Kristin Bailey

The defendants, Recovery Science Corporation (RSC) and Stephen Tan, brought a motion for summary dismissal of the plaintiff's negligence claim, arguing that a signed Liability Waiver released them from liability.

The plaintiff alleged faulty equipment, inadequate investigation, careless removal of a GPS ankle bracelet, and misleading information provided to police, leading to his re-arrest for breach of recognizance.

The court found the Waiver valid and binding but determined that significant factual issues remained regarding the cause of damage to the ankle bracelet and whether the defendants provided forthright information to police.

The court concluded that these issues, including credibility assessments and expert report scrutiny, required a trial and could not be fairly resolved on a summary judgment motion.

The defendants' motion was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the plaintiff.

The accused was charged with sexual assault, sexual interference, and choking to assist in the commission of a sexual assault involving a 15-year-old complainant.

The court found the complainant's testimony, despite inconsistencies regarding intoxication and memory, to be credible on the core facts of non-consensual sexual activity and choking, corroborated by physical injuries and DNA evidence.

The accused's testimony was disbelieved due to contradictions with physical evidence.

The defense of mistake of age was rejected, as the accused did not take reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant's age and was found to be reckless as to her underage status, having ignored "red flags" regarding her appearance and circumstances.

The accused was found guilty on all three counts.

The appellant was convicted of assault causing bodily harm after a jury trial.

The complainant, who was in a long-term relationship with the appellant, recanted her initial allegations at the preliminary hearing and trial.

The appeal raised three grounds: the trial judge's failure to instruct the jury on prior consistent statements, the admission of prior disreputable conduct evidence, and the admission of the complainant's police statement for the truth of its contents.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's instructions or evidentiary rulings, particularly regarding the principled exception to hearsay and the use of prior bad acts to understand the relationship.

A defendant was charged with sexual assault with a weapon, robbery, and other associated offences.

The case relied on overwhelming circumstantial evidence, including CCTV footage, DNA evidence, and the defendant's statement to police.

The court found the defendant's denial and an eyewitness's testimony unreliable due to intoxication and inconsistencies with video evidence.

The judge concluded that the circumstantial evidence, including matching clothing, items, and physical characteristics, left no reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt, dismissing the innocent explanation as an implausible coincidence.

A similar act application by the Crown was dismissed due to lack of probative value and inconsistencies.

Michael Haughton, 47, sought a second bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code, citing the availability of electronic monitoring as a material change in circumstances.

This followed a previous dismissal of his bail application where the Crown met its onus on secondary and tertiary grounds.

The court found electronic monitoring to be a material change but ultimately dismissed the application, concluding that the proposed release plan, even with electronic monitoring, was insufficient to address the substantial likelihood of re-offending due to Haughton's extensive criminal record, history of non-compliance, and severe crack cocaine addiction.

The court also found that confidence in the administration of justice would be seriously eroded by his release.

Michael Haughton, charged with numerous break and enter offences and breaches of court orders, sought a bail review based on a material change in circumstances, including delays due to COVID-19 and his asthma.

The Crown opposed release on secondary and tertiary grounds.

The court found the Crown's case strong and the proposed surety plan inadequate.

Despite the increased risk of COVID-19 in custody and the applicant's asthma, the court determined that the risk to public safety and the need to maintain confidence in the administration of justice outweighed these concerns, dismissing the bail review application.

K.V. sought an extension of time to file a notice of appeal against a Superior Court judge's decision to quash a subpoena issued to the prosecuting Crown counsel in his ongoing sexual offence trial.

The Crown opposed, arguing lack of merit and delay.

The Court of Appeal granted the extension, finding the appeal not frivolous and that K.V. had a right to appeal, despite concerns about trial delay, as the complainant's evidence was complete.

K.B. was found guilty of four counts of sexually assaulting S.F., a vulnerable adult with the intellectual capacity of a child, over a four-day period.

He was acquitted of unlawful confinement.

The court considered sentencing principles, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for offences against vulnerable persons, and applied principles from cases involving child sexual abuse.

Aggravating factors included the victim's extreme vulnerability, the prolonged nature of the assaults, the victim's lack of escape means, and K.B.'s significant criminal record including prior assaults.

The court imposed a global sentence of 5 years for the sexual assault counts, to be served concurrently.

After credit for pre-trial custody, the remaining sentence was 2 years and 54 days.

Ancillary orders included a weapons prohibition, DNA sample order, lifetime Sex Offender Information Registration Act compliance, and a non-communication order.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder in the death of George Washington Burnett.

The appellant appealed on the grounds that the trial judge erred in his instructions on the elements of second degree and first degree murder, and in his instructions regarding after-the-fact conduct evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's instructions on planning and deliberation were properly tailored to the live issues at trial, that the after-the-fact conduct evidence was admissible and relevant to planning and deliberation, and that the jury was adequately instructed on the limited use of such evidence.

The accused was charged with four counts of sexual assault and one count of unlawful confinement involving a 26-year-old complainant with an intellectual disability.

The complainant went missing for four days, during which time she stayed at the accused's apartment and was repeatedly sexually assaulted.

The court applied the standard for child witnesses to assess the complainant's credibility and found her evidence reliable regarding the sexual assaults.

The accused was found guilty of sexual assault but acquitted of unlawful confinement due to a reasonable doubt about whether the complainant was held against her will.

The defendant was charged with dangerous driving causing death after making an illegal U-turn that resulted in a fatal collision with a motorcycle.

The court found that the defendant's driving was objectively dangerous, thus establishing the actus reus of the offence.

However, the court acquitted the defendant, concluding that while the driving constituted a departure from the standard of care, it did not amount to a "marked departure" required for criminal fault, but rather a single, momentary error in judgment.

The decision emphasized the distinction between civil negligence and criminal conduct, relying on Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence.

The appellant, a member of the Batchewana First Nation, appealed his sentence for sexual assault.

The sentencing judge imposed six months' imprisonment followed by three years of probation.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred in proceeding with sentencing based on an inadequate Gladue report without ordering a supplementary report.

The court directed the Crown to obtain a supplementary Gladue report to determine whether non-custodial alternatives were available.

After receiving the supplementary report, which confirmed that the Batchewana First Nation has no formal restorative justice programs and that meaningful community-based alternatives were not available, the court concluded that denunciation must be the primary sentencing objective.

The court granted leave to appeal but dismissed the appeal, finding the original sentence fit and proportionate.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder under s. 231(5)(b) of the Criminal Code on the theory that he intentionally killed the victim while committing sexual assault.

The appellant argued that first degree murder under s. 231(5)(b) requires physical domination of the victim and that a sexual assault arising from fraudulently obtained consent does not satisfy this requirement.

The appellant also challenged the Crown's cross-examination as improper and prejudicial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that domination is not a distinct element of s. 231(5)(b), that sexual assault by its nature involves unlawful domination, and that any improprieties in cross-examination were adequately remedied by the trial judge's jury instructions.

Appeal from conviction for sexual assault and unlawful confinement, and from sentence of six months imprisonment.

The appellant, an Aboriginal offender, challenged the trial judge's credibility findings and the sentencing judge's failure to properly apply Gladue principles.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the sexual assault conviction appeal, stayed the unlawful confinement conviction pursuant to the Kienapple principle, and found the sentencing judge erred by proceeding without adequate Gladue and pre-sentence reports addressing community-based sentencing alternatives.

The sentence appeal was reserved pending a supplementary pre-sentence report.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 5.5 years (66 months) less 25 months credit for time in predisposition custody, resulting in a net sentence of 41 months in federal penitentiary.

The appellant pleaded guilty to possession of a prohibited firearm with readily accessible ammunition, dangerous operation of a motor vehicle, flight from police, and possession of marijuana for trafficking purposes.

The appellant contended the trial judge erred in principle by failing to apply restraint as a first-time offender and by imposing a sentence outside the range for similar offenders.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence fit and appropriate given the serious nature of the offences.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sentenced to two years' imprisonment following a trial in which the trial judge found that the complainant fell asleep and awoke to find the appellant engaged in non-consensual intercourse with her.

The appellant appealed his conviction on three grounds: (1) the trial judge erred in assessing evidence of prior sexual activity; (2) the trial judge erred in applying the rule in Browne v. Dunn; and (3) the trial judge reversed the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal allowed the conviction appeal on the ground that the trial judge erred in finding violations of the rule in Browne v. Dunn and in drawing negative inferences about the appellant's credibility as a result.

The Court found that these errors adversely impacted the appellant's credibility and that there was a real risk the erroneous findings influenced the trial judge's assessment of the evidence and tipped the scale toward a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The conviction was quashed and a new trial was ordered.

The accused was charged with three counts of attempted murder and one count of attempting to possess a prohibited firearm.

The court found that while the accused possessed the specific intent to kill, his actions regarding the attempted murder of the complainant's children did not progress beyond mere preparation, thus failing to establish the actus reus.

Consequently, he was found not guilty of attempted murder.

However, the court found that the accused's actions and inquiries to obtain a firearm constituted an attempt to possess a prohibited firearm, finding him guilty of that charge.

The offender, D.W., was found guilty by a jury of sexual assault, sexual touching, and invitation to sexual touching involving a seven-year-old victim.

The sexual assault conviction was stayed under the Kienapple Principle.

The court considered aggravating factors such as breach of trust and the victim's vulnerability, and mitigating factors including harsh pre-trial custody conditions and the certainty of deportation.

The court declined to grant credit for time spent in immigration detention as it was not directly a result of the charges.

A global sentence of 4.5 years imprisonment was imposed, with a 1.5:1 credit for 21 days of pre-bail custody.

Ancillary orders included a DNA sample, lifetime sexual offender registry, lifetime weapons prohibition, and a lifetime no-contact order with the victim and her family.

The Court dismissed the Crown appeal and upheld an order for a new trial on second degree murder, holding that the jury charge contained reversible errors on the use of post-offence conduct evidence for intent and that the curative proviso did not apply.

The applicant brought a Rowbotham application seeking a conditional stay of proceedings pending the provision of state-funded counsel.

The applicant was charged with seven counts of fraud, six counts of possession of property obtained by crime, four counts each of forgery, personation with intent, drawing documents without authority, uttering documents without authority, and theft, and two counts of obtaining credit by fraud.

The court addressed three issues: the applicable standard of proof, whether the applicant established indigency, and whether counsel was essential for a fair trial.

The court held that the standard of proof is a balance of probabilities, not a high degree of probability, and found that the applicant established indigency.

However, the court found that the applicant failed to establish that counsel was essential to ensure a fair trial, given her educational background, business expertise, and the trial judge's ability to provide assistance.

The application was dismissed.