Orlando M. Rosa

The plaintiff Beechhill Capital Corp. brought a motion for summary judgment on a promissory note in the amount of $1,372,230.00 issued by the defendants.

The defendants acknowledged the debt but raised defences including lack of consideration, statute of limitations, oppression claims, and misrepresentation regarding the value of pledged HEXO shares.

The court granted summary judgment for the plaintiff, finding that the defences lacked merit.

The court determined that valuable consideration existed through antecedent debt and forbearance, the limitation period had not expired as the note was renewed, oppression was not a valid defence to a promissory note, and the alleged misrepresentations could not have induced the defendants to sign the note since the debt predated the note and the defendants had knowledge of the share dispositions.

The moving defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to enforce a settlement agreement reached with the plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs argued the settlement lacked certainty and that the court should exercise its discretion not to enforce it, particularly because one plaintiff was a party under disability.

The court found that an objective reading of the communications between counsel established a binding agreement to settle.

The court also found the settlement was in the best interests of the party under disability and declined to exercise its discretion to set aside the agreement, noting the plaintiffs' remedy for any alleged bad advice lay against their former counsel.

The motion to enforce the settlement was granted.

The appellant land developer brought a $6 million breach of contract action against a not-for-profit environmental association and its members, alleging that the association's president had breached a settlement agreement by testifying before the Ontario Municipal Board regarding the ecological impact of the appellant's proposed subdivision development.

The respondents brought a pre-trial motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the action as a strategic lawsuit against public participation.

The Court unanimously dismissed the appeal, holding that the respondents met the threshold burden under s. 137.1(3) and that the appellant failed to satisfy either the merits-based hurdle under s. 137.1(4)(a) or the public interest weighing exercise under s. 137.1(4)(b).

The Court provided comprehensive guidance on the proper interpretation and application of Ontario's anti-SLAPP framework, clarifying the standards of 'satisfies,' 'arises from,' 'substantial merit,' and the public interest weighing exercise.

The decision affirms that freedom of expression and public participation in democratic processes are fundamental values that the anti-SLAPP legislation was enacted to protect.

The plaintiff, Tracks & Wheels Equipment Brokers Inc., sought summary judgment for specific performance of options to purchase real property.

The defendant, KKP Investments Inc., brought a cross-motion to dismiss or stay the action as an abuse of process and for payment of rent.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment due to the risk of duplicative or inconsistent findings with a related "Main Action" and because it was not advisable in the context of the litigation as a whole.

The defendant's motion to dismiss or stay was also dismissed, as the court found the plaintiff's new action was a matter of form over substance given prior settlement attempts.

The defendant's request for interim rent was withdrawn.

Both actions were ordered to be tried together.

The Plaintiff, Algoma District School Board (ADSB), brought a motion for partial summary judgment against the Defendant, Algoma Insurance Brokers Ltd. (AIB), alleging negligence and breach of contract in insurance brokerage services from 1965-1986.

AIB brought a cross-motion for dismissal of ADSB's claim for delay.

The court dismissed ADSB's motion for partial summary judgment, finding it inappropriate given the complexity and lack of efficiency.

The court granted AIB's motion to dismiss for delay, concluding that the 13.5-year delay was inordinate and inexcusable, and ADSB failed to rebut the strong presumption of prejudice to AIB, particularly concerning the fading memories of elderly witnesses and the death of key individuals.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing his action as frivolous and vexatious under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The action named numerous defendants including government entities, corporations, and political parties, alleging perceived personal wrongs.

The motion judge found the statement of claim contained nonsensical allegations that disclosed no cause of action against any defendant.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding both the underlying action and the notice of appeal to be frivolous and vexatious, as the appeal grounds merely reiterated the same problematic allegations from the statement of claim without demonstrating any merit.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for partial summary judgment seeking the release of $500,000 held in escrow following a share purchase agreement.

The defendants brought cross-motions seeking an interpleader order and a portion of the funds for uncollectible accounts receivable.

The court granted the plaintiffs leave to bring their motion after setting the action down for trial, finding it was an efficient step.

The court held that partial summary judgment was appropriate as the issue could be resolved on uncontested facts.

The court found that the defendants failed to provide the required notice under the escrow agreement, entitling the plaintiffs to the return of the full escrow amount plus interest.

The plaintiff, Priddle-Luck Professional Corporation, brought a motion for an interim interim interlocutory injunction seeking mandatory orders for the return of client information and disclosure of communications, and prohibitory injunctions against using goodwill/client lists and soliciting clients.

The motion arose from the sale of an accounting practice and subsequent competition.

The court applied the three-part test from RJR-MacDonald Inc. v Canada (serious issue, irreparable harm, balance of convenience) and noted the exceptional nature of mandatory and interlocutory injunctions.

The court found that the test had not been met at this preliminary stage due to significant divergence in evidence requiring further exploration.

Consequently, the motion was dismissed, and costs were reserved.

The defendants brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's action for breach of a settlement agreement, invoking Ontario's anti-SLAPP legislation (s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act).

The court found that the defendants' expression (testimony at an Ontario Municipal Board hearing regarding a land development's environmental impact) related to a matter of public interest, thereby satisfying the first part of the anti-SLAPP test.

However, the plaintiff successfully demonstrated that their action had substantial merit, the defendants had no valid defence, and the public interest in upholding the sanctity and finality of settlement agreements in litigation outweighed the public interest in protecting the defendants' expression.

Consequently, the motion to dismiss was denied, and each party was ordered to bear its own costs, given the novelty and merit of the anti-SLAPP motion.

The applicant, a motor vehicle dealer, brought a motion for relief under section 11(b) and section 24 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging that its right to be tried within a reasonable time had been breached.

The applicant was charged with two offences under the Motor Vehicles Dealers Act, 2002 for allegedly failing to ensure advertisements complied with the Act.

The motion was heard on May 21, 2014, and decision was rendered on September 12, 2014.

The court applied the four-factor test from R. v. Askov to assess the delay claim.

While the court found that the total delay of approximately 47 months from the alleged offence to the motion was prima facie excessive, and that approximately 28 months of that delay was attributable to institutional limitations and Crown conduct, the court concluded that the applicant had not established irremedial prejudice to its fair trial interests.

The court dismissed the motion and directed that the trial proceed on its merits.

Following dismissal of a wrongful dismissal action after a four-and-a-half-day trial, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The successful defendant sought partial indemnity costs exceeding $62,000, while the unsuccessful plaintiff argued that the amount should not exceed $40,000.

Applying the factors in Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, including the principles of indemnity and the reasonable expectations of an unsuccessful party, the court reduced the amount claimed.

The court also permitted recovery of modest travel expenses for out-of-town counsel.

Costs were fixed at $50,000 inclusive of disbursements and tax.

An employee with 33 years of service brought a wrongful dismissal action after being laid off and subsequently refusing the employer’s offer to return to work.

The court accepted that the layoff constituted constructive dismissal and that the reasonable notice period would have been 24 months.

However, applying Evans v. Teamsters Local Union No. 31, the court held that a reasonable person would have accepted the employer’s prompt offer of reinstatement because the workplace would not have been hostile or humiliating.

The employee therefore failed to mitigate damages by refusing to return.

The claim for damages in lieu of notice and moral damages was dismissed.