Susan Ficek

The appellant appealed her conviction for fraud and forgery on two grounds: (1) that the verdict was unreasonable, and (2) that the Crown had the burden to disprove the defence of complicity by the complainant once an air of reality was raised.

The Court of Appeal rejected both grounds, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessment and his treatment of the complainant's evidence.

The trial judge was entitled to accept only part of the witness's testimony and gave clear reasons for his conclusions.

The appellant also sought leave to appeal her sentence based on delay in proceedings, but this was dismissed as the trial judge had properly considered the delay argument and noted it would be relevant at parole eligibility review.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

He argued his s. 11(b) Charter rights were infringed due to unreasonable delay.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial was completed under the 30-month ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

On the sentence appeal, the court allowed the appeal in part, granting 1.5:1 pre-trial custody credit and reducing the sentence by three months because the trial judge improperly considered the absence of remorse as an aggravating factor.

The forfeiture and s. 161 orders were upheld.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault as a party to a robbery and sentenced to an effective term of five and one-half years.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by capping pre-sentence custody credit at 1.5 days without considering the harsh lockdown conditions he endured, and by imposing a longer sentence than his co-accused.

The Court of Appeal agreed the trial judge erred in law regarding the cap on credit for harsh conditions, but declined to grant enhanced credit due to a lack of evidence showing an adverse impact on the appellant.

The court also found no error regarding parity, noting the co-accused's guilty plea.

The appeal was allowed only to correct a 23-day calculation error in the pre-sentence credit.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault of a 13-year-old complainant he met on a dating website.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in his credibility assessments, including his reasons for rejecting the appellant's evidence, his use of a friend's evidence to corroborate the complainant's allegations, and his finding that the complainant had no motive to fabricate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's credibility findings and concluding that the trial judge properly applied the W.(D.) test.

The appellant, a home renovation contractor, appealed his convictions for fraud over $5,000 and theft.

He had persuaded an elderly, vulnerable homeowner to enter into contracts totaling over $300,000 for renovations on a house worth $400,000, grossly overcharging her.

The Court of Appeal upheld the fraud conviction, finding that the overcharging, combined with taking advantage of the victim, constituted 'other fraudulent means'.

However, the court set aside the theft conviction, ruling that because the victim intended to part with her money (albeit induced by fraud), the appellant could not be convicted of both theft and fraud for the same funds.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual touching, arguing the trial judge's reasons were insufficient, misapprehended the evidence, and applied an uneven standard of scrutiny.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons permitted meaningful appellate review and properly assessed the credibility of the complainant and the appellant's police statement.

The applicant sought leave to appeal a sending order made under the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act after arguing that certain records fell outside the scope of the gathering order and that the motion judge misinterpreted both the gathering order and governing appellate authority.

The court held that appeals under the Act are limited to questions of law alone and found that at least some proposed grounds were arguably mixed fact and law.

It further held that the proposed issues were fact-specific, lacked broader importance, and had weak merits in light of authority establishing that a judge at a sending hearing need not determine whether material was gathered in accordance with the gathering order or whether it would afford evidence of an offence in the requesting state.

Leave to appeal was refused and the application was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder, arguing that the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding aiding and abetting, the mens rea for murder, and manslaughter.

The appellant also challenged the exclusion of hearsay statements by a co-accused and the admission of intercepted conversations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the jury instructions, read as a whole, adequately conveyed the essential issues and that any errors were harmless.

The court also upheld the evidentiary rulings, concluding that the hearsay statements lacked reliability and necessity, and the intercepted conversations were relevant to the Crown's theory without being unduly prejudicial.

The appellant appealed his convictions for weapons offences, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting a seized gun under s. 24(2) of the Charter after finding he was arbitrarily detained contrary to s. 9.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's s. 24(2) analysis.

The court held that the trial judge's finding that the police acted in good faith and their conduct was not egregious was reasonably supported by the context, including the appellant's flight in a high crime area and the brief period of detention.

The appellants appealed their convictions for an armed robbery of a restaurant.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, relying on the appellants' proximity to the getaway van shortly after the robbery.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge could infer the appellants were in the van, concluding they were the robbers was not the only rational inference.

Evidence showed at least three people were in the van, and DNA from other individuals was found inside.

The trial judge erred by failing to consider other possible combinations of perpetrators.

The appeal was allowed and acquittals were entered.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge's eight-page reasons were inadequate to permit meaningful review.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while it would have been preferable for the trial judge to more fully address the alleged frailties in the complainant's evidence, the pathway to the conclusion was apparent.

The trial judge had specifically addressed the fact that the complainant lied to the police, finding she was terrified.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge erred in his final instructions on reasonable doubt and that the jury selection process was compromised by late disclosure of an annotated juror list by the Crown.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge's short-form instructions on reasonable doubt were problematic, the charge as a whole did not leave the jury under any misapprehension of the standard of proof.

The Court also held that the jury vetting process did not cause a miscarriage of justice, as defence counsel was provided with the same information and chose not to use it.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder, arguing the trial judge erred in her jury instructions regarding collusion between Crown witnesses, fabrication of alibi evidence, motive to lie, and exclusive motive to kill.

The Crown cross-appealed the sentence, seeking to increase the 13-year parole ineligibility period to 15 years.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding no errors in the jury instructions and concluding the trial judge engaged in a comprehensive and fair assessment of the sentencing factors.

The appellant pleaded guilty to multiple serious offences, including assaulting a police officer with a sawed-off shotgun while on his way to commit arson.

The trial judge imposed a global sentence of 8 years and 9 months, which significantly exceeded the Crown's submission of 6 years.

On appeal, the appellant argued the sentence was too harsh and that the trial judge erred by 'jumping' the Crown's submission without notice.

The Court of Appeal held that while trial judges should advise counsel before significantly exceeding Crown submissions, the sentence imposed was warranted given the extreme seriousness of the offences and the appellant's prior record.

The appellant was convicted of attempted murder and firearms offences following a trial by judge alone.

The main issue was identity, relying heavily on the victim's testimony.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred by failing to give himself a Vetrovec warning regarding the victim's evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that there is no requirement for a judge sitting alone to recite a Vetrovec caution in their reasons, and the trial judge was acutely aware of the dangers of relying on the victim's evidence.

The appellant was convicted of attempted murder and firearms offences and sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment.

He appealed the sentence, arguing the trial judge overemphasized community impact, took improper judicial notice, and imposed a harsh sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's consideration of the premeditated nature of the offence, the use of a prohibited handgun, and the appellant's prior record.

During a murder investigation, police obtained a warrant to search a rooming house and found a sawed-off shotgun in the appellant's rented room.

The appellant was charged with weapons offences and argued the search violated his section 8 Charter rights.

The trial judge excluded the evidence, but the Court of Appeal reversed this decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that there was sufficient credible and reliable evidence for the issuing justice to authorize the warrant for the appellant's room.

The appellant laid a private information against his ex-wife alleging perjury, arson, and fraud.

At the pre-enquete, the justice of the peace refused to issue process, finding insufficient evidence.

The appellant applied for an order in lieu of mandamus, which was dismissed by the Superior Court.

On appeal, the appellant argued the justice erred by failing to consider hearsay evidence under s. 540(7) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the justice's refusal was based on the overall insufficiency and speculative nature of the evidence, not merely its inadmissibility, and that evidentiary errors generally do not amount to jurisdictional errors remediable by mandamus.

The appellant appealed his convictions for attempted murder, aggravated assault, and uttering a death threat, as well as his six-year sentence for attempted murder.

The Crown conceded the aggravated assault conviction violated the Kienapple principle, and it was stayed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal for attempted murder, finding the trial judge correctly refused to leave self-defence with the jury as there was no objective air of reality to the defence given the pre-emptive nature of the machete attack.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the appellant's subjective fear was not a mitigating factor and the six-year sentence was not manifestly unfit.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault, assault with a weapon, and dangerous driving.

The Crown conceded that the trial judge made a serious error relating to self-defence in the main charge to the jury and in answering a jury question.

The Court of Appeal found that the misdirection affected all charges, as the events occurred in one continuous series.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.