Jocelyn Rivera Espejo-Clarke

Five bellwether individual issues trials were heard as summary judgment motions to determine whether class members who were placed in administrative segregation in federal penitentiaries were entitled to additional compensatory damages beyond their share of the aggregate damages award.

The court assessed the idiosyncratic harm suffered by each plaintiff, taking into account their pre-existing mental health conditions and other stressors.

The court awarded additional compensatory damages to three plaintiffs ($50,000, $25,000, and $75,000) who proved that their time in segregation caused specific, additional harm.

The claims of the other two plaintiffs were dismissed as they failed to prove causation.

The court declined to award punitive damages in any of the cases.

This appeal concerns the interaction between a provincial legislative scheme governing child protection (CYFSA) and a federal legislative scheme for removing those without citizenship or immigration status from Canada (IRPA).

Specifically, it addresses a disclosure order granted to the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness in a child protection status hearing.

The motion judge granted the disclosure, which was upheld by the Superior Court.

The appellants (the parent, the Children's Aid Society, and the Office of the Children's Lawyer) argued that the disclosure order improperly prioritized the Minister's interests over the children's privacy and best interests.

The Court of Appeal found that while the motion judge had jurisdiction to order disclosure, she erred by not requiring the Minister to establish a prima facie basis for the scope of submissions or the requested disclosure.

The appeal was allowed, and the matter remitted to the motion judge for reconsideration based on a new framework requiring the Minister to justify the scope of submissions and disclosure.

The applicant, a citizen of Sri Lanka, sought judicial review of a decision by the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) refusing his refugee protection claim on the basis that he was excluded under Article 1E of the Convention due to his permanent resident status in Switzerland.

The applicant argued that he was denied natural justice due to the incompetence of his former representative, an immigration consultant, who failed to obtain evidence confirming his loss of status in Switzerland and failed to make oral submissions at the RPD hearing.

The Federal Court found that the former representative's conduct amounted to incompetence, which resulted in a miscarriage of justice.

The Court set aside the RPD's decision and remitted the matter for redetermination.

The Court also certified a question regarding whether the phrase "any right of appeal" in paragraph 72(2)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act includes an application to reopen a claim before the RPD.

The applicant, a citizen of Nigeria, sought a stay of his removal pending judicial review of a deferral officer's decision.

He submitted new evidence of a same-sex relationship, arguing he faced risk of persecution upon return.

The deferral officer had dismissed the new evidence as pertaining to a risk previously assessed by the Refugee Protection Division.

The Federal Court found the officer erred by failing to consider whether new evidence could overcome previous negative risk findings, establishing a serious issue.

Concluding that removal would expose the applicant to irreparable harm and the balance of convenience favoured him, the Court granted the stay of removal.

The Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness brought a motion within ongoing child protection proceedings, seeking disclosure of case documents and the right to make submissions regarding a final supervision order.

This was prompted by an existing deportation order against the mother and one child, which is stayed if the Minister has an opportunity to make submissions under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

The Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto, the mother, and the Office of the Children’s Lawyer opposed the extent of the Minister's requested involvement, arguing for limited submissions and no disclosure.

The court found it had jurisdiction, either explicitly under the Family Law Rules or implicitly, to order disclosure to a non-party.

It ruled that the Minister was entitled to make informed and meaningful submissions on all relevant issues, including whether a genuine lis existed between the parties, and ordered the society to provide past and future relevant documents, with strict conditions on their use to protect privacy.

The applicant sought judicial review of a visa officer's decision refusing her application for a study permit.

The officer was not satisfied that the applicant would leave Canada at the end of her authorized stay, citing insufficient ties to her home country and the vague nature of her study plan.

The Federal Court found the officer's decision was reasonable, noting that the applicant failed to establish she would leave Canada and that her arguments amounted to a mere disagreement with the officer's weighing of the evidence.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The appellants, who had been in immigration detention for lengthy periods awaiting deportation, brought applications for habeas corpus in the Ontario Superior Court.

The application judge declined jurisdiction, finding that the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) provided a comprehensive statutory review mechanism as broad and advantageous as habeas corpus.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals, holding that where the legality of a continuing lengthy detention of uncertain duration is challenged, the IRPA review process is less broad and less advantageous than habeas corpus.

The Court found that habeas corpus places the onus on the Minister to justify the detention and is available as of right, unlike the discretionary judicial review process under the IRPA.

The moving party brought an urgent motion to stay a deportation order pending the release of the Court of Appeal's decision in an appeal concerning habeas corpus applications for lengthy immigration detention.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding no serious question to be tried because the deportation order is an independent immigration determination that would not be affected by the outcome of the habeas corpus appeal.

The court noted that deportation would actually bring an end to the detention the moving party sought to review.