Cameron J. Wetmore

The applicants sought a declaration that they had a right-of-way over the respondent's property to access their summer cottage, relying on a 1937 agreement, proprietary estoppel, or the Road Access Act.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the 1937 agreement did not create a valid easement due to a lack of certainty regarding its location.

The court also rejected the proprietary estoppel claim as the respondent made no representations guaranteeing access.

Finally, the court held that the disputed trail was not an 'access road' under the Road Access Act because it was an overgrown bush trail unsuitable for motor vehicles.

The respondent's counterapplication to remove a caution from title was granted.

In proposal proceedings under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, the debtor brought concurrent expungement motions against proofs of claim filed by two former law firms.

The court held that the debtor failed to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that the trustee erred in admitting the unpaid appeal-fee claim of one firm or that the claim was not legitimate, and further held that s. 135(5) did not permit reopening paid accounts or ordering repayment beyond the amount of the proof of claim.

Applying insolvency expungement jurisprudence, solicitor’s account assessment principles, and the single proceeding model, the court found that the negligence allegations against the second firm raised complex unliquidated set-off issues more appropriately determined in the pending civil negligence action.

The expungement motion as to the first law firm was dismissed, while the motion as to the second was adjourned pending the civil action, with the trustee directed to retain the disputed amount.

The appellant appealed the motion judge's decision dismissing its motion to dismiss or stay the respondents' claim for non-payment under a promissory note.

The appellant argued that Delaware was the appropriate forum based on a forum selection clause in a related agreement of purchase and sale.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that Delaware had no appropriate connection to the dispute and that Ontario was the clearly more appropriate forum.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

Talon International Inc. brought a motion under Rule 49.09 to enforce settlements it claimed to have reached with five parties regarding aborted purchases and sales of condominium units.

The court found that there was no meeting of the minds and thus no settlement, dismissing Talon's motion.

The matter is to proceed on the merits, and no costs were awarded due to the miscommunication and counsel's emergency absence.

The defendant, OTO.Coach Inc., brought a motion to dismiss or stay the plaintiffs' claim for breach of a promissory note, arguing that Delaware was the more appropriate forum (forum non conveniens).

The plaintiffs, OW Technologies, LLC and OW International, LLC, sought payment of over $1.8 million USD under the promissory note.

The court found that Delaware did not have an appropriate connection to the claim, as the promissory note was governed by Ontario law, OTO's headquarters are in Ontario, and the plaintiffs were not party to the related agreement of purchase and sale (APS) or its forum selection clause.

The court dismissed OTO's motion to stay the action, concluding that Ontario was the more appropriate forum.

Costs were fixed at $20,000 in favour of the plaintiffs.

This is a costs endorsement following appeals and cross-appeals in three inter-related actions.

The Court of Appeal had previously granted Samuel Jacob Berkovits' appeal in the "Murder for Hire Action" and dismissed all other appeals and cross-appeals brought by Harold Gerstel and the Gerstel parties.

The parties were unable to agree on costs.

The court found the Berkovits parties to be more successful overall.

It ordered Harold Gerstel to pay $28,000 in all-inclusive costs to Samuel Jacob Berkovits for his unsuccessful cross-appeal in the Murder for Hire Action.

Additionally, the Gerstel parties were held jointly and severally liable to the Berkovits parties for $28,000 in all-inclusive costs for their unsuccessful appeal in the Interference Action.

No costs were awarded in the "Town Crier Action" due to divided success.

Maria Konstan and Samuel Jacob Berkovits had already settled their costs for the Murder for Hire appeal and trial.

This decision addresses consolidated appeals and cross-appeals arising from a protracted "turf war" between two competing cash-for-gold businesses, operated by Harold Gerstel and Samuel Jacob Berkovits (Jack).

The litigation involved three main actions: the "Murder for Hire Action" (malicious prosecution, abuse of process, intentional infliction of emotional distress), the "Interference Action" (nuisance, intentional interference with economic relations), and the "Town Crier Action" (defamation).

The trial judge found Jack liable for abuse of process to Maria Konstan (Harold's employee), Harold liable to Jack for nuisance and intentional interference, and Harold liable to Jack for defamation.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal granted Jack's appeal, setting aside the finding that he was liable to Maria for abuse of process, by clarifying the stringent "initiation" requirement for private complainants in such torts.

All other appeals and cross-appeals, including Harold's challenges to liability and damages for nuisance/interference, and Jack's cross-appeal for aggravated/punitive defamation damages, were dismissed.

The plaintiff brought an action for specific performance of an agreement of purchase and sale for a commercial property.

The parties had negotiated the terms over several months and signed the agreement, along with a side letter allowing the defendant's lawyer 48 hours to review the legal wording.

The defendant subsequently attempted to renegotiate the business terms and ultimately repudiated the agreement when the property's value increased.

The court found that a binding agreement had been reached and that the side letter did not permit renegotiation of business terms.

Because the property was uniquely suited to the plaintiff's business needs and damages would be inadequate, the court ordered specific performance.

The applicant, Growthworks Canadian Fund Ltd. (the Fund), sought an order in CCAA proceedings that its former manager, Growthworks WV Management Ltd. (the former manager), as the sole Class C shareholder, was not entitled to further dividends or payments upon the Fund's dissolution.

The former manager claimed entitlement to $672,390.61 as an incentive payment (IPA payment) on dissolution, arguing it was a debt or payable under specific share conditions.

The court dismissed the former manager's claim, finding the payment was not a debt and that the conditions for payment under the Class C share articles, specifically the performance tests, were not met as of the dissolution date due to the Fund's negative annualized rate of return.

The plaintiff condominium corporation appealed an Associate Justice's order striking several paragraphs from its Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim.

The underlying action alleged that the defendants conspired to cause the plaintiff to release easements over adjacent land for little or no value.

The Associate Justice struck paragraphs referring to the financial position of non-parties as irrelevant and scandalous, and struck other paragraphs for pleading evidence rather than material facts.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle in the Associate Justice's exercise of discretion.

The defendant moving party brought a motion to discharge a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) registered against a 700-acre property.

The property was sold to the moving party under a power of sale while concurrently being sold by the owner to the plaintiffs.

The court found that there were triable issues regarding the validity of the power of sale and whether the moving party was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice.

The court concluded that the equities favoured maintaining the CPL to prevent the property from being encumbered or sold before trial, and found no material non-disclosure by the plaintiffs when they initially obtained the CPL ex parte.

The motion to discharge the CPL was dismissed.

The appellants brought a motion for a stay of the Tribunal's order suspending their motor vehicle dealer and salesperson registrations pending their appeal to the Divisional Court.

The Tribunal applied the RJR-MacDonald test and found that the appeal raised a serious issue to be tried, the appellants would suffer irreparable harm if the stay was not granted due to unrecoverable financial losses and the rendering of their appeal moot, and the balance of convenience favoured the appellants as there was no evidence they posed an urgent risk to the public.

The motion for a stay was granted.

The Registrar of the Motor Vehicle Dealers Act, 2002 proposed to revoke the registrations of a motor vehicle dealership, its owner/operator, and a salesperson.

The proposal was based on allegations of retaining an unregistered salesperson, using identities of others to purchase vehicles, falsifying documents, and failing to disclose required information to purchasers (such as accident damage, structural damage, and out-of-province registration).

The Licence Appeal Tribunal found the allegations regarding the unregistered salesperson and use of identities unproven.

However, the Tribunal found that the salesperson falsified bills of sale and failed to disclose required information in several transactions, and that the dealership and its owner failed to ensure compliance with regulatory disclosure requirements, thereby breaching conditions of their registration.

The Tribunal concluded that revocation was unwarranted but ordered a 90-day suspension for the salesperson and a 120-day suspension for the dealership and its owner.

The plaintiff, York Region Vacant Land Condominium Corporation No. 1010, brought a motion for leave to file a Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim, including the addition of a new defendant, Patrick Greco.

The defendants opposed certain proposed amendments, arguing they were scandalous, irrelevant, or pleaded evidence.

The Master granted leave to amend the statement of claim and add the new defendant, but struck paragraphs 8, 95, and 102-105 from the proposed pleading, finding them to be scandalous references, irrelevant, or improper pleadings of evidence.

The respondent Fund and the appellant Manager agreed that the Fund should be liquidated and dissolved but disagreed on the liquidation process.

The motion judge ordered liquidation without appointing a court-supervised liquidator, instead allowing the Fund to proceed with its proposed process using an expert.

The Manager appealed, arguing the motion judge erred in not appointing a liquidator.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that section 217 of the Canada Business Corporations Act grants courts broad discretion to make orders in connection with liquidation and dissolution, and does not mandate the appointment of a liquidator.

The motion judge's reasons were cogent and supported by the record.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking to exclude documents disclosed late by the defendants or, alternatively, to examine the defendants on them, citing non-compliance with disclosure rules.

The defendants also sought to examine the plaintiff on newly disclosed handwritten notes.

The court granted leave for the defendants to use their late-disclosed documents, but on terms that included an adjournment of the trial, an examination of the defendants on the documents, and payment of the plaintiff's costs thrown away.

The court also ordered the plaintiff to attend an examination regarding her late-disclosed notes, a request which was unopposed.

This decision reconsiders a previous costs award concerning two applications.

The self-represented litigants, William Alexander Young and John David Dinsdale, sought costs for their time spent on work ordinarily done by a lawyer, in addition to previously awarded partial indemnity for legal services and disbursements.

The court approved a minor increase in disbursements but maintained its ruling that Young and Dinsdale had not sufficiently proven lost opportunities for remuneration for their self-represented time.

The court also noted their role was akin to interveners, who typically do not receive costs.

This decision addresses costs arising from two competing applications concerning land ownership between Aragon (Wellesley) Development (Ontario) Corporation and Piller Investments Limited.

While Aragon and Piller settled their costs, the court determined the costs payable by Piller to William Alexander Young and John David Dinsdale, who were participants in the original dispute.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs for the period Young and Dinsdale were represented by counsel, along with disbursements.

However, claims for costs for their time as self-represented litigants were denied, as they failed to demonstrate a loss of remunerative activity, consistent with established principles for self-represented litigants.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision granting a stay of proceedings on forum non conveniens grounds.

The motion judge had characterized the claim as one for oppression under the Canada Business Corporations Act and found that Ontario was forum non conveniens because the core dispute involved shareholders' dissatisfaction with internal management decisions of a Quebec-based company.

The appellants argued the motion judge erred by misconstruing their claim as purely oppression and failing to recognize a common law claim for fraudulent misrepresentation with connections to Ontario.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's characterization of the claim or his forum non conveniens analysis.

Aragon brought an application for a declaration that Piller and its tenants were obstructing Aragon's right of way over an L-shaped parcel of land.

Piller brought a cross-application claiming it had acquired possessory title to the L-shaped land and a portion of Aragon's land through adverse possession by its tenants, and that Aragon had abandoned its right of way.

The court found that Piller's tenants, as trespassers, did not meet the high threshold for adverse possession, particularly the inconsistent use requirement, as their use was not inconsistent with the servient owner's intended use.

Furthermore, the court found no evidence that Aragon or its predecessors intended to abandon the expressly granted right of way.

Aragon's application was granted, and Piller's cross-application was dismissed.

Piller was ordered to remove the obstructions.