Karen Shai

The appellant, who had died prior to the appeal hearing, was convicted on March 16, 2017 by Justice Randall W. Lalande of the Ontario Court of Justice.

Both the Crown and the appellant's counsel agreed that the conviction represented a miscarriage of justice.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and entered an acquittal.

Two appellants were convicted following a jury trial for their roles in an armed robbery of a drug dealer's residence in Barrhaven.

During the robbery, one of the perpetrators shot and killed the resident.

The first appellant was convicted of first degree murder; the second appellant was convicted of second degree murder.

On appeal, the first appellant's conviction was upheld.

However, the second appellant's conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered due to errors in the trial judge's jury instructions regarding the mens rea requirement for party liability to murder under section 21(2) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant was convicted on an indictment containing ten counts of various offences against three persons, with allegations spanning periods of 8 to 10 years.

On appeal from conviction, the appellant advanced two grounds: first, that the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence, subjecting Crown witnesses to a less rigorous standard than defence witnesses; and second, that the trial judge improperly imposed an evidentiary burden on the appellant to explain injuries sustained by one complainant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both grounds, finding that the trial judge's reasons reflected a cautious, even-handed approach to credibility assessment and that the trial judge's comments regarding the unexplained injuries were merely observations on the state of evidence rather than an improper shift in the burden of proof.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board dated February 6, 2017, challenging the Board's addition of a "24-hour-a-day" supervision requirement to a community accommodation condition.

The appellant contended this requirement was not part of the joint submission made at the hearing.

The Court of Appeal found no merit in the appeal, determining that the hearing transcript clearly showed counsel for the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health had proposed a housing clause specifically including 24-hour staff supervision, which the appellant's counsel had supported.

The Board's disposition therefore accepted the parties' joint submission rather than departing from it.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a ten-year sentence imposed for manslaughter following her conviction for beating her three-year-old daughter to death.

The appellant raised four grounds of appeal: inadequate credit for stringent bail conditions, penalization for letters of support from family members, treatment of absence of remorse as an aggravating factor, and failure to consider immigration consequences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds, finding no error in the trial judge's sentencing decision.

The court emphasized the brutal nature of the killing, the extensive injuries inflicted on the victim, and the absence of meaningful mitigating factors.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on eight charges of serious assault, including physical and sexual abuse.

The trial judge acquitted the respondent on all counts after a nine-day trial.

The Crown argued that the trial judge failed to provide adequate reasons for the acquittals, providing only brief comments on the record that did not explain the decision or permit meaningful appellate review.

The trial judge promised detailed written reasons but never delivered them despite repeated requests over several months.

The appellate court found that the trial judge's brief comments constituted only the "bottom line" decision without any analysis of the evidence, contradictions between witnesses, or identification of specific evidentiary gaps supporting the reasonable doubt conclusion.

The court held that the failure to provide reasons that permit meaningful appellate review constitutes reversible error in law.

The appellant appealed his conviction, seeking to introduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application to admit fresh evidence, finding it lacked potential cogency and was available at trial.

The Court upheld the conviction, concluding that the circumstantial evidence was sufficient and the trial judge did not err in giving substantial weight to the false alibi evidence.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his detention at a mental health facility.

He argued his risk could be managed on a conditional discharge and that his detention amounted to cruel and unusual punishment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's conclusion reasonable given the appellant's lack of community support, history of elopements, and substance abuse issues.

The Court also rejected the Charter argument, noting the detention was not a probable period of indefinite incarceration as the facility offered necessary programming for potential future reintegration.

The appellant, a military member, appealed his sexual assault conviction on the basis of unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter, and appealed his sentence regarding a $4,000 victim surcharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's characterization of pre-charge and post-charge delay.

The sentence appeal was allowed, and the victim surcharge was reduced to the statutory minimum of $100 because there was no inquiry into the appellant's ability to pay the elevated amount.

The appellant, a caregiver for an elderly man, was convicted of fraud and theft after withdrawing approximately $180,000 from his bank account over several years.

She was also convicted of defrauding the Department of Veterans Affairs.

She was sentenced to 20 months in custody, two years of probation, and ordered to pay restitution.

On appeal, she argued the trial judge erred in finding she controlled the victim, that the verdict was unreasonable, and that the restitution order failed to consider her ability to pay.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusions reasonable and the restitution order appropriate given the amounts taken and the modest payment schedule imposed.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board's decision was reasonable and based on the expert evidence of Dr. Woodside.

The Court held that the Board's order represented the least onerous and least restrictive disposition for the appellant at the time, and there was no basis to inquire into what might happen beyond the one-year term of the disposition.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in drawing inferences from video evidence regarding causation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant's blow significantly contributed to the victim's rupture was amply supported by the record.

The sentence appeal was abandoned.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual offences, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting the evidence of two complainants as similar fact evidence due to potential collusion.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge thoroughly and correctly addressed the possibility of collusion, both as deliberate concoction and as the potential impact of their discussions on the independence of their evidence.

The trial judge's finding that the evidence was not the product of concoction was upheld.

The appeal was dismissed, with the Court noting the case against the appellant was overwhelming.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter, criminal negligence causing death, and failing to provide the necessaries of life after her severely developmentally delayed sister starved to death while locked in her basement.

She was sentenced to nine years' imprisonment.

On appeal, she argued the trial judge provided insufficient reasons regarding expert evidence, failed to properly consider the mental elements of the offences, and imposed a sentence that offended the parity principle compared to her husband's conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons sufficient, the mental elements properly established, and the disparity in sentences justified by the appellant's role as primary caregiver and lack of remorse.

The appellant appealed his conviction for a home invasion, arguing that the trial judge failed to consider exculpatory evidence, improperly considered inadmissible statements, misapprehended footprint evidence, and failed to properly assess credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence, credibility findings, or treatment of the statements.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching involving two children who had been placed in temporary foster care in his daughter's home.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in admitting out-of-court statements from one of the children under the principled exception to the hearsay rule, and in using the evidence of each child as similar fact evidence on the counts relating to the other.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly applied the principled exception to the hearsay rule and that the trial judge's findings of guilt did not improperly rely on similar fact evidence.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder in the drowning death of her four-year-old daughter.

On appeal, she argued the trial judge erred in admitting a paediatric pathologist's expert evidence regarding bruising and in failing to adequately instruct the jury on the included offence of manslaughter.

The Court of Appeal found no error in admitting the expert evidence but concluded the jury instructions on manslaughter were fatally flawed, as they failed to present the defence's perspective on the appellant's intent.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed her conviction for the second-degree murder of her partner's two-year-old child.

She argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on expert pathological evidence regarding blunt force trauma and on her post-offence conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge fairly and accurately dealt with the expert evidence and properly instructed the jury that if they accepted the appellant's innocent explanation for her post-offence lies, that conduct could not be used as circumstantial evidence of guilt.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittals for attempted murder, aggravated assault, and leaving the scene of an accident.

The accused had run over the victim with her car following an altercation, and the main issue at trial was whether she acted intentionally or accidentally out of panic.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred by instructing the jury to consider the accused's crack cocaine consumption in relation to her state of mind.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the instruction was a proper 'rolled-up charge' rather than a stand-alone intoxication defence, and concluded that even if there was an error, it would not have had a material bearing on the acquittals.

The appellant appealed her conviction and sentence.

She abandoned her conviction appeal, which was consequently dismissed.

Despite commending the appellant's sincere efforts at rehabilitation and addressing her drug addiction, the Court of Appeal found the original sentence to be fit and dismissed the sentence appeal.