investment assets, fiduciary breaches, property management arrangements, and trust income expectations—introduced new factual bases and potential grounds of liability.

Leave was granted to deliver the proposed rejoinder in full.

The applicant filed an application alleging discrimination in employment on the grounds of race and place of origin.

A hearing was scheduled, but the applicant failed to attend.

After waiting 30 minutes and confirming that the applicant had notice of the hearing, the Tribunal dismissed the application due to the applicant's non-attendance.

The appellant appealed an order finding that the applicable limitation period had expired.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the appellant's materials did not create a genuine issue for trial regarding whether he lacked the capacity to initiate proceedings within the limitation period.