Kevin Michael Rawluk

The appellant was convicted of four counts of criminal harassment and one count of breach of release conditions.

During a court-ordered NCR assessment, the appellant made statements to a forensic psychiatrist.

The Crown introduced those statements at trial without a voir dire on admissibility under s. 672.21 of the Criminal Code, without first putting the statements to the appellant in cross-examination as required by ss. 10 and 11 of the Canada Evidence Act, and without disclosing its intention to use the statements for impeachment purposes.

The Court of Appeal held that the combined effect of these errors deprived the appellant of a fair trial, quashed the convictions, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction on five counts (three counts of distributing intimate images without consent, one count of criminal harassment, and one count of sexual assault) on the basis that the trial judge erred in refusing to stay the conviction for delay contrary to s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The trial judge found that the net delay of 506 days did not exceed the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan by attributing 196 days to defence delay.

On appeal, the court reconsidered the attribution of three disputed periods of delay in light of subsequent Supreme Court and Court of Appeal decisions, ultimately finding that the net delay was 515 days, which remained within the reasonable time threshold for a provincial court trial.

The appellant appealed both his conviction for sexual assault and his sentence of two years and six months' imprisonment.

The trial judge found the appellant's testimony unreliable, evasive, inconsistent, and self-serving.

The trial judge also found that a text message sent by the appellant to the complainant after the incident, in which he said he was "sorry" multiple times, constituted an admission and was corroborative of the complainant's account.

The appellant argued that his use of the word "sorry" was culturally customary and not an apology.

The Court of Appeal found no basis for appellate intervention in the trial judge's credibility assessments and dismissed both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal.

The appellant appealed his sentence of four years' imprisonment following conviction on three counts of sexual assault.

The offences occurred in 1989 and involved the appellant's 17-year-old niece whom he had sponsored to come to Canada from the Philippines.

The appellant threatened not to sponsor the complainant's mother and siblings if she revealed the assaults.

The Court of Appeal found no errors in principle by the sentencing judge and dismissed the sentence appeal.

Fresh evidence regarding the appellant's dementia was rejected as insufficient to warrant sentence reduction.

The appellant appealed his sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in principle by holding that the conditions of the appellant's incarceration while completing his conditional sentence were not relevant in assessing Duncan/Marshall credit.

However, the court concluded that this error did not affect the fitness of the sentence given significant aggravating factors.

The appellant also complained about the failure to implement a plea deal, but the record showed the Crown was not prepared to proceed with it and defence counsel did not pursue it at trial.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the sentence appeal was dismissed.

This is a sentence appeal by Brendan Bananish from a 7-year and 3-month global sentence (reduced to 24 months after credit), designation as a long-term offender, and an 8-year long-term supervision order, following a violent attack on an intimate partner.

The appellant raised several grounds of appeal, including alleged expert bias, dispute of prior conviction facts, and the fairness of the sentencing process.

The Court of Appeal found no merit in the grounds raised and dismissed the appeal, granting leave to appeal sentence but upholding the trial judge’s findings and sentence.

The appellant, C.D., appealed his conviction for sexual interference, sexual exploitation, and sexual assault, and his sentence.

The sentence appeal was abandoned during oral submissions.

The conviction appeal raised three issues: the admissibility of prior discreditable conduct (the "shower incident"), the lack of a caution regarding the complainant's prior consistent statement, and the absence of an instruction against cross-count reasoning.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors by the trial judge.

The court held that the shower incident evidence was admissible for motive and to rebut defence theories, and that the lack of specific jury instructions was a legitimate tactical decision by defence counsel.

The appellant appealed convictions for four counts of sexual assault, one count of assault, and one count of forcible confinement, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing the complainant's credibility and reliability by treating memory gaps and inconsistencies as enhancing factors, and materially misapprehended the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly grappled with the difficulties in the complainant's evidence, provided rational explanations for her findings, and that her credibility findings were owed deference.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder and appealed on the grounds that the Criminal Code's provocation provisions were unconstitutional and that the trial judge erred in jury instructions on provocation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the constitutional challenge, affirming its reasoning in a companion case.

The court also dismissed the appeal regarding jury instructions, holding that the trial judge correctly instructed the jury on the elements of assault and self-defence as they relate to the definition of provocation under section 232(2) of the Criminal Code, which requires the provocative act to constitute an indictable offence.

The appellant, Sukhchain Brar, appealed his conviction for first-degree murder of his wife, Gurpreet Brar.

He admitted the killing but sought a manslaughter conviction based on lack of mens rea or provocation.

The appeal raised constitutional challenges to s. 232(2) of the Criminal Code, which defines the partial defence of provocation, arguing it infringes s. 7 of the Charter by being arbitrary and overbroad.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the constitutional challenge, finding the purpose of the amendment was to limit provocation to serious unlawful conduct, not just to address "honour killings." The court also dismissed other non-constitutional grounds of appeal related to jury instructions on provocation, cultural/religious motive, ante-mortem statements, and after-the-fact conduct.

The appellant, Elias Gibb, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder, raising three grounds: the constitutionality of the Criminal Code's provocation provision (s. 232(2)), the trial judge's failure to provide a free-standing instruction on intoxication's impact on mens rea for murder, and an error in the W.D. instruction for co-accused.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the constitutional challenge based on a companion case.

Regarding intoxication, the court found no error, noting the defence strategically chose to integrate intoxication into the provocation defence rather than seeking a separate instruction.

The court also found that while the W.D. instruction was imperfect in its wording, it did not lead to an unfair verdict when read in context, as the jury was otherwise properly instructed on separate verdicts for each accused.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a conditional sentence of two years less one day imposed for sexual assault, arguing it was manifestly unfit.

The respondent had sexually assaulted the complainant four times while she feigned sleep.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred by applying an inappropriate sentencing range and failing to justify the conditional sentence with "exceptional circumstances." The court clarified that the appropriate sentencing range for penetrative sexual assault is three to five years, regardless of the victim's state or relationship to the offender, and that "forced penetration" refers to lack of consent.

The appeal was allowed, the conditional sentence set aside, and a three-year term of imprisonment imposed, with credit for time served.

The court declined to impose a SOIRA order due to lack of appellate jurisdiction.

The appellant, convicted of second-degree murder, appealed his conviction and sentence.

The conviction appeal challenged the trial judge's jury instructions on the defence of a third party and accident, arguing there was no air of reality to the former and the latter was inadequate, thereby undermining his primary defence of identity.

The sentence appeal challenged the 12-year parole ineligibility period, alleging misapprehension of evidence regarding aggravating factors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding that the trial judge correctly instructed the jury on the defences, which had an air of reality and did not prejudice the appellant's primary defence.

The court also found no reversible error in the parole ineligibility period, concluding that the trial judge's factual findings were supported by evidence and the sentence was proportionate.

The appellant, Johnathan Impey, appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The appeal raised two grounds: the trial judge's response to a jury question regarding the definition of reasonable doubt, and the alleged failure to instruct the jury on how to deal with the complainant's motivation to fabricate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's response to the jury's question was appropriate, especially given counsel's joint submission, and that the general instructions on witness credibility were sufficient to address the issue of motive to fabricate.

The respondent was acquitted of child luring, with the trial judge finding him reckless as to the complainants' ages but concluding recklessness was insufficient mens rea based on a misinterpretation of R. v. Morrison.

The Court of Appeal clarified that recklessness as to age is sufficient mens rea for child luring under s. 172.1(1)(a) of the Criminal Code where the Crown proves an actual child complainant, distinguishing this from police sting operations.

However, as the trial judge did not make findings on the respondent's subjective intent to facilitate a secondary offence, the appeal was allowed, acquittals set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, convicted of theft over $5,000 and sentenced to six months imprisonment followed by two years probation, appealed both her conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the trial judge properly grappled with the evidence and that the grounds of appeal constituted an attempt to reargue the trial.

The court also denied a fresh evidence application regarding alleged gaps in the trial transcript, concluding that the appellant failed to establish irreparable prejudice or that material evidence was missing.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was not demonstrably unfit and the trial judge's discretion in declining a conditional sentence for a breach of trust involving theft from an employer was upheld.

The appellant, Awale Hussein, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder and sought leave to appeal the parole ineligibility component of his sentence.

The conviction appeal was based on alleged errors in dismissing a Corbett application (allowing cross-examination on his criminal record) and in the jury charge regarding police investigation inadequacies.

The sentence appeal argued errors in disregarding juror recommendations for parole ineligibility and treating absence of motive as an aggravating factor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no errors in principle or unreasonable exercises of discretion by the trial judge.

The appellant, B.S., appealed his conviction for indecent assault and the imposed sentence of 18 months' imprisonment.

The conviction appeal challenged the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's reliability and credibility, and the rejection of the appellant's evidence.

The sentence appeal argued the trial judge erred by not imposing a conditional sentence, particularly in light of the appellant's Indigenous status and the absence of a Gladue report at sentencing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, affirming the trial judge's findings on credibility and reliability, and upholding the custodial sentence as appropriate given the nature of the offence against a vulnerable child.

The appellant appealed a conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient and that she misapprehended evidence regarding the opportunity to commit the offence.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge's reasons sufficient, noting that credibility assessments are complex and that the judge clearly rejected the defence's evidence after a full review of the complainant's testimony.

The court reiterated that incomplete transcripts do not automatically lead to a new trial unless there is a serious possibility of error or deprivation of appeal grounds.

The appeal was dismissed.

Stuart Murray, convicted of fraud, sought an extension of time to appeal his conviction, arguing his guilty plea was involuntary and uninformed due to his mental state and unexpected collateral consequences from Law Society proceedings.

The Crown opposed, citing delay and lack of merit.

The motion judge granted the extension, finding that psychiatric evidence raised sufficient doubt about Murray's cognitive functionality at the time of the plea and adequately explained the delay, thus warranting an appeal on the validity of the guilty plea.