Sanj Sood

This decision resolves two related oppression applications concerning the ownership and management of a closely held family trucking and logistics business, the World Wide Group of Companies.

The court finds that, despite the corporate records, there was an oral agreement among the four principal family members (two brothers and two brothers-in-law) that they would be equal beneficial owners of the main operating company and related entities.

The court orders rectification of the share register and grants a buy-out remedy to effect a final separation of interests, given the irreparable breakdown in relationships and mutual trust.

This motion arose from a family business dispute concerning the management of World Wide Carriers Ltd. (WWC) and related companies.

The applicants sought a declaration that the respondent, Sukhdev Dhaliwal, breached a prior court order (the "October Order") by not operating WWC in the ordinary course of business, and requested extensive access to WWC's documents, premises, and electronic systems.

The court found Sukhdev breached the October Order by terminating WWC's long-standing relationship with World Wide India (WWI), a key service provider primarily owned by the applicants, and transferring that business to a new company controlled by Sukhdev.

This action was deemed outside the ordinary course of business and prejudicial to the applicants' interests.

However, the court denied the applicants' requests for physical and electronic access to WWC and most broad documentary requests, concluding that granting such relief would give them undue control contrary to previous judicial determinations.

The applicants were granted access to documents and information they would have received as directors under the Business Corporations Act (Ontario).

Due to divided success, each party was ordered to bear their own costs.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed an appeal by the Finlays for failure to post security for costs as previously ordered.

The Finlays, who had a history of non-compliance and vexatious litigation, failed to provide compelling reasons for their default.

The court found the appeal appeared frivolous and vexatious, and that the Finlays lacked sufficient assets to cover costs.

The decision reinforced that deference is owed to prior security for costs orders and that re-arguing their merits is generally unsuccessful.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario granted the landlord's motion to lift the automatic stay of enforcement and for an order for security for costs against the tenants.

The tenants, who had not paid rent for an extended period, were found to have engaged in vexatious and abusive litigation tactics, including repeated unsubstantiated medical excuses for non-attendance.

The court affirmed the lower court's judgment for rent arrears and possession, finding the appeal frivolous and vexatious, and ordered substantial security for costs.

This is a costs endorsement from the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The respondent landlord (One Clarendon Inc.) sought costs for a motion to quash an appeal and an adjournment, which the appellants (Kathleen and John Finlay, tenants) had abandoned.

The tenants had appealed an interim order from the Superior Court compelling them to pay ongoing rent and arrears.

The Court of Appeal awarded partial indemnity costs to the landlord, noting that while the tenants' conduct appeared abusive, the issue of full indemnity costs was better addressed in the context of the Superior Court trial.

The applicants brought a motion for an interim and/or interlocutory order to restrain the respondents from exercising powers prejudicial to their interests in a family trucking business and to nullify recent corporate governance actions.

The court granted a partial injunction, restraining the respondents from acting prejudicially or outside the corporation's best interests, finding a serious question to be tried, irreparable harm, and the balance of convenience favoring this restraint.

However, the court denied the request to nullify the corporate governance actions (which removed the applicants as directors and officers), as this constituted a mandatory injunction requiring a strong prima facie case, which the applicants failed to meet regarding their shareholder status.

Sukhdev Dhaliwal remained the sole shareholder, director, and officer, subject to the imposed restraints.

This appeal addressed a pre-contractual negligent misrepresentation and the interpretation of a commercial lease.

The trial judge found that the tenant (respondent) reasonably relied on the landlord's (appellant's) negligent misrepresentation regarding free, accessible, and convenient customer parking, and that the entire agreement provision in the lease did not preclude the tenant's claim for damages.

On appeal, the landlord argued the trial judge erred by failing to consider the lease as a whole, specifically articles related to parking, which it contended formed part of the "subject matter" of the lease.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's finding that customer parking was not the "subject matter" of the lease and that the entire agreement clause did not preclude the claim, applying a deferential standard of review for contractual interpretation.

The landlord brought a motion for an interim order requiring the tenants to pay ongoing rent and outstanding arrears of $70,200 pending the final adjudication of the landlord's claim and the tenants' counterclaim for an abatement.

The tenants agreed to pay ongoing rent but argued they should not have to pay the arrears until the matter was resolved.

The court held that tenants are not entitled to unilaterally abate rent prior to a decision on the merits.

The court ordered the tenants to pay ongoing rent and to pay the arrears in six monthly instalments, with 50% of the payments to be held in trust by the landlord's counsel pending final determination.

The applicant sought costs against the self-represented respondents who unsuccessfully opposed its application for a declaration of adverse possession over a laneway.

The respondents, descendants of the original 1824 owner, opposed the application expecting compensation from the developer.

The court found that the respondents' opposition caused the applicant to incur incremental costs, as the application would have otherwise proceeded in writing.

The court rejected the respondents' arguments that their self-represented status or financial circumstances should shield them from a costs award.

Costs were awarded to the applicant on a partial indemnity basis, fixed at $25,000.

The applicant sought a declaration of ownership over a narrow laneway behind its property, which remained registered in the name of an individual who purchased it in 1824.

The respondents, descendants of the original owner, opposed the application.

The court found that the applicant's predecessors in title had exercised open, exclusive, continuous, and peaceable possession of the laneway for over 75 years, effectively excluding the original owner and his heirs.

The court granted the declaration of possessory title in favour of the applicant.

The plaintiff landlord brought an interim motion for the payment of rent pending the hearing of its action to evict the defendant tenants and recover arrears.

The self-represented tenants requested an adjournment on the day of the hearing, citing severe respiratory illness supported by doctors' notes.

Despite concerns about the tenants' history of delay tactics, the court reluctantly granted a brief, peremptory adjournment, ordering the tenants to pay $4,006.00 in partial rent prior to the return date.

This appeal addresses whether an Ontario court should recognize and enforce a "ricochet judgment" – a British Columbia judgment that itself recognized and enforced a foreign judgment from the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.

The appellant, H.M.B. Holdings Limited, sought to enforce a Privy Council judgment (compensation for expropriated property in Antigua and Barbuda) in British Columbia, obtaining a default judgment.

After an unsuccessful attempt to register this BC judgment in Ontario under the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act, H.M.B. commenced a common law action in Ontario to recognize and enforce the BC judgment.

The motion judge dismissed the action, finding no real and substantial connection between British Columbia and the underlying Antiguan dispute.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, but on the principled basis that the common-law test for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments does not extend to ricochet judgments, as such judgments are local in scope and enforcing them in another jurisdiction would improperly circumvent local laws, such as limitation periods.

The appellant sought to register in Ontario a default judgment obtained in British Columbia to enforce a Privy Council judgment awarding compensation for expropriation of its property by the respondent.

The application judge and majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the application on the basis that the respondent was not carrying on business in British Columbia under s. 3(b) of Ontario's Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act.

The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law in the interpretation of "carrying on business" and no palpable and overriding error in the factual conclusion that the respondent lacked any actual presence in British Columbia.

Côté J. concurred but wrote separately to address the open question of whether recognition (derivative) judgments fall within the REJA's definition of "judgment", concluding that they do.

The plaintiff sought summary judgment to recognize and enforce a British Columbia default judgment in Ontario.

The B.C. judgment had recognized a Privy Council judgment against the defendant.

The defendant argued that the B.C. judgment was a 'ricochet judgment' and that B.C. lacked a real and substantial connection for the purposes of extra-provincial enforcement.

The court agreed, finding that while B.C. legislation provided a presumption of jurisdiction for local enforcement, it did not satisfy the common law real and substantial connection test required for enforcement outside of B.C. The action was dismissed.

This decision addresses procedural issues in a complex civil action involving claims for delayed delivery of residential lots and a right of first refusal.

The court considered whether a previously agreed-upon bifurcated trial could proceed given new limitations defences proposed by the defendant, and whether the action should remain under a "One Judge Model" case management pilot program.

The court ruled that a single trial was necessary to avoid the risk of inconsistent judgments due to overlapping evidence and credibility issues related to the limitations defences.

Furthermore, the action was removed from the pilot program because the parties consistently engaged in formal, contested interlocutory proceedings, contrary to the program's emphasis on informal dispute resolution.

The applicant sought to register a British Columbia default judgment against the Antiguan Government in Ontario under the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act.

The British Columbia judgment was itself a derivative judgment enforcing a Privy Council order regarding expropriation compensation.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the Antiguan Government did not carry on business in British Columbia through its Citizenship by Investment Program representatives.

Furthermore, the court held that the 'original judgment' under s. 3(g) of the Act was the Privy Council judgment, not the British Columbia judgment, meaning the respondent would have a valid limitation period defence in Ontario.

Canadian National Railway Company moved for a stay of the Court of Appeal's June 2018 order requiring CN to reopen the James Street Bridge in Thunder Bay for vehicle traffic and maintain it in accordance with a 1906 agreement between Grand Trunk Pacific Railway Company and the Town of Fort William.

CN sought the stay pending its application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The motion judge declined to grant the stay, finding that CN's leave application lacked sufficient merit to warrant a stay despite CN's potential irreparable harm from financial commitments to reconstruction work.

Aragon brought an application for a declaration that Piller and its tenants were obstructing Aragon's right of way over an L-shaped parcel of land.

Piller brought a cross-application claiming it had acquired possessory title to the L-shaped land and a portion of Aragon's land through adverse possession by its tenants, and that Aragon had abandoned its right of way.

The court found that Piller's tenants, as trespassers, did not meet the high threshold for adverse possession, particularly the inconsistent use requirement, as their use was not inconsistent with the servient owner's intended use.

Furthermore, the court found no evidence that Aragon or its predecessors intended to abandon the expressly granted right of way.

Aragon's application was granted, and Piller's cross-application was dismissed.

Piller was ordered to remove the obstructions.

Following a motion where the defendants successfully vacated a certificate of pending litigation, the defendants sought costs of $73,579.49 payable forthwith.

The plaintiff argued that costs should be in the cause and in a lower amount due to the public interest nature of the proposed class action.

The court held that while the defendants were successful, the plaintiff's initial pursuit of the remedies was not unreasonable, and the defendants had delayed in bringing their motion.

The court exercised its discretion to order costs in the cause.

The City of Thunder Bay appealed a decision dismissing its application for a declaration that Canadian National Railway Company breached a 1906 agreement by refusing to reopen the James Street Swing Bridge for motor vehicle traffic following a 2013 fire.

The bridge is a combined railway and roadway structure.

The application judge found that the parties intended the bridge to be maintained only for the type of traffic existing in 1906 (streetcars, horses, and carts), not modern motor vehicles.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the application judge's interpretation was unreasonable and tainted by extricable errors of law.

The court held that the perpetual right to cross the bridge for "vehicle traffic" and the obligation to maintain it "in perpetuity" must include modern motor vehicles, not merely those existing in 1906.

The court also found the application judge erred in placing the onus on Thunder Bay to provide specific proposals for making the bridge safe for vehicles, when that obligation rested with CN as the bridge operator.