Dr. Angus McDonald

The appellant, who suffered from schizophrenia and represented himself at trial, appealed his first-degree murder conviction.

He argued he was unfit to stand trial and urged the Court of Appeal to overturn or modify the 'limited cognitive capacity' test from R. v. Taylor to require that an accused be capable of making rational decisions in their best interests.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the Taylor test, clarifying that while an accused must have a reality-based understanding of their legal predicament and the ability to make decisions, they need not possess 'analytic capacity' to make decisions in their own best interests.

The Court also dismissed grounds of appeal relating to the voluntariness of statements made to a Crown psychiatrist and refused to admit fresh psychiatric evidence to substitute a verdict of not criminally responsible.

On a Crown application in a judge-alone prosecution for historical sexual offences against a child, the court admitted extrinsic similar fact evidence from another alleged victim who attended the same school at the same time.

Applying the similar fact evidence framework, the court held that the live issue was whether the complainant's account reflected real events rather than fantasy, particularly in light of anticipated psychiatric evidence challenging reliability and truthfulness.

The surrounding circumstances of the alleged incidents, including age similarity, school setting, authority relationship, isolated locations, focus on genital touching, and reassuring language, supplied sufficient connectedness despite differences in number and invasiveness of acts.

The court found the risk of prejudice reduced in a judge-alone trial and concluded the probative value outweighed the prejudicial effect.

Following conviction for criminal harassment and before disposition, the court addressed serious concerns about the accused's mental health and criminal responsibility.

After an earlier assessment order failed to yield the mandatory written report, the court held that the statutory requirements under ss. 672.11 and 672.2 of the Criminal Code had not been met.

Relying on forensic psychiatric evidence, the court concluded that a fulsome inpatient assessment was necessary to determine criminal responsibility and to inform a fair and safe sentencing disposition.

A fresh 60-day assessment order was issued, with detailed directions and prompt transport to the psychiatric facility.

The Crown applied to have the offender declared a dangerous offender following his guilty plea to sexual assault.

The offender had a lengthy criminal record, including three prior sexual assaults, and was diagnosed with antisocial personality disorder and severe substance abuse issues.

The court found that the offender met the criteria for a dangerous offender designation due to his pattern of repetitive and persistent aggressive behaviour and failure to control his sexual impulses.

However, the court concluded that a lesser measure than an indeterminate sentence would adequately protect the public, imposing a determinate sentence of five years followed by a ten-year long-term supervision order.

The applicant hospital brought a motion under s. 672.76 of the Criminal Code to suspend a disposition of the Ontario Review Board pending appeal.

The Board had ordered the respondent, who was found not criminally responsible, to be detained in a medium secure unit.

The applicant sought to transfer the respondent to a maximum security facility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, holding that suspending a Board disposition requires compelling evidence of extraordinary circumstances, which the applicant failed to provide as the evidence on the motion was the same as that considered by the Board.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault of a developmentally disabled complainant and an eight-month custodial sentence.

The majority held that the complainant’s videotaped and oral out-of-court statements were properly admitted under the principled hearsay exception because the evidence established necessity through her indefinite inability to testify and threshold reliability through timing, demeanour, absence of apparent fabrication, and corroborative admissions by the appellant.

The court further upheld findings that the complainant lacked capacity to consent to the sexual activity and that the defence of honest but mistaken belief had no air of reality, given the appellant’s knowledge of her significant cognitive limitations and failure to take reasonable steps to ascertain capacity and consent.

The s. 11(b) delay argument and sentence appeal were also rejected.

A dissent would have ordered a new trial on the basis that necessity was not established because the complainant’s unavailability may have been temporary and the inability to cross-examine her impaired full answer and defence.

The appellant appealed a first degree murder conviction arising from the killing of a child, where the central trial issue was his mental state and potential exemption from criminal responsibility.

The Court of Appeal held that statements made by the appellant to a psychiatrist during a court-ordered psychiatric assessment for fitness and criminal responsibility were protected under s. 672.21 of the Criminal Code and were inadmissible to prove actus reus or mens rea.

The court found the appellant's consent was limited to assessment for fitness and criminal responsibility and did not authorize substantive use of the statements to prove planning and deliberation.

Because the psychiatrist's evidence was central to the Crown's case on first degree murder, the curative proviso could not be applied.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The accused was convicted of three counts of sexual assault and declared a dangerous offender, receiving an indeterminate sentence.

The Court of Appeal overturned the designation, finding the trial judge failed to consider the gravity of the predicate offences in isolation.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that under s. 753(b) of the Criminal Code, a trial judge need not focus on the objective seriousness of a predicate offence to justify a dangerous offender designation, provided the offender's past conduct demonstrates a present likelihood of inflicting future harm.

The trial judge's findings were reasonable and supported by psychiatric evidence.