Gurlal Singh Kler

Following a trial decision in a wrongful dismissal action, a dispute arose regarding the calculation of the plaintiff's Long-Term Incentive Plan (LTIP) damages.

The plaintiff included a dividend payment of $1,736.10 related to a Restricted Share Unit in his calculations, which the defendant opposed on the basis that dividends were not specifically addressed in the trial reasons.

The court held that the dividend flowed naturally from the decision to award the plaintiff value for his LTIP and permitted its inclusion in the final order.

Wrongful dismissal action by a senior executive seeking common law notice damages, bonus compensation, long-term incentive compensation, tax gross-up, benefits, and bad faith-related damages.

The court rejected inducement, fixed reasonable notice at eight months, and applied the common law framework governing incentive compensation during the notice period.

It held that the employee was entitled to a 40% STIP for 2019 and a prorated STIP through the end of notice, and to the value of LTIP units vesting within notice plus prorated value of unvested LTIP, because the forfeiture language in the grant documents was not sufficiently enforceable to remove common law entitlements.

Claims for tax gross-up and bad faith, punitive, and moral damages were dismissed, and limited benefits damages were awarded.

The plaintiff moved for default judgment in a wrongful dismissal action against her former employer.

The defendant's Statement of Defence had been struck in August 2022 due to the defendant's delaying tactics and misconduct.

The defendant appealed unsuccessfully and sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal for Ontario, which was also denied.

The defendant subsequently attempted to file a factum in response to the default judgment motion.

The court initially granted default judgment in the amount of $170,415.42 plus costs and disbursements.

Upon learning that the defendant's materials had not been before the court, the judge temporarily vacated the endorsement to consider the defendant's request for leave to make submissions.

The court ultimately dismissed the defendant's request for leave and reinstated the default judgment, finding that permitting submissions would constitute an abuse of process given the defendant's extensive history of delay, misconduct, and unsuccessful appeals.

The plaintiff moved for default judgment in a wrongful dismissal action against her former employer.

The defendant failed to respond to the Statement of Claim, resulting in deemed admissions of fact.

The court granted the motion for default judgment, awarding damages of $170,415.42 plus $6,879 in costs and disbursements, inclusive of HST.

The court determined that a six-month notice period was appropriate based on the plaintiff's age and length of service, and calculated damages based on monthly compensation of $18,883.34 and $60,000 in owed commissions, less amounts already paid.

The defendant appealed an order striking its statement of defence in a wrongful dismissal action.

The statement of defence was struck after the defendant engaged in a months-long pattern of delaying and frustrating the scheduling of examinations for discovery, despite warnings from plaintiff's counsel and a case management judge.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the Associate Justice's exercise of discretion.

The court confirmed that striking the pleading was a proportionate response to the defendant's egregious and ongoing dilatory conduct.

The plaintiff, a 61-year-old commission salesperson with 19.5 months of service, was terminated without cause shortly before the COVID-19 pandemic.

He brought a motion seeking 10 months of reasonable notice, while the defendant employer argued for two months.

The court assessed the relevant factors, noting the plaintiff's short tenure, non-managerial role, and the lack of evidence that his age or the pandemic significantly hindered his job search during the applicable notice period.

The court awarded a reasonable notice period of 2.5 months.

The plaintiff, a 61-year-old finance manager with nine months of service, was terminated without cause.

He brought a motion for summary judgment to determine the appropriate period of reasonable notice.

The court applied the Bardal factors, noting the plaintiff's short service, performance-based compensation, and the robust job market prior to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court held that the pandemic, being a subsequent event, should not impact the notice period calculation and awarded two months' reasonable notice.

The court issued a consent timetable for a one-day summary trial, setting deadlines for the exchange of affidavits and the filing of a joint book of documents.

The plaintiff brought a motion for further and better particulars of the defendants' statement of defence.

The plaintiff's counsel initially appeared as both counsel and witness, leading to an adjournment and the withdrawal of his affidavit.

The court reviewed the demands for particulars and found that, with a few clarifications agreed to by the defendants, the existing particulars were sufficient to permit the plaintiff to plead.

The court held that the remaining requests were matters for discovery, not particulars, and dismissed the motion.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment that dismissed his defamation and related claims against his former employer and awarded him only $17,192.57 for wrongful dismissal, while ordering him to pay $35,000 in costs.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in her defamation analysis, credibility findings, and acceptance of unpleaded defences.

The Divisional Court dismissed the substantive grounds of appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that the employer's negative reference was substantially true.

However, the court granted leave to appeal the costs award, finding the trial judge erred by applying Rule 49.10(1) instead of Rule 49.10(2) for a defendant's offer to settle, and remitted the costs issue to the trial judge.

The plaintiff, Adam Papp, brought a claim for wrongful dismissal, defamation, and other damages against his former employer, Stokes Economic Consulting Inc., and its president, Ernest Stokes.

The defendants conceded wrongful dismissal without cause, disputing only the quantum of reasonable notice.

The court found that Ernest Stokes' statements made during a reference check, which led to Papp being denied a job, were substantially true and protected by qualified privilege, as Stokes did not act with malice or recklessness.

Consequently, the defamation claim and associated damages were dismissed.

The court awarded Papp four months' reasonable notice for wrongful dismissal, reduced by payments already received.

The defendant, Ericsson Canada Inc., brought a motion to dismiss or, alternatively, stay the plaintiff's action and compel arbitration of a dispute concerning unpaid commissions under a Sales Incentive Plan (SIP).

The plaintiff, Dahl Morrison, argued the arbitration clause was not binding, that Ontario law governed his employment, and that arbitration in Texas would be inconvenient and expensive, especially given other claims for wrongful dismissal.

The court found the SIP's arbitration clause to be clear and mandatory, requiring disputes arising from the plan to be settled by final and binding arbitration in Dallas, Texas.

Citing Section 7 of the Arbitration Act, 1991, and Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence, the court ruled that the existence of a valid arbitration agreement ousted the court's jurisdiction.

The motion was granted, the Ontario action was stayed, and the plaintiff was directed to proceed with arbitration.

The defendants moved for costs of the action after the plaintiff's action was dismissed by the Registrar and the plaintiff's subsequent motion to set aside the dismissal was denied.

The plaintiff requested a further extension of time to make costs submissions, which the court denied as unreasonable and unduly delaying the matter.

The court awarded costs to the defendants fixed at $8,500 all-inclusive on a partial indemnity basis, noting the plaintiff should have accepted the defendants' earlier offer of a dismissal without costs.

The appellant sought to appeal an interlocutory order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, finding it had no jurisdiction to hear an appeal from an interlocutory order.

Costs of $2,000 were awarded to the respondents.

An employee brought a wrongful dismissal claim after her employment as a clinical trials coordinator was terminated without cause after more than eight years of service.

The court determined the effective working notice period was 6.5 weeks because the employer’s revised termination letter replaced the original notice, resetting the notice date.

Applying the Bardal factors, including the employee’s age (64), length of service, professional responsibilities, and limited availability of comparable employment, the court fixed reasonable notice at ten months.

The employer argued the employee failed to mitigate by not applying for hospital nursing positions, but the court held the employer failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that additional efforts would likely have resulted in higher income.

Damages were awarded after deducting mitigation income.

The applicant, a 60-year-old lawyer, alleged age discrimination after he was not interviewed for a legal writer position with the respondent.

The Tribunal found that the primary hiring manager did not discriminate, as her concerns were based on the applicant's incomplete resume and lack of explanation for seeking a major career change.

However, the Tribunal found that an external HR consultant's communications to the applicant, which falsely stated he was rejected because the company was seeking more junior candidates, were tainted by age discrimination.

This deprived the applicant of the opportunity to follow up on his application.

The Tribunal awarded $5,000 for injury to dignity, feelings, and self-respect.

The parties, both sophisticated commercial entities, entered into Minutes of Settlement requiring the appellant to pay 1 million EUR over two years.

The agreement stipulated that upon default, the appellant would consent to judgment for 1 million EUR without credit for prior payments.

After paying 380,000 EUR, the appellant defaulted.

The motion judge granted summary judgment for 1 million EUR and dismissed the appellant's claim for relief from forfeiture.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the forfeited amount was neither disproportionate in law nor unconscionable in equity, as the provision was designed to incentivize compliance.