Christopher J. Matthews

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal the decision of the lower court.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the moving party to pay costs of $7,500 to the responding party.

The respondent sought partial indemnity costs of $144,054.57 following a successful application.

The applicants argued for no costs, asserting the matter was a case of first impression, or alternatively $30,000.

The court held that costs should follow the cause because the parties were advancing private financial interests rather than a public interest.

Applying the Boucher principles, the court found the respondent's time spent was excessive compared to the applicants' and reduced the requested fees by approximately 40 percent, fixing costs at $75,000 plus HST and disbursements.

The plaintiffs sued their former insurer, Economical, and a related foundation, claiming entitlement to demutualization benefits after Economical declined to renew their home insurance policy due to their claims history.

The defendants moved for summary judgment.

The court granted the motion and dismissed the action, finding that the plaintiffs were not eligible policyholders on the crystallization date for demutualization benefits.

The court also held that Economical had no duty to warn the plaintiffs about its internal underwriting guidelines or to renew the policy, and that the claim was statute-barred as it was commenced outside the two-year limitation period.

The applicants sought a declaration that an option in a 1997 mining rights option agreement was void under the 21-year perpetuity period in s. 13(3) of the Perpetuities Act.

The court held, in a case of first impression, that the option concerned an incorporeal interest akin to a profit à prendre and therefore fell within s. 14, which provides a 40-year vesting period for easements, profits à prendre, and similar interests.

Applying a textual, contextual, purposive, and original-meaning interpretation, the court concluded that s. 13(3) addressed options relating to corporeal hereditaments, while s. 14 addressed incorporeal hereditament interests.

Because the option was created in 1997, it remained presumptively valid and the application was dismissed.

Canadian National Railway Company moved for a stay of the Court of Appeal's June 2018 order requiring CN to reopen the James Street Bridge in Thunder Bay for vehicle traffic and maintain it in accordance with a 1906 agreement between Grand Trunk Pacific Railway Company and the Town of Fort William.

CN sought the stay pending its application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The motion judge declined to grant the stay, finding that CN's leave application lacked sufficient merit to warrant a stay despite CN's potential irreparable harm from financial commitments to reconstruction work.

The City of Thunder Bay appealed a decision dismissing its application for a declaration that Canadian National Railway Company breached a 1906 agreement by refusing to reopen the James Street Swing Bridge for motor vehicle traffic following a 2013 fire.

The bridge is a combined railway and roadway structure.

The application judge found that the parties intended the bridge to be maintained only for the type of traffic existing in 1906 (streetcars, horses, and carts), not modern motor vehicles.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the application judge's interpretation was unreasonable and tainted by extricable errors of law.

The court held that the perpetual right to cross the bridge for "vehicle traffic" and the obligation to maintain it "in perpetuity" must include modern motor vehicles, not merely those existing in 1906.

The court also found the application judge erred in placing the onus on Thunder Bay to provide specific proposals for making the bridge safe for vehicles, when that obligation rested with CN as the bridge operator.

The defendants brought a motion under Rules 25.10 and 30.04(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking document production and particulars regarding an alleged agreement of purchase and sale for parkland.

The court found the plaintiff's responses to the document inspection requests satisfactory, as the plaintiff produced the draft agreements and emails relied upon.

However, the court ordered the plaintiff to provide further particulars regarding the facts relied upon to support the allegation that the unsigned draft agreement was binding and properly entered into.

The City of Thunder Bay applied for declaratory orders and specific performance to compel Canadian National Railway Company (CN) to reopen and perpetually maintain the James Street Swing Bridge for vehicular traffic.

The City argued that CN's perpetual maintenance obligation included upgrading the bridge to modern safety standards.

CN contended its obligation was limited to the original 1906 design and that reopening required significant structural reconfiguration beyond maintenance.

The Fort William First Nation supported the City's position.

The court dismissed the application, finding the City's proposals for reopening the bridge vague and lacking specificity, and that the evidence did not clearly define the required work or establish that such work fell within CN's contractual maintenance obligation.

The plaintiffs, members of the Grassy Narrows First Nation, brought an action alleging that Ontario's issuance of a forestry licence in the Keewatin portion of Treaty 3 lands violated their treaty harvesting rights.

The trial judge found that Ontario could not take up lands in the Keewatin territory without Canada's approval.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that upon the transfer of beneficial ownership of the Keewatin lands to Ontario in 1912 pursuant to s. 109 of the Constitution Act, 1867, Ontario acquired the right to take up lands under the treaty without federal approval.

The Court found that the trial judge erred in interpreting the treaty as requiring a two-step authorization process and in finding that s. 91(24) gave Canada a continuing supervisory role over provincial land use.

The court was asked for assistance in settling the terms of an order granting intervener status, specifically regarding costs.

The respondents submitted a draft order, agreed to by most parties, stating that interveners would not be entitled to seek costs or be liable for costs of the appeals.

As no other parties proposed different terms, the court approved the draft order in accordance with its usual practice.

Several First Nations and a mining company brought motions to intervene in an appeal concerning Aboriginal harvesting rights under Treaty 3 and Ontario's jurisdiction to grant logging permits.

The court granted friend of the court status to Grand Council of Treaty 3, Lac Seul First Nation, Big Grassy First Nation, and Treaty 6 First Nations, finding their perspectives would assist the court.

The court granted party status to Goldcorp Inc. and Wabauskang First Nation, finding they had a direct interest in the subject matter and could be adversely affected by the broad declaration under appeal.

The interveners were ordered to accept the record as it is and not expand the issues.

The applicants sought an interlocutory injunction reinstating two students expelled from a private school for possessing and consuming marijuana on campus.

The expulsions were imposed pursuant to the school’s zero‑tolerance drug policy contained in contractual enrollment documents.

The applicants argued that the court had jurisdiction under the Judicial Review Procedure Act or, alternatively, through contract law, and that procedural fairness required notice and a hearing before expulsion.

The court held that the decision of a private school to expel students was not the exercise of a statutory power of decision and therefore was not subject to judicial review under the JRPA.

Applying the RJR‑MacDonald test, the court found no serious issue to be tried because the contractual documents clearly incorporated the zero‑tolerance policy and the misconduct was admitted.

The motion for interlocutory reinstatement was dismissed.

The plaintiff sued for damages after a crane it purchased was destroyed in a fire.

The plaintiff mistakenly named the Canadian distributor instead of the Austrian manufacturer.

After the limitation period expired, the plaintiff successfully moved before a Master to correct the misnomer and substitute the manufacturer as a defendant.

The manufacturer and the Canadian distributor appealed the Master's order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding it was reasonably open to the Master to conclude that the 'litigating finger' pointed at the manufacturer and that there was no prejudice in allowing the correction.

Following an unsuccessful application for judicial review regarding mill closures, the applicants argued that no costs should be awarded due to the public interest nature of the litigation.

The court rejected this argument, noting the applicants had a personal and pecuniary interest in the outcome.

The court awarded costs to the successful respondents, fixing the Ministry's costs at $22,368.68 and reducing Domtar's claimed costs to $12,000 to account for duplication of work among the respondents.

The applicants sought judicial review and an order of mandamus to compel the Minister of Natural Resources to require public consultation and amendments to Forest Management Plans before two forestry companies could restructure their operations, close certain sawmills, and redirect wood supply.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Plans regulate forest operations and sustainability, not the processing of harvested wood at specific mills.

As the restructuring did not change the forest operations or impact sustainability, no Plan amendments or public consultations were required under the Crown Forest Sustainability Act.

The applicants, members of the Grassy Meadows First Nation, brought an application for judicial review challenging the Minister of Natural Resources' authority to approve forest licences and management plans that allegedly infringed their Treaty 3 hunting and fishing rights.

The Minister and the licensee, Abitibi-Consolidated Inc., brought motions to quash the application.

The Divisional Court held that a single judge has jurisdiction to quash an application for judicial review.

The court quashed the application on the basis that much of the relief sought, which involved constitutional challenges and declarations against a private company, fell outside the court's judicial review jurisdiction.

Furthermore, the court exercised its inherent jurisdiction to quash the application because the complex factual and constitutional issues, including aboriginal treaty rights, required a full trial rather than a summary application.

The application was quashed with leave to commence an action.