Raymond Earl Boggs

The applicant, Gaetano Di Blasi, sought a declaration that his property in Aurora, Ontario, was protected as an existing non-conforming use, allowing him to continue using it for outdoor storage of vehicles, machinery, equipment, business operations, storage of heavy trucks, and trailers.

The Town of Aurora opposed all uses except residential.

The court reviewed the history of zoning, prior proceedings, and the legal test for non-conforming use, ultimately finding that the relevant date for establishing legal non-conforming use was September 8, 1970, and that the applicant failed to prove the claimed uses were legal and continuous from that date.

The application was dismissed, and costs awarded to the Town.

The appellant, Gaetano Di Blasi, appealed a trial order declaring a berm he constructed to be in breach of municipal bylaw, authorizing the Regional Municipality of York to enter his property for remediation, enjoining him from interfering with water flow, and requiring him to pay damages in nuisance.

He also appealed a contempt finding and a $10,000 fine for failing to comply with a 2014 order to remove the berm.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge’s decision, upheld the findings, and dismissed the appeal, awarding $25,000 in costs to the respondent.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault and assault with a weapon following an incident on July 23, 2014, where she stabbed and bit the complainant with scissors.

The appellant was acquitted on the count of unlawful entry.

On appeal, the appellant raised three grounds: (1) that the trial judge failed to consider her defence of lawful ejection of trespassers under s. 35 of the Criminal Code; (2) that the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of her discreditable conduct; and (3) that her assault convictions conflicted with her acquittal on the unlawful entry count.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the convictions.

The appellant appealed a committal order for extradition to the United States on charges of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and mail fraud, and possession and transmission of counterfeit money orders.

The domestic equivalent offence was possession of property obtained by crime.

The appellant challenged whether the evidence met the standard of proof on two essential elements: identification as a participant in the scheme and knowledge of the criminal origins of the funds.

The Court of Appeal upheld the committal order, finding that the evidence of identical names and dates of birth, combined with circumstantial evidence, satisfied the identification requirement, and that the totality of the evidence permitted a reasonable jury to conclude the appellant knew the funds were proceeds of fraud.

The appellant's application for judicial review of the Minister's surrender order was dismissed as abandoned.

Anna La Force was found guilty of aggravated assault and assault with a weapon.

This decision outlines the sentencing, considering aggravating factors such as the violent, prolonged, and premeditated nature of the attack on a "Good Samaritan," and the accused's lack of remorse.

Mitigating factors included her youth, lack of criminal record, and family support.

The court also addressed the collateral consequence of potential deportation due to her permanent resident status, affirming that while it can be considered, it cannot compromise fundamental sentencing principles.

A sentence of 20 months' imprisonment for aggravated assault and a concurrent 12 months for assault with a weapon was imposed, along with probation and ancillary orders.

The appellant appealed a ten-year sentence imposed for manslaughter following her conviction for beating her three-year-old daughter to death.

The appellant raised four grounds of appeal: inadequate credit for stringent bail conditions, penalization for letters of support from family members, treatment of absence of remorse as an aggravating factor, and failure to consider immigration consequences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds, finding no error in the trial judge's sentencing decision.

The court emphasized the brutal nature of the killing, the extensive injuries inflicted on the victim, and the absence of meaningful mitigating factors.

Anna La Force was charged with aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, and unlawful entry into a dwelling.

The charges stemmed from an attack on Allison Robinson, a friend of Luisa Botelho, with whom La Force and Botelho were both in a relationship with Cavin Banfield.

The court found La Force to be the aggressor, rejecting her self-defence claim.

She was convicted of aggravated assault and assault with a weapon.

However, the court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that La Force was in the dwelling without lawful excuse, leading to an acquittal on the unlawful entry charge.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder for killing a 2½-year-old child in his care and assault causing bodily harm.

He was acquitted of aggravated assault.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence, arguing that the jury instructions were inadequate, that the murder conviction was unreasonable, and that the verdicts were inconsistent.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding that the jury was properly instructed, that the evidence supported the murder conviction, and that the verdicts were reconcilable based on their different elements and temporal distinctions.

On sentencing, the appellant sought to introduce fresh evidence of his Aboriginal status, which was admitted but found insufficient to warrant a reduction in the 15-year period of parole ineligibility.

The appellant appealed her conviction for fraud and forgery on two grounds: (1) that the verdict was unreasonable, and (2) that the Crown had the burden to disprove the defence of complicity by the complainant once an air of reality was raised.

The Court of Appeal rejected both grounds, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessment and his treatment of the complainant's evidence.

The trial judge was entitled to accept only part of the witness's testimony and gave clear reasons for his conclusions.

The appellant also sought leave to appeal her sentence based on delay in proceedings, but this was dismissed as the trial judge had properly considered the delay argument and noted it would be relevant at parole eligibility review.

The offender, Sukhraj Atwal, was convicted of forgery and fraud after trial.

She was an external bookkeeper for Star Plastics Inc. and, over an 8-week period in 2006, forged 97 cheques totaling over one million dollars, resulting in an actual loss of $645,301.16 to the company.

The court considered aggravating factors such as breach of trust, planned and deliberate conduct, and the significant financial loss, and mitigating factors including her age (54), lack of prior record, and generally positive presentence report.

The court rejected the defence's arguments for a conditional sentence based on delay and the victim's alleged "unclean hands." A penitentiary sentence was deemed necessary for general deterrence.

Gregory McClurg was charged with making and possessing child pornography, sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching.

The complainant, a 15-year-old runaway, testified that the accused showed her pornography, sexually touched her, and took photographs of her.

The accused denied the allegations, presenting an alibi and suggesting his son's involvement, and also claimed erectile dysfunction.

The court found the complainant's testimony credible regarding sexual touching and the creation of child pornography, but had lingering doubt about the accused's direct involvement and the reliability of his alibi.

Consequently, the Crown failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and the accused was acquitted of all charges.

In a murder prosecution, the Crown sought to admit multiple statements made by the accused during police interviews and at the scene of a medical emergency involving a child.

The defence argued the statements were involuntary and obtained in breach of ss. 7 and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court conducted a voir dire examining voluntariness under the confessions rule and the accused’s right to silence.

Some statements were admitted where the accused attended voluntarily and spoke without coercion, while other statements were excluded where police interrogation ignored repeated assertions of the right to remain silent or involved oppressive questioning.

The ruling provides a contextual analysis of voluntariness and the interaction between the confessions rule and Charter protections.