Donnaree Nygard

An immigration detainee applied for habeas corpus after 13 months in immigration detention, challenging the legality of his detention on the grounds that it was lengthy and of indeterminate duration and was being served in inappropriate maximum-security lockdown conditions, both in alleged violation of ss. 7 and 9 of the Charter.

The chambers judge declined jurisdiction on the basis that the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act provided a complete, comprehensive and expert statutory scheme at least as broad and advantageous as habeas corpus (the Peiroo exception).

The majority of the Supreme Court held that the Peiroo exception does not bar habeas corpus applications in all immigration matters; rather, a court must examine whether the statutory scheme is as broad and advantageous as habeas corpus with respect to the specific grounds raised.

The IRPA scheme fell short in three ways regarding lengthy, indeterminate detention: the onus on detainees is less advantageous; the scope of federal court review is narrower than superior court review on habeas corpus; and the IRPA offers a less timely remedy.

The appeal was dismissed, with Abella J. dissenting on the basis that the IRPA scheme, properly interpreted, provides review at least as broad and advantageous as habeas corpus.

On a motion to extend the suspension of the declaration of constitutional invalidity granted in an earlier physician-assisted death ruling, the moving party sought a six-month extension.

The Court held that the federal election delay constituted extraordinary circumstances justifying only a four-month extension.

The Court also granted an exemption for Quebec in relation to specified provincial end-of-life care provisions and permitted eligible individuals to seek judicial authorization from superior courts during the extension period.

A partial dissent would have granted only the four-month extension and refused both exemption requests.

Special costs were awarded on a full indemnity basis.

The appellants challenged Criminal Code provisions barring assistance in dying, arguing the absolute prohibition violated section 7 Charter rights of competent adults with grievous and irremediable medical conditions causing intolerable suffering.

The Court held the blanket ban was overbroad relative to Parliament’s objective of protecting vulnerable persons and was not justified under section 1.

It declared section 14 and section 241(b) of no force or effect to the extent they prohibit physician-assisted death for competent, consenting adults meeting the defined criteria.

The declaration of invalidity was suspended for 12 months to allow a legislative response.

The Court also awarded special costs on a full indemnity basis to the appellants, with partial cost responsibility assigned to British Columbia.

RCMP members challenged federal wage restraint measures, arguing that rollback of agreed wage increases without prior consultation violated freedom of association under s. 2(d) of the Charter.

The majority held the Expenditure Restraint Act did not substantially interfere with the existing consultation process and dismissed the appeal, while a dissent found unconstitutional unilateral interference.

This appeal addressed public interest standing in a broad constitutional challenge to prostitution-related Criminal Code provisions.

The Court reaffirmed that standing is determined by a flexible, purposive weighing of three factors: serious justiciable issue, genuine interest, and whether the proceeding is a reasonable and effective means to bring the claims forward.

It held that parallel or potential litigation does not automatically defeat standing and that practical barriers affecting directly impacted persons are relevant to the analysis.

In the circumstances, the respondents met the test and were granted public interest standing.