David Morawetz

The plaintiff moved for default judgment in a wrongful dismissal action against her former employer.

The defendant's Statement of Defence had been struck in August 2022 due to the defendant's delaying tactics and misconduct.

The defendant appealed unsuccessfully and sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal for Ontario, which was also denied.

The defendant subsequently attempted to file a factum in response to the default judgment motion.

The court initially granted default judgment in the amount of $170,415.42 plus costs and disbursements.

Upon learning that the defendant's materials had not been before the court, the judge temporarily vacated the endorsement to consider the defendant's request for leave to make submissions.

The court ultimately dismissed the defendant's request for leave and reinstated the default judgment, finding that permitting submissions would constitute an abuse of process given the defendant's extensive history of delay, misconduct, and unsuccessful appeals.

The defendant brought a motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the plaintiff's defamation action as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP).

The dispute arose from the defendant's social media posts concerning alleged financial improprieties and political partiality of a Hindu temple towards the Sri Lankan government.

The court found that the defendant's expressions related to matters of public interest.

The plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the action had substantial merit or that the defendant had no valid defence (justification for financial allegations, fair comment for cultural allegations).

The court also found no serious harm to the plaintiff and a strong public interest in protecting the defendant's expression.

The motion was granted, the action dismissed, and full indemnity costs were awarded to the defendant.

The defendant moved to discharge a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) and a mortgage registered against several properties.

The CPL was obtained ex parte by the plaintiff, who claimed fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and sought constructive/resulting trust remedies for funds invested in the defendant's property ventures.

The court found a triable issue regarding the plaintiff's claim to an interest in the properties.

While the defendant delayed bringing the motion and the plaintiff failed to disclose a material $100,000 payment on the ex parte motion, the court exercised its equitable discretion.

It ordered the CPL to remain on two properties (King and Fort Rouille) and the mortgage to remain on additional properties, but discharged the CPL and mortgage from Lakeshore, balancing the parties' rights and ensuring sufficient security for the plaintiff's claim.

The plaintiff landlord sought to continue an ex parte injunction preventing the defendant tenant from removing equipment, including an external HVAC unit and generator, from the leased premises.

The tenant argued it had paid for the equipment and had the right to remove it.

The court found a serious issue to be tried regarding the ownership of the equipment and whether it constituted fixtures or trade fixtures.

The court concluded that the balance of convenience favoured leaving the external HVAC unit and generator in place pending the litigation, effectively granting a preservation order, while noting that damages would be an adequate remedy for equipment already removed.

The defendants brought a motion to strike paragraphs 19-24 of the plaintiff's reply and defence to counterclaim, arguing they were scandalous, frivolous, and vexatious.

The impugned paragraphs contained allegations of drug addiction, spousal violence, and anger issues against the personal defendants.

The court found these allegations to be irrelevant personal attacks that did not clarify the issues in dispute regarding alleged financial irregularities.

The motion was granted and the paragraphs were struck.

The applicant sought an extension of time to perfect an appeal from an order dismissing an oppression application under the Ontario Business Corporations Act.

The Court of Appeal determined it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal, as section 255 of the Act specifies that appeals from such orders lie to the Divisional Court.

Despite finding that other factors for an extension of time (intention to appeal, brief delay, minimal prejudice) would have favoured the applicant, the motion was dismissed due to the fundamental lack of jurisdiction.

The appellant appealed a Superior Court decision dismissing his application arising from a failed agreement of purchase and sale.

The appellant argued the application judge erred in virtually all of her conclusions.

The Court of Appeal found no merit in any of the appeal grounds.

The court upheld the application judge's findings that the respondent had standing to sue, that the appellant was required to pay the second deposit, that the respondent did not breach the agreement by failing to provide the original survey and clear title, that the respondent's failure to discharge an existing mortgage before the appellant's demand letter did not constitute a breach, and that the appellant's letter constituted anticipatory breach which the respondent properly terminated.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

This decision addresses costs following the dismissal of two consolidated motions to disqualify counsel, Mr. Suvendu Goswami, for alleged conflicts of interest.

The court had initially recommended substantial indemnity costs but invited an apology from the applicants' lawyers and a request for partial indemnity.

Despite one lawyer's "paltry apology" and the other's refusal, the court ultimately awarded partial indemnity costs, acknowledging Mr. Goswami's acceptance of the apology.

The court also clarified that the two groups of applicants were complicit in the conduct justifying a punitive costs award, but the final award was based on normal principles due to the apology's acceptance.

The applicants in two related applications concerning the governance of a religious organization brought motions to disqualify the respondents' lawyer of record.

The applicants alleged that the lawyer was unfit to practice law, was a potential material witness, and had personal and client conflicts of interest.

The court dismissed the motions, finding no merit to any of the grounds for disqualification.

The court held that the lawyer's fitness to practice was not in issue, he was not a material witness, and he had no disqualifying conflicts of interest.

The court awarded substantial indemnity costs to the respondents, noting that the applicants' lawyers had overreacted and made unfounded allegations.

The plaintiff, Damiano Di Martino, sought summary judgment against Giuseppe Montana and Calogera Montana for $240,000 arising from a loan agreement.

The court granted summary judgment, finding that a late payment clause in the agreement did not apply to the plaintiff's loan, Mr. Montana was not entitled to deduct claimed expenses or a penalty, and Ms. Montana was jointly liable due to unjust enrichment as the loan funds were deposited into her account for her benefit.

The applicants sought the partition and sale of two industrial properties owned by corporations in which they held shares, following a breakdown in the business relationship with the respondents.

The respondents argued that the applicants had no interest in the land because the properties were owned by the corporations.

The court dismissed the application, holding that shareholders do not have a possessory interest in property owned by a corporation, and therefore the applicants had no prima facie right to partition under the Partition Act.

Following a trial where the plaintiffs recovered $9,000 for wrongful distress, the court determined costs.

The plaintiffs were ordered to pay $9,000 in costs to two individual defendants against whom the action was discontinued at the opening of trial.

Because the plaintiffs recovered an amount within the monetary jurisdiction of the Small Claims Court and failed to tender evidence supporting their $80,000 claim, their costs against the remaining defendants were limited to the Small Claims Court scale, fixed at $6,098.64.

The defendant landlord was also ordered to pay the defendant bailiff's costs of $20,085.75 on a partial indemnity scale for unsuccessfully defending a crossclaim for indemnification.

The appellants (sellers) appealed a decision granting the respondent (purchaser) rescission of an agreement of purchase and sale and return of the deposit.

The dispute concerned the interpretation of an illegal substances clause in a standard form Ontario Real Estate Association/Toronto Real Estate Board Agreement of Purchase and Sale.

The purchaser discovered after execution that the property had previously been used as a marijuana grow-operation and sought to terminate the agreement.

The application judge found the sellers had breached their representation and warranty in the clause.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the sellers' representation and warranty regarding the property's prior use was limited to their knowledge and belief as it existed at the time of execution of the agreement, not at closing.

Since the sellers did not know about the prior use at execution, no breach occurred.

The plaintiff corporation purchased equipment from a tenant operating a kitchen manufacturing business.

The landlord subsequently distrained the equipment for unpaid rent owed by a subsequent tenant and sold the goods through a bailiff.

The plaintiff sued the landlord and the bailiff for trespass to goods.

The court found that the plaintiff owned the goods at the time of sale and that the landlord's distress was unlawful.

The court awarded damages of $9,000, representing the liquidation value of the goods, holding the landlord and bailiff jointly liable, but ordered the landlord to fully indemnify the bailiff.

Following the successful application by the purchaser to rescind an agreement of purchase and sale due to the property's history as a marijuana grow-op, the purchaser sought costs of $30,000 on a partial indemnity scale.

The vendors argued no costs should be awarded due to unproven allegations of recklessness and procedural delays by the purchaser's counsel.

The court rejected the argument to deny costs entirely but reduced the quantum, finding some time spent by the purchaser's counsel was beyond the reasonable expectations of the unsuccessful parties.

Costs were fixed at $26,436.43.

The sellers of a residential property represented in the agreement of purchase and sale (APS) that, to the best of their knowledge, the property had never been used for the growth or manufacture of illegal substances.

Before closing, the purchaser discovered the property had previously housed a marijuana grow operation in 2004, a fact unknown to the sellers when the APS was made.

The purchaser refused to close and sought rescission and return of deposit, while the sellers sought declarations that the APS was binding and damages for breach.

The court found the "illegal substances clause" to be a material representation that induced the purchaser to enter the APS.

Upon learning the property's history, the sellers' representation became untrue, triggering a duty to disclose.

The court held that the purchaser was entitled to rescission, declaring the APS void ab initio, and ordered the return of the deposit.

The sellers' application was dismissed, and the purchaser's claim for damages was allowed to proceed as an action.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment declaring them in breach of the trust provisions of the Construction Lien Act and ordering them to pay $216,662.84 to Airex Inc. Ben Air System Inc. had entered into a subcontract with Omico Mechanical Ltd. to perform HVAC work on a TTC facility and ordered equipment from Airex.

The appellants argued that Ben Air had paid out more money on the project than it received, and therefore had not breached the trust provisions.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment, finding that the appellants failed to file evidence of sufficient weight to support their position.

The evidence was contradictory, lacked documentary support, and was delivered late.

The court found that once Airex established it was a subcontractor owed money and that Ben Air had received trust funds, it was Ben Air's burden to show the trust monies had been properly applied.

The plaintiff sought to enforce a Quebec default judgment against the personal defendant, Lorenzo Panarese, in Ontario.

Panarese challenged the Quebec court's jurisdiction and argued that the judgment should not be enforced due to breach of natural justice or fraud.

The court found that the Quebec court had a real and substantial connection to the dispute and that Panarese had attorned to its jurisdiction by participating in the Quebec proceedings without reserving on jurisdiction.

The court dismissed the defences of natural justice and fraud, concluding that the evidence did not support a finding of fraud and that issues of service and the right to be heard were already litigated and decided in Quebec.

The Ontario court granted recognition and enforcement of the Quebec judgment against Panarese.