C. William Hourigan

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Appeal dismissed.

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Appeal dismissed.

The representative plaintiffs in a class action alleging a price-fixing conspiracy for packaged bread sought to amend their pleadings and the Certification Order to add Maple Leaf Foods Inc. as a certified defendant.

The original Certification Order had refused certification against Maple Leaf on the basis that the pleadings disclosed no cause of action against it, and this decision was not appealed.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's dismissal of the motion, finding that the original refusal to certify was a final order that gave rise to res judicata.

The court held that the Class Proceedings Act does not permit relitigation of matters finally decided, and the motion judge did not err in refusing to exercise his limited discretion to bypass res judicata.

The appellant real estate developers sought judicial review of a decision by the Ontario Energy Board (OEB) regarding a cost-sharing dispute with an electricity distributor.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for lack of jurisdiction, finding the OEB had merely provided an opinion and had not exercised a statutory power of decision.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the OEB's interpretation of the Distribution System Code to resolve the parties' complaint constituted a final, binding decision under its exclusive statutory jurisdiction.

As such, the decision was of a sufficiently public character to attract public law remedies, including certiorari, and constituted the exercise of a statutory power of decision under the Judicial Review Procedure Act.

A reference to the Court of Appeal for Ontario concerning whether legal online gaming and sports betting would remain lawful under the Criminal Code if users were permitted to participate in games and betting involving individuals outside of Canada.

The majority (Tulloch C.J.O., Gillese, Hourigan and Dawe JJ.A.) answered affirmatively, finding that section 207(1)(a) of the Criminal Code permits Ontario to conduct and manage a lottery scheme with international pooled liquidity, provided Ontario continues to conduct and manage the Ontario-based aspects of the scheme in accordance with provincial law.

The majority rejected the application of the real and substantial connection test and distinguished the Earth Future decisions.

Van Rensburg J.A. dissented, arguing that the Proposed Model would contravene the Criminal Code because it would require Ontario to conduct and manage aspects of the lottery scheme outside Ontario's territorial boundaries, contrary to the plain meaning of "in that province" in section 207(1)(a).

The appellant appealed his sentence of two years less a day imposed for theft over $5,000, forgery, and possession of stolen property over $5,000 for the purpose of trafficking.

The appellant had stolen the famous "Roaring Lion" portrait photograph of Winston Churchill by Yousuf Karsh from the Château Laurier Hotel in Ottawa, replaced it with a forgery, and sold the original through an auction house in London.

The majority upheld the sentence, finding no error in principle and that the sentence was not demonstrably unfit.

The dissenting judge found errors in principle in the sentencing judge's approach to establishing the sentencing range, particularly in relying on foreign precedents and narrowing focus to art crimes, and would have substituted a conditional sentence.

The moving party sought to review an order denying a stay of enforcement of a mortgage, specifically a writ of possession.

The Court of Appeal found the motion moot because the first mortgagee had taken possession, the moving party had refinanced the property and retaken possession.

The underlying appeal had been dismissed by a prior order denying an extension of time for perfection of the appeal.

The motion was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The respondents sought and obtained an order for adverse possession of a 1.6-acre triangular parcel of land abutting a farm property owned by the appellant.

The application judge found that all elements of adverse possession were satisfied based on evidence that the Slak family had occupied and improved the land from 1979 onwards, establishing actual possession, intention to exclude the true owner, and effective exclusion.

The appellant appealed on multiple grounds, challenging the sufficiency of evidence, the adequacy of reasons, and the demarcation of the boundary.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding that the evidence supported all findings, the reasons were adequate for appellate review, and the boundary demarcation using a line of trees was appropriate to the facts.

The appellant, a Senior Financial Advisor employed by CIBC, appealed a motion judge's decision striking portions of his Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim alleging defamation, libel, and negligence against CIBC and CIBC Securities.

The motion judge found that the alleged defamatory statements were not contained in the documents referenced, or alternatively, were not published by the respondents.

The Microsoft Teams chat could not constitute publication for defamation purposes.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error in the analysis of the documents and dismissing the appeal with costs awarded to the respondents.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's order finding that a solicitor-client relationship existed between Paul Kasanda and the respondent law firm (KMH Lawyers and Miriam Vale Peters) for the purposes of an assessment of unpaid legal accounts under the Solicitors Act.

The appellants sought to remove Paul as a party to the assessment, arguing he was not a client and had not agreed to pay for legal services.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that sufficient indicia of a solicitor-client relationship existed based on the totality of the circumstances, including retainer agreements, communications, instructions, advice, and payment arrangements.

An appeal from a trial judgment dismissing claims by a steel company against a former employee who established a competing business.

The trial judge found that the employee was not a fiduciary and therefore could not breach fiduciary duties.

Although the employee breached employment duties of good faith, loyalty, and fidelity by misappropriating business documents (constituting conversion), the trial judge found no damages were proven.

The appellate court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's findings were open to her on the record and that her reasons were adequate for meaningful appellate review.

The appellant was convicted of child luring, invitation to sexual touching, making child pornography, criminal harassment, and uttering a death threat against a 12-year-old girl in Manitoba.

The main contested issue at trial was identity.

The trial judge found the appellant guilty as charged and imposed a net sentence of three years' imprisonment.

The appellant appealed both his convictions and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding that the circumstantial evidence linking the appellant to the Snapchat account and phone numbers was overwhelming, and that the trial judge's reasoning path could be readily discerned from the evidence as a whole despite sparse reasons.

The court also found no reversible error in the trial judge's refusal to adjourn sentencing to permit a post-conviction Charter application.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of sexual interference against two children under the age of 16 years.

The trial judge found that the appellant had committed sexual offences against both complainants in a park in Brantford on a single occasion in August 2019, and that he had also sexually abused one complainant over an extended period in the family home prior to the park incident.

The appellant was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the conviction on three grounds: alleged errors in the W.(D.) analysis, uneven scrutiny of evidence, and misapprehension of DNA evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the conviction.

A young person was convicted of sexual assault, sexual touching, and invitation to sexual touching of his stepsister.

On appeal, the court found two critical errors: (1) the trial judge improperly discontinued cross-examination of a key witness based on insufficient medical evidence and then relied on that witness's testimony to support the conviction, and (2) the trial judge placed undue weight on the appellant's demeanour to reject his evidence as untruthful, despite initially finding him credible.

The appeal was allowed, convictions on two counts were quashed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 18 years imprisonment (less 50 months presentence custody) imposed after pleading guilty to twelve firearm-related offences, including two counts of discharge of a prohibited firearm with intent to prevent arrest, possession of a firearm while prohibited, dangerous driving, and possession of explosive substances.

The appellant argued that the sentencing judge erred by overemphasizing denunciation and deterrence, failed to properly consider mitigating factors including his guilty plea, and imposed an excessive sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge's decision reasonable and the sentence appropriate given the gravity of the offences and the need for an exemplary sentence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for multiple counts of fraud, attempted fraud, identity theft, and fraudulent personation, as well as the restitution order imposed.

The appellant sought to adduce fresh evidence, including a psychiatric report and his own affidavit, to explain why he did not testify at trial and to establish what his evidence would have been.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application to adduce fresh evidence, finding that the appellant made a free and informed choice not to testify, as evidenced by written instructions signed before trial.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal regarding the $300,000 restitution order, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge's sentencing discretion.

The Ontario Securities Commission appealed an order appointing a receiver over Cacoeli Asset Management and related entities pursuant to section 129(1) of the Securities Act.

The appellants argued that the appointment of a receiver requires a strong prima facie case of breaches of the Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's decision, holding that the correct evidentiary standard is a serious concern that there have been possible breaches of the Act.

The court found that the OSC had met this standard based on evidence that funds raised from investors for specific projects were diverted to other purposes without investor disclosure or consent.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered the issue of costs following an appeal between the Township of Adelaide Metcalfe and the Municipality of Strathroy-Caradoc.

The court determined that there would be no costs of the appeal, as the determinative issue was not raised before the Divisional Court.

The costs previously ordered by the Divisional Court were set aside.

Following the dismissal of the appellant's appeal, the court issued a costs endorsement.

The successful respondent was awarded its costs of the appeal.

The court ordered the appellant to pay the respondent costs in the all-inclusive amount of $10,000.

The appellant municipality appealed a Divisional Court order that quashed an Ontario Land Tribunal decision assuming jurisdiction over a dispute regarding a municipal servicing agreement.

The Court of Appeal held that the Tribunal's decision was interlocutory, as it only assumed jurisdiction on a prima facie basis and deferred the final determination of forum to the Superior Court.

Because the Ontario Land Tribunal Act only permits appeals of final decisions, the Divisional Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

The appeal was allowed and the Tribunal's order was restored.