Susan Ficek

The appellant appealed her conviction for fraud and forgery on two grounds: (1) that the verdict was unreasonable, and (2) that the Crown had the burden to disprove the defence of complicity by the complainant once an air of reality was raised.

The Court of Appeal rejected both grounds, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessment and his treatment of the complainant's evidence.

The trial judge was entitled to accept only part of the witness's testimony and gave clear reasons for his conclusions.

The appellant also sought leave to appeal her sentence based on delay in proceedings, but this was dismissed as the trial judge had properly considered the delay argument and noted it would be relevant at parole eligibility review.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault as a party to a robbery and sentenced to an effective term of five and one-half years.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by capping pre-sentence custody credit at 1.5 days without considering the harsh lockdown conditions he endured, and by imposing a longer sentence than his co-accused.

The Court of Appeal agreed the trial judge erred in law regarding the cap on credit for harsh conditions, but declined to grant enhanced credit due to a lack of evidence showing an adverse impact on the appellant.

The court also found no error regarding parity, noting the co-accused's guilty plea.

The appeal was allowed only to correct a 23-day calculation error in the pre-sentence credit.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

He argued his s. 11(b) Charter rights were infringed due to unreasonable delay.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial was completed under the 30-month ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

On the sentence appeal, the court allowed the appeal in part, granting 1.5:1 pre-trial custody credit and reducing the sentence by three months because the trial judge improperly considered the absence of remorse as an aggravating factor.

The forfeiture and s. 161 orders were upheld.

The applicant sought leave to appeal a sending order made under the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act after arguing that certain records fell outside the scope of the gathering order and that the motion judge misinterpreted both the gathering order and governing appellate authority.

The court held that appeals under the Act are limited to questions of law alone and found that at least some proposed grounds were arguably mixed fact and law.

It further held that the proposed issues were fact-specific, lacked broader importance, and had weak merits in light of authority establishing that a judge at a sending hearing need not determine whether material was gathered in accordance with the gathering order or whether it would afford evidence of an offence in the requesting state.

Leave to appeal was refused and the application was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder, arguing that the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding aiding and abetting, the mens rea for murder, and manslaughter.

The appellant also challenged the exclusion of hearsay statements by a co-accused and the admission of intercepted conversations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the jury instructions, read as a whole, adequately conveyed the essential issues and that any errors were harmless.

The court also upheld the evidentiary rulings, concluding that the hearsay statements lacked reliability and necessity, and the intercepted conversations were relevant to the Crown's theory without being unduly prejudicial.

The appellants appealed their convictions for an armed robbery of a restaurant.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, relying on the appellants' proximity to the getaway van shortly after the robbery.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge could infer the appellants were in the van, concluding they were the robbers was not the only rational inference.

Evidence showed at least three people were in the van, and DNA from other individuals was found inside.

The trial judge erred by failing to consider other possible combinations of perpetrators.

The appeal was allowed and acquittals were entered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge erred in his final instructions on reasonable doubt and that the jury selection process was compromised by late disclosure of an annotated juror list by the Crown.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge's short-form instructions on reasonable doubt were problematic, the charge as a whole did not leave the jury under any misapprehension of the standard of proof.

The Court also held that the jury vetting process did not cause a miscarriage of justice, as defence counsel was provided with the same information and chose not to use it.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder, arguing the trial judge erred in her jury instructions regarding collusion between Crown witnesses, fabrication of alibi evidence, motive to lie, and exclusive motive to kill.

The Crown cross-appealed the sentence, seeking to increase the 13-year parole ineligibility period to 15 years.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding no errors in the jury instructions and concluding the trial judge engaged in a comprehensive and fair assessment of the sentencing factors.

The appellant pleaded guilty to multiple serious offences, including assaulting a police officer with a sawed-off shotgun while on his way to commit arson.

The trial judge imposed a global sentence of 8 years and 9 months, which significantly exceeded the Crown's submission of 6 years.

On appeal, the appellant argued the sentence was too harsh and that the trial judge erred by 'jumping' the Crown's submission without notice.

The Court of Appeal held that while trial judges should advise counsel before significantly exceeding Crown submissions, the sentence imposed was warranted given the extreme seriousness of the offences and the appellant's prior record.

The appellant was convicted of attempted murder and firearms offences and sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment.

He appealed the sentence, arguing the trial judge overemphasized community impact, took improper judicial notice, and imposed a harsh sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's consideration of the premeditated nature of the offence, the use of a prohibited handgun, and the appellant's prior record.

The appellant was convicted of attempted murder and firearms offences following a trial by judge alone.

The main issue was identity, relying heavily on the victim's testimony.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred by failing to give himself a Vetrovec warning regarding the victim's evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that there is no requirement for a judge sitting alone to recite a Vetrovec caution in their reasons, and the trial judge was acutely aware of the dangers of relying on the victim's evidence.

During a murder investigation, police obtained a warrant to search a rooming house and found a sawed-off shotgun in the appellant's rented room.

The appellant was charged with weapons offences and argued the search violated his section 8 Charter rights.

The trial judge excluded the evidence, but the Court of Appeal reversed this decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that there was sufficient credible and reliable evidence for the issuing justice to authorize the warrant for the appellant's room.

The appellant laid a private information against his ex-wife alleging perjury, arson, and fraud.

At the pre-enquete, the justice of the peace refused to issue process, finding insufficient evidence.

The appellant applied for an order in lieu of mandamus, which was dismissed by the Superior Court.

On appeal, the appellant argued the justice erred by failing to consider hearsay evidence under s. 540(7) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the justice's refusal was based on the overall insufficiency and speculative nature of the evidence, not merely its inadmissibility, and that evidentiary errors generally do not amount to jurisdictional errors remediable by mandamus.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for offences involving a child complainant.

The appeal focused on the trial judge's credibility findings, which heavily favoured the complainant over the appellant and the child's mother.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's detailed credibility findings were entitled to a high degree of deference and revealed no error.

The appellant also failed to establish an adequate basis for the production of third-party records under section 278.2 of the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed his sentence for impaired driving and driving while disqualified, arguing the sentencing judge failed to apply the 'step' and 'gap' principles and erred by not granting 1:1 credit for time spent in a rehabilitation centre while on bail.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the 24-month sentence reasonable given the appellant's extensive record of similar offences.

The court held that because the sentencing judge had already reduced the sentence length to account for the appellant's rehabilitation efforts, she was not required to grant additional pre-sentence custody credit for the time spent in rehab.

The appellant appealed his convictions arising from an armed robbery, arguing the trial judge erred by using his pre-trial silence upon arrest to reject his exculpatory testimony.

The Court of Appeal agreed that using the appellant's constitutionally protected silence to assess credibility was a serious error in law.

However, the Court applied the curative proviso and dismissed the appeal, finding that the Crown's circumstantial case was overwhelming and the appellant's testimony was entirely implausible, such that no reasonable trier of fact could have reached a different verdict.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on first degree murder, in her jury instructions regarding the timing of the victim's injuries, and in failing to give a limiting instruction on post-offence conduct.

The Crown's theory was that the appellant killed the victim while forcibly confining him.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's application of the Arcuri test for a directed verdict, nor in the jury instructions when read as a whole.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on weapons offences after the trial judge excluded a sawed-off shotgun and ammunition found in his rooming house basement apartment.

The evidence was discovered during the execution of a search warrant related to a murder investigation involving another tenant.

The trial judge found the Information to Obtain (ITO) the search warrant was insufficient and intentionally confusing, violating the respondent's s. 8 Charter rights, and excluded the evidence under s. 24(2).

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge misapprehended and failed to consider relevant evidence.

The majority concluded that the cumulative facts in the ITO provided sufficient reasonable grounds for the authorizing justice to issue the warrant.

The acquittals were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The applicant, awaiting a retrial for first-degree murder, had his bail revoked after failing to report to police on Christmas Eve.

He applied for a review of the revocation order under s. 680 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence showing the applicant had been acquitted of the failure to comply charge because he simply forgot to report.

Finding the failure was not deliberate, the Court set aside the revocation order and reinstated the applicant's bail on the original conditions.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder in the shooting death of his wife, who had recently left him.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in admitting the deceased's ante mortem statements about her fear of him, in instructing the jury on eyewitness identification and gunshot residue evidence, in restricting cross-examination about third-party suspects, in allowing re-examination of an investigator, and in dismissing a mistrial application for late disclosure.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions, and concluding that the late disclosure did not impair the right to make full answer and defence.