Michael Rusek

The applicant brought a motion to compel the Ontario Motor Vehicle Industry Counsel (OMVIC) to produce documents related to its investigation into alleged fraudulent purchases by the defendants.

OMVIC, though not a party to the main litigation, was the subject of the motion and resisted disclosure, citing statutory privilege under section 36(1) of the Motor Vehicle Dealers Act, 2002.

The court dismissed the applicant's motion, finding that the MVDA created a robust statutory privilege that prevented OMVIC from disclosing the requested information, even after the investigation concluded, and that the exceptions to the privilege did not apply to disclosure in a civil action.

The applicant, a motor vehicle dealer, brought a motion for relief under section 11(b) and section 24 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging that its right to be tried within a reasonable time had been breached.

The applicant was charged with two offences under the Motor Vehicles Dealers Act, 2002 for allegedly failing to ensure advertisements complied with the Act.

The motion was heard on May 21, 2014, and decision was rendered on September 12, 2014.

The court applied the four-factor test from R. v. Askov to assess the delay claim.

While the court found that the total delay of approximately 47 months from the alleged offence to the motion was prima facie excessive, and that approximately 28 months of that delay was attributable to institutional limitations and Crown conduct, the court concluded that the applicant had not established irremedial prejudice to its fair trial interests.

The court dismissed the motion and directed that the trial proceed on its merits.