Elin R. S. Sigurdson

A citizen of a self-governing Indigenous First Nation challenged a residency requirement in the First Nation's constitution requiring its Chief and Councillors to reside on settlement land or relocate there within 14 days of election.

The majority held that the Charter applies to the First Nation as a government by nature under s. 32(1), that the residency requirement constitutes a prima facie infringement of the appellant's s. 15(1) equality right, but that s. 25 of the Charter shields the requirement from abrogation or derogation because it protects Indigenous difference tied to ancient land-based governance practices.

Martin and O'Bonsawin JJ. dissented on the appeal, finding the s. 15(1) claim must succeed and s. 25 does not shield internal governance rules from Charter claims brought by community members.

Rowe J. dissented on the cross-appeal, finding the Charter does not apply to the First Nation's exercise of its inherent self-government right.

The appellant First Nation's reserve land was flooded in the 1920s–1930s to power hydroelectricity generation without its consent, without compensation, and without lawful authorization.

The trial judge found Canada breached its fiduciary duty and awarded $30,000,000 in equitable compensation, valuing the flooded land based on general expropriation principles and excluding the land's value to the hydroelectricity project.

The majority of the Supreme Court held that the trial judge erred by treating compliance with minimum expropriation obligations as sufficient to discharge the fiduciary duty, which required Canada to negotiate compensation reflecting the full value of the land to the project.

The appeal was allowed and the equitable compensation award returned to the Federal Court for reassessment to include the value of the flooded land for hydroelectricity generation.

Côté J. dissented, finding no reviewable error in the trial judge's compensation assessment and no evidentiary basis for the majority's approach.

The plaintiffs, members of the Grassy Narrows First Nation, brought an action alleging that Ontario's issuance of a forestry licence in the Keewatin portion of Treaty 3 lands violated their treaty harvesting rights.

The trial judge found that Ontario could not take up lands in the Keewatin territory without Canada's approval.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that upon the transfer of beneficial ownership of the Keewatin lands to Ontario in 1912 pursuant to s. 109 of the Constitution Act, 1867, Ontario acquired the right to take up lands under the treaty without federal approval.

The Court found that the trial judge erred in interpreting the treaty as requiring a two-step authorization process and in finding that s. 91(24) gave Canada a continuing supervisory role over provincial land use.

This appeal addressed public interest standing in a broad constitutional challenge to prostitution-related Criminal Code provisions.

The Court reaffirmed that standing is determined by a flexible, purposive weighing of three factors: serious justiciable issue, genuine interest, and whether the proceeding is a reasonable and effective means to bring the claims forward.

It held that parallel or potential litigation does not automatically defeat standing and that practical barriers affecting directly impacted persons are relevant to the analysis.

In the circumstances, the respondents met the test and were granted public interest standing.

A case management conference was held to determine the procedure for hearing motions for leave to intervene in the appeals.

The court ordered that all interested persons must bring a motion in accordance with Rule 13 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, and set a timetable for the service and filing of motion records and factums, with the motions to be heard on June 28, 2012.

The appellants, representative plaintiffs in two class actions, challenged the constitutionality of provisions in the Public Service Superannuation Act and the Canadian Forces Superannuation Act that reduced the supplementary death benefit payable to surviving spouses based on the age of the deceased plan member.

They argued this constituted age discrimination under s. 15(1) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the reduction provisions did not violate s. 15(1).

The Court clarified that a formalistic 'mirror comparator group' approach is not required for a s. 15(1) analysis.

Instead, a substantive equality approach must be taken, considering the full context of the legislative scheme.

Viewed contextually, the benefit scheme met the actual needs of the claimants and did not perpetuate disadvantage or negative stereotypes.