Barbara Louise Jackman

Landmark decision reforming the framework for judicial review of administrative decisions.

The Court established a presumption that reasonableness is the applicable standard of review, rebuttable where the legislature has indicated a different standard (including by providing a statutory appeal mechanism) or where the rule of law requires correctness review on constitutional questions, general questions of central legal importance, or jurisdictional boundaries between administrative bodies.

The Court also provided extensive guidance on conducting reasonableness review.

On the merits, the Registrar's decision to cancel the respondent's citizenship certificate was found unreasonable, as the statutory exception denying citizenship by birth to children of foreign government employees was intended to apply only to individuals whose parents had been granted diplomatic privileges and immunities.

An immigration detainee applied for habeas corpus after 13 months in immigration detention, challenging the legality of his detention on the grounds that it was lengthy and of indeterminate duration and was being served in inappropriate maximum-security lockdown conditions, both in alleged violation of ss. 7 and 9 of the Charter.

The chambers judge declined jurisdiction on the basis that the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act provided a complete, comprehensive and expert statutory scheme at least as broad and advantageous as habeas corpus (the Peiroo exception).

The majority of the Supreme Court held that the Peiroo exception does not bar habeas corpus applications in all immigration matters; rather, a court must examine whether the statutory scheme is as broad and advantageous as habeas corpus with respect to the specific grounds raised.

The IRPA scheme fell short in three ways regarding lengthy, indeterminate detention: the onus on detainees is less advantageous; the scope of federal court review is narrower than superior court review on habeas corpus; and the IRPA offers a less timely remedy.

The appeal was dismissed, with Abella J. dissenting on the basis that the IRPA scheme, properly interpreted, provides review at least as broad and advantageous as habeas corpus.

The appellant challenged the refusal of humanitarian and compassionate relief under s. 25(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act after unsuccessful refugee and risk-assessment proceedings.

The majority held that the officer unreasonably constrained discretion by treating 'unusual and undeserved or disproportionate hardship' as rigid legal thresholds rather than descriptive guidance.

The reasons emphasized holistic assessment, including mental health evidence, discrimination risk evidence, and the best interests of a directly affected child.

The appeal was allowed, the officer’s decision was set aside, and the matter was remitted for reconsideration.

A dissent would have upheld the refusal as reasonable under a stringent but flexible exceptional-relief framework.