Stephen Kurelek

The appellant, who was designated a dangerous offender and given an indeterminate sentence in 1988, appealed the dismissal of his application for habeas corpus.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the original sentencing judge lacked jurisdiction to order a psychiatric remand under the Criminal Code and failed to invoke the Mental Health Act.

Furthermore, the sentencing judge erred by fettering his discretion when he concluded he had no choice but to impose the dangerous offender designation if statutory criteria were met.

The habeas corpus application was granted, the dangerous offender designation was quashed, and the matter was remitted to the Superior Court for a fresh sentencing hearing.

Five bellwether individual issues trials were heard as summary judgment motions to determine whether class members who were placed in administrative segregation in federal penitentiaries were entitled to additional compensatory damages beyond their share of the aggregate damages award.

The court assessed the idiosyncratic harm suffered by each plaintiff, taking into account their pre-existing mental health conditions and other stressors.

The court awarded additional compensatory damages to three plaintiffs ($50,000, $25,000, and $75,000) who proved that their time in segregation caused specific, additional harm.

The claims of the other two plaintiffs were dismissed as they failed to prove causation.

The court declined to award punitive damages in any of the cases.

The applicant, Steven Forster, sought habeas corpus with certiorari in aid to quash his 1988 warrant of committal as a dangerous offender and for immediate release, after over 31 years of imprisonment.

He alleged procedural and jurisdictional errors during his dangerous offender designation and ineffective assistance of counsel.

The court first addressed the admissibility of Correctional Service Canada records and the Ministry of the Attorney General records, finding them admissible for context and relevance to the requested relief and public safety concerns.

The court then considered whether to decline jurisdiction based on alternative remedies or comprehensive review procedures, ultimately deciding it had jurisdiction as there was no statutory right of appeal for the dangerous offender designation based on procedural errors at the time.

The court found that the psychiatric remand was authorized, notice of the dangerous offender application was adequate and caused no prejudice, and the applicant was present during submissions.

While the sentencing judge erred in believing he lacked discretion in the dangerous offender designation, this error was deemed to have no practical effect on the outcome.

The claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was also dismissed as the applicant failed to establish incompetence or resulting miscarriage of justice.

Consequently, the application for habeas corpus was dismissed.

Class counsel brought a motion for approval of their legal fees and disbursements following a successful summary judgment motion that awarded $20 million in aggregate damages for Charter breaches related to the administrative segregation of mentally ill inmates.

The court approved the requested 33.3% contingency fee, totaling $6.66 million plus HST, finding it reasonable given the significant risks undertaken and the substantial success achieved.

The court also approved a $15,000 honorarium for each of the two representative plaintiffs in recognition of their exceptional contributions to the litigation.

The plaintiffs, Christopher Brazeau and David Kift, sought an award of costs totaling $1,164,059.22 in partial indemnity costs and disbursements after a partially successful summary judgment motion in a certified class proceeding against the Attorney General of Canada.

The Federal Government argued for each party to bear their own costs or a significant reduction, citing divided success, reduction in class period, dismissal of certain claims, and abandonment of health care claims during the motion.

The court awarded the plaintiffs $800,000, all-inclusive, comprising $600,000 for legal expenses and $200,000 for disbursements, finding them to be the successful party despite divided success, but adjusting the award due to the abandonment of health care claims and insufficient documentation for disbursements.

The Representative Plaintiffs sought prejudgment and postjudgment interest on a $20 million Charter damages award previously granted for deterrence and vindication in a class action concerning administrative segregation of mentally ill inmates.

The Federal Government opposed the award of interest.

The court determined that Charter damages awarded purely for deterrence and vindication are functionally similar to punitive damages, on which interest is generally precluded by the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act.

Alternatively, the court exercised its discretion to disallow interest, emphasizing that the $20 million award was non-compensatory, intended to remedy societal harm and ensure future Charter compliance, rather than to compensate individual class members for pecuniary loss.

Consequently, no prejudgment or postjudgment interest was awarded.

The representative plaintiffs brought a summary judgment motion in a class action on behalf of seriously mentally ill inmates placed in administrative segregation in federal penitentiaries.

The court found that administrative segregation is a form of solitary confinement that causes severe psychological harm to mentally ill inmates.

The court held that the Federal Government breached section 7 of the Charter due to an inadequate review process, and breached sections 7 and 12 by subjecting mentally ill inmates to prolonged administrative segregation (over 30 days involuntary or 60 days voluntary).

The court awarded $20 million in aggregate Charter damages for vindication and deterrence, to be used for structural changes or additional mental health resources.

The appellant, imprisoned as a dangerous offender for over 30 years, launched a habeas corpus application challenging the validity of his detention and warrant of committal.

The application judge dismissed the application summarily on a motion by the respondent, finding it was plain and obvious the application could not succeed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the application should not have been dismissed without a full hearing on the merits.

The court found that the application judge misapplied civil procedure rules to a criminal matter and that the appellant's grounds were arguably unique and not frivolous or vexatious.

The applicant, Steven Forster, sought a writ of habeas corpus with certiorari in aid and relief under s. 24(1) of the Charter, challenging the validity of his 1988 dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence.

He argued jurisdictional errors by the trial court, including lack of notice, unlawful psychiatric remand, absence from court, and the trial judge's failure to exercise discretion.

The respondent, Attorney General of Canada, moved to strike the application, arguing it was a collateral attack on a decision previously appealed and that the court should decline habeas corpus jurisdiction where an appellate route was available.

The court found that the challenges raised by the applicant were available to him during his 1995 appeal to the Ontario Court of Appeal, which had upheld the indeterminate sentence and implicitly the dangerous offender finding.

Distinguishing the case from precedents like *R. v. Gamble* and *Gallichon v. Canada*, where applicants challenged ongoing deprivation of liberty due to changes in law, the court concluded that Forster's application was an attempt to circumvent appeal rights already exercised.

The respondent's motion to dismiss the application was granted.

The applicant sought a writ of habeas corpus with certiorari in aid to challenge his re-classification from minimum to medium security and subsequent transfer by the Correctional Service of Canada (CSC).

The applicant argued the re-classification and transfer were unreasonable and unlawful due to incorrect file information affecting his Security Classification Scale (SRS) score.

The court found that the deprivation of liberty was reasonable and lawful.

It determined that while an initial error in the SRS score was acknowledged by CSC, the re-classification and transfer were ultimately justified based on a holistic assessment of institutional adjustment, escape risk, and public safety, overriding the SRS score with professional judgment.

The application for habeas corpus was dismissed.