Robert William Trifts

The plaintiff, a private mortgage lender, brought a summary judgment motion against its title insurer for an additional $72,000 in losses arising from title fraud.

The dispute centered on whether the $72,000, representing prepaid interest withheld from the loan advance, constituted an "actual monetary loss" covered by the policy.

The defendant insurer argued it was not a loss as the funds were never advanced to the borrower.

The court, applying principles of insurance contract interpretation (broad coverage grant, narrow exclusions/limitations), found that the withholding of interest was an accounting set-off and the plaintiff's actual loss was the full principal amount less recoveries.

The court concluded that the $72,000 interest was part of the insured loss.

Summary judgment was granted to the plaintiff for $70,882.21, plus prejudgment interest and costs.

The defendant moved to discharge a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) and a mortgage registered against several properties.

The CPL was obtained ex parte by the plaintiff, who claimed fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and sought constructive/resulting trust remedies for funds invested in the defendant's property ventures.

The court found a triable issue regarding the plaintiff's claim to an interest in the properties.

While the defendant delayed bringing the motion and the plaintiff failed to disclose a material $100,000 payment on the ex parte motion, the court exercised its equitable discretion.

It ordered the CPL to remain on two properties (King and Fort Rouille) and the mortgage to remain on additional properties, but discharged the CPL and mortgage from Lakeshore, balancing the parties' rights and ensuring sufficient security for the plaintiff's claim.

The appellant appealed an order requiring him to execute a standard form mutual release with a "no claims over" clause, stemming from a 2017 settlement agreement.

The appellant argued procedural errors (motion under r. 49.09), limitation period expiry, and the overbreadth of the release form.

The Court of Appeal affirmed that while r. 49.09 was inapplicable, the motion was properly brought to enforce a settlement in an ongoing action, and no limitation period had expired as the claim arose when the appellant refused to sign.

However, the court found the motion judge erred in not prescribing the specific form of release.

The appeal was allowed in part, directing the appellant to sign a release including a "no claims over" clause but without an indemnity for its breach, and requiring the attachment of a specific undertaking.

The defendant, Ronald Flom, brought a motion to dismiss or stay the action of the corporate plaintiff, O Cannabis We Stand On Guard for Thee Corporation, for lack of authority, and to consolidate the plaintiffs' Ottawa action with his earlier Toronto action for fees.

The corporate plaintiff discontinued its action shortly before the hearing.

The court found significant overlap between the Ottawa and Toronto actions, arising from the same transaction, and ordered the Ottawa action stayed until the Toronto action's assessment hearing was determined, after which it would be consolidated as a counterclaim in Toronto.

The court also addressed costs, finding the plaintiffs and their counsel jointly and severally liable for substantial indemnity costs due to the unauthorized corporate action and the plaintiffs' failure to accept a reasonable offer to settle.

An appeal from a summary judgment motion dismissing a claim for breach of confidence.

The appellant, a pharmaceutical company, alleged that the respondent misused confidential information regarding a potential equipment manufacturer (HED International) that was disclosed during a due diligence period for a failed asset purchase agreement.

The motion judge dismissed the claim, finding no detriment to the appellant.

The appellate court upheld the dismissal, finding that although the motion judge's approach to detriment was overly narrow, the appellant suffered no detriment as a matter of fact because it was not ready to manufacture its products and could not have benefited from direct access to the equipment manufacturer.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal from a Superior Court judgment.

The Court of Appeal invited the parties to make written submissions on costs after issuing reasons on May 23, 2019.

The parties were unable to reach agreement and submitted written arguments.

The Court awarded costs to the appellant against one of the respondents.

The appellant leased commercial premises from the respondent with a right to renew for five years.

The appellant sublet the premises to a third party without reserving the last day of the head lease term.

When the appellant attempted to exercise its renewal option, the respondent claimed the appellant had forfeited its rights through an assignment.

The application judge failed to resolve this central issue and instead found a breach of contract with no damages.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that section 3 of the Commercial Tenancies Act permits a sublease even without reserving the last day of the head lease term, provided there is sufficient evidence that the parties did not intend an assignment.

The sublease language clearly demonstrated the parties' intent to preserve the appellant's renewal rights.

The applicant, a former tenant, sought to enforce a lease renewal option and claim damages for breach of contract against the landlord and sub-tenant.

The court found that both the landlord and sub-tenant breached their duties of good faith and contractual obligations to the applicant regarding the renewal.

However, no monetary damages were awarded to the applicant because the fair market rent for the renewed term would have resulted in a break-even scenario.

The application for specific enforcement was denied, and the applicant was ordered to return a $10,000 deposit to the sub-tenant.

No costs were awarded due to the mixed outcome.

The plaintiff moved for the appointment of a receiver over the books and records of several corporate defendants following loans exceeding USD $111 million for casino and gaming ventures in Jamaica and the Dominican Republic.

The defendants failed to provide required financial reporting, access to records, and audited statements despite contractual obligations and prior court orders.

Evidence indicated possible fraudulent reporting, significant discrepancies in financial information, and unexplained diversion of approximately $50 million to related entities.

The court held that the defendants had repeatedly obstructed access to records and that the circumstances justified the equitable appointment of a receiver to secure and review corporate books and records.

The motion was granted.

In a shareholders’ dispute involving a corporation operating casinos abroad, the applicant sought interim injunctive relief against a trustee holding shares as bare trustee for the applicant and another beneficial owner.

The trustee refused to transfer the shares, asserting the beneficial owners were defaulting shareholders under a shareholders’ agreement and therefore could not exercise shareholder rights.

Applying the test in RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (A.G.), the court found a serious issue to be tried regarding whether the trustee breached fiduciary duties by asserting personal shareholder rights in conflict with his obligations as trustee.

The court also found risk of irreparable harm if the trustee continued acting as though the beneficial owners had no rights.

Interim orders were granted restraining the trustee from exercising rights attached to the trust shares and directing cooperation among the shareholders to maintain ordinary course operations pending the hearing of the application.

The defendants moved to set aside ex parte Anton Piller orders and Mareva injunctions obtained by the plaintiff in a fraud action involving alleged misappropriation of corporate funds and improper commissions.

The court reviewed the strict legal requirements for such extraordinary remedies and emphasized the obligation of full, fair, and frank disclosure on without‑notice motions.

It found the plaintiff failed to disclose material facts, including ongoing communications with certain defendants, repayment negotiations, employment relationships, and other contextual facts that could have influenced the original decision.

The court also found insufficient evidence that certain defendants possessed incriminating documents or posed a real risk of asset dissipation.

As a result, the Anton Piller orders and Mareva injunctions were set aside against all defendants.

A related motion by one defendant to strike portions of the statement of claim was dismissed.

The moving parties sought reconsideration of case management scheduling orders that set hearing dates for a bankruptcy application and a receiver’s motion to pass accounts on the Commercial List.

They argued the hearings should be adjourned until the Court of Appeal determined a separate appeal relating to a solicitor’s file delivery order.

The court reviewed the procedural history, including prior adjournments, disclosure orders, and repeated failures by the moving parties to comply with deadlines for filing objections and conducting examinations.

Finding that the evidentiary materials had long been available and that no concrete prejudice was demonstrated, the court concluded further delay was unwarranted.

The request to adjourn the scheduled hearings was refused.

The defendants moved for an order requiring the plaintiff to post additional security for costs under Rule 56.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Although the plaintiff resided outside Ontario and the court found that the defendants had satisfied the threshold for ordering security, the plaintiff argued that the proceeding was fundamentally an oppression action under the Nova Scotia Companies Act.

The court held that the true nature of the claim was oppression based on the plaintiff’s status as a beneficial shareholder and allegations that corporate managers stripped profits to the detriment of that shareholder.

Section 7(3) of the Third Schedule to the Nova Scotia Companies Act prohibits requiring security for costs from a complainant bringing such an action.

As a result, despite finding that security would otherwise have been justified, the court dismissed the motion.