Kristin Bailey

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter following a home invasion where the victim was beaten and shot.

At trial, a key Crown witness refused to testify, and the trial judge admitted her preliminary inquiry testimony under s. 715(1) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting the evidence, gave an inadequate Vetrovec warning, and that the verdict was unreasonable.

He also appealed his 13-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's exercise of discretion to admit the preliminary inquiry evidence, as the appellant had a full opportunity to cross-examine the witness and the admission did not render the trial unfair.

The court also found the Vetrovec warning adequate and the verdict reasonable.

The sentence appeal was dismissed as the 13-year term was fit for an aggravated manslaughter involving a preplanned home invasion.

The Court dismissed the Crown appeal and upheld an order for a new trial on second degree murder, holding that the jury charge contained reversible errors on the use of post-offence conduct evidence for intent and that the curative proviso did not apply.

The appellant appealed his sentence, seeking enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, noting the sentencing judge did not have the benefit of the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Summers.

The appellant was granted 1.5 to 1 credit for all pre-sentence custody, resulting in a further 5 months of credit.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession and distribution of child pornography, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding his whereabouts on a specific date when illegal content was accessed on his home computer.

The Court of Appeal found ample evidence supporting the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant was home on that date.

Furthermore, the court held that even if an error occurred, it was not essential to the conviction, as the distinctive pattern of internet browsing pointed to the appellant.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant pleaded guilty to 12 offences, including possession for the purpose of trafficking in methamphetamine and cocaine, and dangerous driving involving ramming police cars.

He appealed his sentence, arguing it was manifestly excessive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence was not manifestly excessive given the seriousness of the offences and the appellant's extensive prior criminal record of over 45 convictions.

The appellant appealed his sentence, raising constitutional arguments regarding the Truth in Sentencing Act and the Charter.

The Court of Appeal found it unnecessary to address the constitutional arguments, noting the parties agreed to credit the appellant with an additional 315 days of pre-sentence custody.

The court held the resulting sentence was fit and at the low end of the range given the aggravating factors, including a lengthy record and the theft of vehicles worth almost $150,000.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant pleaded guilty to possession of a restricted firearm with ammunition and was sentenced to nine and one-half years' imprisonment.

He appealed his sentence, arguing that his prior youth conviction for the same offence should not trigger the enhanced mandatory minimum for a 'second or subsequent offence' under the Criminal Code due to the protections of the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that because the adult offence was committed within the statutory access period for the youth record, the appellant lost the protection of the YCJA.

Consequently, the prior youth conviction constituted an earlier offence, and the enhanced mandatory minimum applied.

The applicant brought a Rowbotham application seeking a conditional stay of proceedings pending the provision of state-funded counsel.

The applicant was charged with seven counts of fraud, six counts of possession of property obtained by crime, four counts each of forgery, personation with intent, drawing documents without authority, uttering documents without authority, and theft, and two counts of obtaining credit by fraud.

The court addressed three issues: the applicable standard of proof, whether the applicant established indigency, and whether counsel was essential for a fair trial.

The court held that the standard of proof is a balance of probabilities, not a high degree of probability, and found that the applicant established indigency.

However, the court found that the applicant failed to establish that counsel was essential to ensure a fair trial, given her educational background, business expertise, and the trial judge's ability to provide assistance.

The application was dismissed.

The Court addressed whether Crown-requested police background checks of prospective jurors were permissible and what disclosure duties followed from that practice.

It held that limited criminal-record checks to assess juror eligibility are permissible, and that relevant information obtained for jury selection must be disclosed to the defence.

Applying the appellate non-disclosure framework, the Court found no reasonable possibility that disclosure failures changed jury composition.

The Court also held the impugned conduct did not meet the threshold for miscarriage of justice based on appearance of unfairness.

The appeals from conviction were dismissed.

The plaintiff condominium corporation brought a motion for summary judgment against its former property manager and several related companies for fraud, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty.

The plaintiff alleged that the individual defendant orchestrated a massive fraud by rigging the tender process for repair work, falsifying contracts, and submitting invoices for work that was never performed.

The court found that the plaintiff's evidence overwhelmingly established the fraud and that the defendants' responding evidence was of no probative value.

Summary judgment was granted in favour of the plaintiff for over $1.3 million in damages, plus full indemnity costs.

The appellant appealed his sentence.

The Crown agreed that the sentence appeal should be allowed and the sentence reduced to 15 months, which equated to the time the appellant had already served.

The Court of Appeal agreed and allowed the appeal on that basis.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, robbery, break and enter, and related offences, as well as his sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on identification evidence and admitting hearsay.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that any alleged errors were inconsequential given the overwhelming DNA evidence placing the appellant at the scene of the home invasion.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the sentence was fit and within the appropriate range.

The applicant sought to quash a committal for trial on a charge of attempted murder following a preliminary inquiry.

The applicant argued the preliminary inquiry judge exceeded jurisdiction by inferring specific intent to kill from the circumstances of a violent assault involving strangulation, sexual assault, and severe beating.

The court applied the test of whether there was any evidence upon which a properly instructed jury could infer the requisite intent.

Considering the nature of the attack, the severity of the injuries, the sequence of events, and the abandonment of the complainant while unconscious and seriously injured, the court held there was sufficient evidence from which intent to kill could be inferred.

The application was dismissed and the committal for trial on attempted murder was upheld.

The applicant applied to re-open his abandoned appeal from a manslaughter conviction relating to the death of his infant grandson.

He argued that new understandings of Shaken Baby Syndrome following the Goudge Inquiry suggested his conviction might be a miscarriage of justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the case did not turn solely on Shaken Baby Syndrome but on cumulative circumstantial evidence, including an unexplained skull fracture, and the applicant failed to provide an innocent explanation for the injuries.

The Crown applied for certiorari with mandamus in aid to quash a preliminary inquiry ruling that discharged the accused on a charge of first degree murder while committing one accused on second degree murder and the other on accessory after the fact.

The Crown argued the preliminary inquiry judge exceeded jurisdiction by weighing evidence, preferring defence-favourable inferences, and failing to consider the evidence as a whole under s. 548(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Superior Court found the preliminary inquiry judge improperly assessed competing inferences and failed to recognize that the circumstantial evidence was capable of supporting planning and deliberation.

Evidence including the shooter’s approach, the execution-style killing, the presence of a getaway driver, and post-offence conduct could reasonably support committal for first degree murder.

The discharge order was quashed and the matter remitted with directions to commit both accused for trial on first degree murder.

The appellant appealed his convictions for dangerous driving causing death and bodily harm.

The convictions arose from an incident where the appellant and his cousin were driving at excessive speeds in close proximity, resulting in the cousin's vehicle losing control and striking another car, killing the cousin and injuring two others.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings on factual causation and tandem driving.

The Court also upheld the trial judge's discretionary decision to refuse the appellant's post-verdict application to re-open the defence case to adduce fresh evidence regarding a prosecution witness's credibility.

The appellant was convicted of attempted murder and firearms offences and sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment.

He appealed the sentence, arguing the trial judge overemphasized community impact, took improper judicial notice, and imposed a harsh sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's consideration of the premeditated nature of the offence, the use of a prohibited handgun, and the appellant's prior record.

The appellant appealed his conviction for the sexual assault of a 15-year-old complainant.

He argued the trial judge erred by relying on hearsay evidence, permitting improper cross-examination about whether he found the complainant attractive, and failing to properly apply the W.D. principles for assessing credibility.

Both parties also sought to introduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the applications to introduce fresh evidence, finding it did not meet the Palmer test.

The Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the hearsay evidence was properly used to infer state of mind, the cross-examination was permissible to rebut the appellant's assertion of good character, and the trial judge correctly applied the burden of proof.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge improperly used his silence as a basis for disbelieving his evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge did not rely on silence, but rather contrasted the appellant's trial testimony with a false story he provided at the scene of the accident.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge, arguing there was a misunderstanding over the view expressed by the pre-trial judge as to the appropriate sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting it could not resolve the conflict in the affidavits and reminding the bar to place the essence of pre-trial plea discussions on the record.

The term of imprisonment and probation were found to be appropriate.