Kristin Bailey

K.V. sought an extension of time to file a notice of appeal against a Superior Court judge's decision to quash a subpoena issued to the prosecuting Crown counsel in his ongoing sexual offence trial.

The Crown opposed, arguing lack of merit and delay.

The Court of Appeal granted the extension, finding the appeal not frivolous and that K.V. had a right to appeal, despite concerns about trial delay, as the complainant's evidence was complete.

K.B. was found guilty of four counts of sexually assaulting S.F., a vulnerable adult with the intellectual capacity of a child, over a four-day period.

He was acquitted of unlawful confinement.

The court considered sentencing principles, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for offences against vulnerable persons, and applied principles from cases involving child sexual abuse.

Aggravating factors included the victim's extreme vulnerability, the prolonged nature of the assaults, the victim's lack of escape means, and K.B.'s significant criminal record including prior assaults.

The court imposed a global sentence of 5 years for the sexual assault counts, to be served concurrently.

After credit for pre-trial custody, the remaining sentence was 2 years and 54 days.

Ancillary orders included a weapons prohibition, DNA sample order, lifetime Sex Offender Information Registration Act compliance, and a non-communication order.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder in the death of George Washington Burnett.

The appellant appealed on the grounds that the trial judge erred in his instructions on the elements of second degree and first degree murder, and in his instructions regarding after-the-fact conduct evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's instructions on planning and deliberation were properly tailored to the live issues at trial, that the after-the-fact conduct evidence was admissible and relevant to planning and deliberation, and that the jury was adequately instructed on the limited use of such evidence.

The accused was charged with four counts of sexual assault and one count of unlawful confinement involving a 26-year-old complainant with an intellectual disability.

The complainant went missing for four days, during which time she stayed at the accused's apartment and was repeatedly sexually assaulted.

The court applied the standard for child witnesses to assess the complainant's credibility and found her evidence reliable regarding the sexual assaults.

The accused was found guilty of sexual assault but acquitted of unlawful confinement due to a reasonable doubt about whether the complainant was held against her will.

The defendant was charged with dangerous driving causing death after making an illegal U-turn that resulted in a fatal collision with a motorcycle.

The court found that the defendant's driving was objectively dangerous, thus establishing the actus reus of the offence.

However, the court acquitted the defendant, concluding that while the driving constituted a departure from the standard of care, it did not amount to a "marked departure" required for criminal fault, but rather a single, momentary error in judgment.

The decision emphasized the distinction between civil negligence and criminal conduct, relying on Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence.

The appellant, a member of the Batchewana First Nation, appealed his sentence for sexual assault.

The sentencing judge imposed six months' imprisonment followed by three years of probation.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred in proceeding with sentencing based on an inadequate Gladue report without ordering a supplementary report.

The court directed the Crown to obtain a supplementary Gladue report to determine whether non-custodial alternatives were available.

After receiving the supplementary report, which confirmed that the Batchewana First Nation has no formal restorative justice programs and that meaningful community-based alternatives were not available, the court concluded that denunciation must be the primary sentencing objective.

The court granted leave to appeal but dismissed the appeal, finding the original sentence fit and proportionate.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder under s. 231(5)(b) of the Criminal Code on the theory that he intentionally killed the victim while committing sexual assault.

The appellant argued that first degree murder under s. 231(5)(b) requires physical domination of the victim and that a sexual assault arising from fraudulently obtained consent does not satisfy this requirement.

The appellant also challenged the Crown's cross-examination as improper and prejudicial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that domination is not a distinct element of s. 231(5)(b), that sexual assault by its nature involves unlawful domination, and that any improprieties in cross-examination were adequately remedied by the trial judge's jury instructions.

Appeal from conviction for sexual assault and unlawful confinement, and from sentence of six months imprisonment.

The appellant, an Aboriginal offender, challenged the trial judge's credibility findings and the sentencing judge's failure to properly apply Gladue principles.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the sexual assault conviction appeal, stayed the unlawful confinement conviction pursuant to the Kienapple principle, and found the sentencing judge erred by proceeding without adequate Gladue and pre-sentence reports addressing community-based sentencing alternatives.

The sentence appeal was reserved pending a supplementary pre-sentence report.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 5.5 years (66 months) less 25 months credit for time in predisposition custody, resulting in a net sentence of 41 months in federal penitentiary.

The appellant pleaded guilty to possession of a prohibited firearm with readily accessible ammunition, dangerous operation of a motor vehicle, flight from police, and possession of marijuana for trafficking purposes.

The appellant contended the trial judge erred in principle by failing to apply restraint as a first-time offender and by imposing a sentence outside the range for similar offenders.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence fit and appropriate given the serious nature of the offences.

Appeal from conviction for arson and possession of incendiary material.

The appellant, an unrepresented accused in custody, was convicted after a two-day trial.

The appeal raised issues concerning the Crown's disclosure obligations to an unrepresented accused and the trial judge's duty to assist such an accused.

The Crown failed to ensure the appellant received a substantial disclosure package of over 500 pages containing witness statement transcripts and fire investigation photographs, which was couriered to the custodial institution but not properly communicated to the appellant.

The trial judge failed to adequately inquire into disclosure issues when they became apparent during trial.

The court found both a breach of the right to disclosure and inadequate judicial assistance, resulting in impairment of the right to make full answer and defence.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sentenced to two years' imprisonment following a trial in which the trial judge found that the complainant fell asleep and awoke to find the appellant engaged in non-consensual intercourse with her.

The appellant appealed his conviction on three grounds: (1) the trial judge erred in assessing evidence of prior sexual activity; (2) the trial judge erred in applying the rule in Browne v. Dunn; and (3) the trial judge reversed the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal allowed the conviction appeal on the ground that the trial judge erred in finding violations of the rule in Browne v. Dunn and in drawing negative inferences about the appellant's credibility as a result.

The Court found that these errors adversely impacted the appellant's credibility and that there was a real risk the erroneous findings influenced the trial judge's assessment of the evidence and tipped the scale toward a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The conviction was quashed and a new trial was ordered.

The accused was charged with three counts of attempted murder and one count of attempting to possess a prohibited firearm.

The court found that while the accused possessed the specific intent to kill, his actions regarding the attempted murder of the complainant's children did not progress beyond mere preparation, thus failing to establish the actus reus.

Consequently, he was found not guilty of attempted murder.

However, the court found that the accused's actions and inquiries to obtain a firearm constituted an attempt to possess a prohibited firearm, finding him guilty of that charge.

The offender, D.W., was found guilty by a jury of sexual assault, sexual touching, and invitation to sexual touching involving a seven-year-old victim.

The sexual assault conviction was stayed under the Kienapple Principle.

The court considered aggravating factors such as breach of trust and the victim's vulnerability, and mitigating factors including harsh pre-trial custody conditions and the certainty of deportation.

The court declined to grant credit for time spent in immigration detention as it was not directly a result of the charges.

A global sentence of 4.5 years imprisonment was imposed, with a 1.5:1 credit for 21 days of pre-bail custody.

Ancillary orders included a DNA sample, lifetime sexual offender registry, lifetime weapons prohibition, and a lifetime no-contact order with the victim and her family.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for possession of child pornography.

He argued that his inculpatory statement to the police was involuntary due to an unrecorded period at the station and his utterances regarding bail.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the statement was voluntary and not induced by police promises.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge had appropriately considered the appellant's strict pre-trial bail conditions as a mitigating factor.

The Crown sought to admit several statements made by the accused to first responders and police following the death of her severely disabled daughter.

The defence conceded there were no threats or inducements but argued the accused lacked an operating mind and that the police failed to keep an accurate record of the utterances.

The court found that the accused's responses were appropriate and demonstrated she had the minimum cognitive ability to understand what she was saying and to whom.

The court also held that the lack of complete recordings went to the weight of the statements, not their admissibility, and ruled all statements admissible.

The accused is charged with the first-degree murder of her severely disabled daughter.

The Crown brought an application to use a couch and a mannequin as demonstrative evidence during the testimony of a firefighter who first discovered the victim.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the firefighter could clearly describe the victim's position without the props, meaning the demonstrative evidence had minimal probative value.

Furthermore, the court held that using the props carried a real risk of prejudicial effect by potentially overemphasizing the victim's initial position or artificially inflating the witness's credibility.

The accused was charged with the first degree murder of her severely disabled daughter.

The defence brought an application for a directed verdict of acquittal on the charge of first degree murder, conceding there was evidence for second degree murder but arguing there was no evidence of planning and deliberation.

The court reviewed the evidence, including the accused's fabricated story of a home invasion, the staging of the crime scene, and the mode of killing by asphyxiation.

The court held that the complexity of the fabricated story and the staging of the scene provided sufficient circumstantial evidence from which a jury could infer that the killing was planned and deliberate.

The application for a directed verdict was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of sexual interference involving a child complainant.

At trial, the complainant's prior consistent statements were introduced to rehabilitate her credibility after cross-examination on inconsistencies.

The trial judge did not give a limiting instruction warning the jury not to use the prior consistent statements for their truth.

The Court of Appeal held that the omission of a limiting instruction was an error of law, as there was a real risk the jury would use the statements for an impermissible purpose to bolster the complainant's credibility.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The applicant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal court decision affirming his convictions for assault and assault with a weapon against his daughter.

He argued the trial judge erred in law by invoking the collateral facts rule to curtail cross-examination of the complainant regarding internet postings.

The Court of Appeal refused leave, finding that second appeals in summary conviction proceedings are exceptional and the proposed ground of appeal did not raise a question of law of general significance or demonstrate a clear legal error.

The appellant appealed a global sentence of 15 months (less one month pre-trial custody) for three serious offences, including uttering threats against his stepdaughter and former wife, and breaching a no-communication order.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle, noting the sentencing judge appropriately emphasized denunciation and deterrence given the appellant's violent history, which included sexual exploitation and obstructing justice.

The court held that the sentencing judge implicitly considered the guilty plea as a mitigating factor and that the sentence did not violate the totality principle.

The appeal was dismissed.