Kristin Bailey

The Law Society alleged that the respondent lawyer engaged in professional misconduct by using his trust account to convert cryptocurrency to Canadian currency for three individuals without providing legal services, in breach of Rule 3.2-7.3 of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

The lawyer admitted the transactions occurred but argued they were inadvertent due to a platform-linked routing error.

The Tribunal found that the lawyer set up his cryptocurrency wallet to route withdrawals directly to his trust account and continued to use it despite knowing the destination, establishing professional misconduct.

The Tribunal dismissed the lawyer's motion to convert the proceeding to an invitation to attend and ordered a two-month suspension of his licence, along with a requirement to complete a practice management program.

The Law Society Tribunal previously found that the respondent lawyer engaged in professional misconduct by practising law while suspended and failing to treat the court with courtesy and civility.

The respondent maintained that he was an "unconquered Métis man" and not subject to the authority of the Law Society Act.

Despite being invited to make submissions on penalty, the respondent did not participate.

The Tribunal concluded that the respondent was ungovernable due to mental illness and that a further suspension would not protect the public interest or maintain public confidence.

The respondent's licence to practise law was revoked.

The appellant's license to practice law was revoked following findings of professional misconduct.

She appealed to the Law Society Tribunal Appeal Division, but failed to perfect her appeal for 11 months.

A single adjudicator of the Appeal Division dismissed the appeal for delay without a formal motion from the Law Society.

The appellant appealed to the Divisional Court, arguing the adjudicator lacked jurisdiction to dismiss the appeal without a motion and that a five-person panel was required.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Tribunal's rules permit it to control its own process, initiate procedural steps, and dismiss an unperfected appeal via a single adjudicator's procedural order.

The applicant, a former paralegal whose licence was revoked in 2018 for professional misconduct including filing forged documents and practicing while suspended, applied for re-licensing.

The Law Society referred the application to the Tribunal to determine if she met the good character requirement.

The Tribunal applied the Armstrong factors and found that the applicant lacked meaningful insight into her past misconduct and failed to demonstrate true remorse or rehabilitation.

The application for re-licensing was dismissed.

The Appellant brought a motion seeking various forms of relief prior to the hearing of his appeal, including a reconsideration of the hearing panel's decision, a transfer to an Indigenous Tribunal, a hearing by a lay member, cross-examinations, payment of transcripts, admission of fresh evidence, and recusal of the adjudicator.

The Tribunal dismissed the motion, finding no jurisdictional basis for the transfer, no foundation for the cross-examinations or recusal, and no evidence of impecuniosity for the transcript costs.

The admissibility of fresh evidence was deferred to the hearing of the appeal.

The Law Society brought a conduct application against a lawyer whose licence was previously suspended due to incapacity arising from mental illness.

The lawyer continued to make numerous court appearances while suspended, acting uncivilly and advancing pseudolegal arguments based on his claim to be an unconquered Métis individual not subject to the Law Society Act.

The Tribunal dismissed the lawyer's recusal motions and found that he engaged in professional misconduct.

The Tribunal established a unified framework for addressing mental illness in conduct applications and concluded that diversion to a capacity proceeding was inappropriate because the lawyer lacked insight into his illness, refused to cooperate, and posed a significant risk to the public.

The Law Society Tribunal determined the penalty for a lawyer found to have engaged in professional misconduct by being wilfully blind to a fraud and money laundering scheme.

The lawyer argued for a suspension, citing powerful mitigating factors including difficult personal circumstances, the isolated nature of the transaction, strong community support, and six years of unblemished practice since the incident.

The Tribunal held that wilful blindness to fraud is tantamount to knowledge, triggering a presumptive penalty of revocation.

Finding that the mitigating factors did not explain why the misconduct occurred or amount to exceptional circumstances sufficient to displace the presumption, the Tribunal ordered the revocation of the lawyer's licence and costs of $24,000.

The appellant sought an adjournment of the appeal hearing to file materials in accordance with the Rules, including seeking leave to file a factum with a larger word count and a reply factum.

The Divisional Court granted the adjournment and directed the parties to attend a case conference to establish a timetable for perfecting the appeal.

The appellant lawyer sought a stay of a Hearing Division order revoking her licence pending her appeal of the professional misconduct findings and penalty.

The lawyer had been found to have engaged in professional misconduct by attempting to mislead opposing counsel and the court about a settlement offer and threatening a Law Society complaint to gain a benefit.

The Tribunal denied the stay, finding that while the appeal raised a serious issue and the lawyer would suffer irreparable harm, the balance of convenience did not favour a stay.

The seriousness of the misconduct, the risk of further misconduct, and the need to protect the public and maintain confidence in the profession outweighed the impact on the lawyer's clients.

The defendants, Recovery Science Corporation (RSC) and Stephen Tan, brought a motion for summary dismissal of the plaintiff's negligence claim, arguing that a signed Liability Waiver released them from liability.

The plaintiff alleged faulty equipment, inadequate investigation, careless removal of a GPS ankle bracelet, and misleading information provided to police, leading to his re-arrest for breach of recognizance.

The court found the Waiver valid and binding but determined that significant factual issues remained regarding the cause of damage to the ankle bracelet and whether the defendants provided forthright information to police.

The court concluded that these issues, including credibility assessments and expert report scrutiny, required a trial and could not be fairly resolved on a summary judgment motion.

The defendants' motion was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the plaintiff.

The accused was charged with sexual assault, sexual interference, and choking to assist in the commission of a sexual assault involving a 15-year-old complainant.

The court found the complainant's testimony, despite inconsistencies regarding intoxication and memory, to be credible on the core facts of non-consensual sexual activity and choking, corroborated by physical injuries and DNA evidence.

The accused's testimony was disbelieved due to contradictions with physical evidence.

The defense of mistake of age was rejected, as the accused did not take reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant's age and was found to be reckless as to her underage status, having ignored "red flags" regarding her appearance and circumstances.

The accused was found guilty on all three counts.

The appellant was convicted of assault causing bodily harm after a jury trial.

The complainant, who was in a long-term relationship with the appellant, recanted her initial allegations at the preliminary hearing and trial.

The appeal raised three grounds: the trial judge's failure to instruct the jury on prior consistent statements, the admission of prior disreputable conduct evidence, and the admission of the complainant's police statement for the truth of its contents.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's instructions or evidentiary rulings, particularly regarding the principled exception to hearsay and the use of prior bad acts to understand the relationship.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to provisionally strike the defendants' jury notices in a motor vehicle accident claim due to anticipated trial delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court noted the significant backlog of civil jury trials in Windsor and the prejudice the plaintiffs would suffer from further delay, particularly regarding the statutory reduction of pre-trial income loss.

The court granted the motion, ordering the matter to proceed as a judge-alone trial unless civil jury trials resume in Windsor by the scheduled trial date.

The defendants brought a motion seeking production of a future care cost report and an income loss report from the plaintiff's 2007 motor vehicle accident benefits file.

The plaintiff had sued for injuries sustained in a 2011 slip and fall.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the requested reports were predicated on medical assumptions and had no relevance since the prior medical reports had already been disclosed to the defendants' experts.

A defendant was charged with sexual assault with a weapon, robbery, and other associated offences.

The case relied on overwhelming circumstantial evidence, including CCTV footage, DNA evidence, and the defendant's statement to police.

The court found the defendant's denial and an eyewitness's testimony unreliable due to intoxication and inconsistencies with video evidence.

The judge concluded that the circumstantial evidence, including matching clothing, items, and physical characteristics, left no reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt, dismissing the innocent explanation as an implausible coincidence.

A similar act application by the Crown was dismissed due to lack of probative value and inconsistencies.

Michael Haughton, 47, sought a second bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code, citing the availability of electronic monitoring as a material change in circumstances.

This followed a previous dismissal of his bail application where the Crown met its onus on secondary and tertiary grounds.

The court found electronic monitoring to be a material change but ultimately dismissed the application, concluding that the proposed release plan, even with electronic monitoring, was insufficient to address the substantial likelihood of re-offending due to Haughton's extensive criminal record, history of non-compliance, and severe crack cocaine addiction.

The court also found that confidence in the administration of justice would be seriously eroded by his release.

Michael Haughton, charged with numerous break and enter offences and breaches of court orders, sought a bail review based on a material change in circumstances, including delays due to COVID-19 and his asthma.

The Crown opposed release on secondary and tertiary grounds.

The court found the Crown's case strong and the proposed surety plan inadequate.

Despite the increased risk of COVID-19 in custody and the applicant's asthma, the court determined that the risk to public safety and the need to maintain confidence in the administration of justice outweighed these concerns, dismissing the bail review application.

The accused applied for a bail review of a detention order on charges including possession for the purpose of trafficking and firearms offences.

The accused argued the justice of the peace erred by overemphasizing the strength of the Crown's case and that there were material changes in circumstances, including a new release plan, withdrawn charges, and the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding the initial decision was not clearly inappropriate and the new circumstances, including the pandemic, would not have affected the balancing exercise given the accused's young age, health, and the unsuitability of a proposed surety.

The plaintiff, Alexandra Davidoff, brought claims against Paderewski Society Home (Niagara) and Rachel Goerz for malicious prosecution and intimidation, stemming from a prior defamation action.

The defendants moved under Rule 21.01(1)(b) to strike the claims for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The court determined that the tort of malicious prosecution does not apply to civil proceedings, that absolute privilege bars tort claims based on communications in court proceedings, and that a lawyer owes no duty to an opposing party.

Consequently, the plaintiff's claims were struck out without leave to amend, and costs were awarded to the defendants.

Alexander Davidoff brought claims of malicious prosecution and intimidation against Paderewski Society Home (Niagara), Rachel Goerz, and Niagara Regional Housing (NRH), arising from a prior defamation action.

The defendants moved to strike these claims under Rule 21.01(1)(b) for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The court granted the motion, holding that the tort of malicious prosecution does not apply to civil proceedings, that absolute privilege bars tort claims based on communications in court proceedings, and that a lawyer owes no duty to an opposing party in litigation.

The claims were struck without leave to amend, and costs were awarded to the defendants.