Ian P. Katchin

The appellants brought an application seeking wide-ranging relief regarding the operation of the respondent gun club and the finances of all three respondents.

The application judge dismissed the application on the basis of lack of standing, a full and final release previously signed by the appellants, and the expiry of the limitation period.

On appeal, the appellants attempted to argue the merits afresh without addressing the application judge's dispositive findings.

The Court of Appeal found no merit to the appeal, holding the release barred the claims and the limitation period had expired, and dismissed the appeal with costs of $22,000 to the respondents.

The Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC) initiated receivership proceedings against 1340182 Ontario Limited and Kazembe & Associates Professional Corporation.

The court-appointed Receiver, MNP Ltd., sought approval of its second report, fees, and authorization to assign 1340182 Ontario Limited into bankruptcy, and to distribute proceeds from the sale of a property.

A key dispute arose regarding the priority of mortgages on the property, specifically between Arthur Bryan, 923944 Ontario Ltd., and CIBC.

Bryan claimed his earlier mortgage was fraudulently discharged and sought declaratory relief to restore its first-ranking priority.

The court dismissed Bryan's cross-motion, finding that even if the discharge was fraudulent, the subsequent mortgages of 923944 Ontario Ltd. and CIBC were valid and enforceable under the Land Titles Act, as they were not fraudulent instruments and the mortgagees had no actual or imputed knowledge of fraud.

The court approved the Receiver's report and authorized distribution according to the registered priorities (923944 Ontario Ltd. first, CIBC second).

The defendants brought a motion to discharge a construction lien registered by the plaintiff roofing company, arguing the lien was not preserved and perfected within the timelines required by the Construction Lien Act.

The defendants claimed the work was completed earlier than the plaintiff asserted, relying on an inspection report and emails.

The court dismissed the motion, finding a genuine issue for trial regarding the actual completion date of the work, noting the defendants' evidence was contradictory and lacked sworn affidavits, and that the timeliness issue was not specifically pleaded in their Statement of Defence.

The appellant, Previn Homes, appealed a lower court decision that found it breached an agreement of purchase and sale for a new home.

The core issue was whether the parties could contractually extend the closing date outside the strict framework of the Tarion Addendum, which governs new home warranties.

The Court of Appeal found that non-compliant amendments to critical dates under the Tarion Addendum are voidable at the purchaser's option, not automatically invalid.

Since the purchaser (Ingarra) did not void the agreed-upon extension, the vendor (Previn Homes) was entitled to terminate the agreement when the purchaser failed to close on the extended date.

The appeal was allowed, dismissing the purchaser's application.

The appellants sought to transfer a proceeding before the Mining and Lands Tribunal to the Ontario Superior Court of Justice.

The respondent had commenced the Tribunal proceeding under section 181(2) of the Mining Act to require the appellants to pay their share of expenditures for mining development.

The appellants argued that an alleged oral agreement absolved them of any obligation to contribute and that this contract matter should be adjudicated by the Superior Court as a preliminary issue.

The application judge refused the transfer.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the refusal to transfer, finding that the Tribunal had specialized expertise in mining matters and that section 181(4) of the Mining Act provided the appellants with a procedure to raise their oral agreement defence before the Tribunal.

The applicants sought to transfer an application from the Mining and Lands Tribunal to the Superior Court of Justice under s. 107 of the Mining Act, arguing the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction over patented mining claims and issues of private property and civil rights.

The respondent contended the Tribunal had exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction.

The court found that the Tribunal had at least concurrent jurisdiction, particularly regarding expenditures under s. 181 of the Mining Act, and that the issues fell squarely within the Tribunal's expertise.

The court dismissed the application to transfer the proceeding, emphasizing the Tribunal's specialized knowledge and efficient procedures for such matters.

The plaintiff, Bisquip Leasing Corporation (Bishop), brought a motion for partial summary judgment against the defendant, Coco Paving Inc., for outstanding payments for construction services.

Bishop initially claimed $151,350.12, which was reduced to $67,001.39 after a partial payment by Coco.

Coco opposed the motion, arguing for equitable set-off, statutory set-off under the Construction Act, and that partial summary judgment was inappropriate due to related counterclaims concerning a deficient sanitary line and liability for a gas line strike.

The court found that the contracts were separate, rejected Coco's equitable set-off defense, and dismissed the counterclaim regarding the sanitary line without prejudice.

The motion for summary judgment was granted for Bishop for $67,001.39, with the court concluding that this would simplify the action and lead to a fair adjudication, despite ongoing related litigation.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for partial summary judgment seeking the release of $500,000 held in escrow following a share purchase agreement.

The defendants brought cross-motions seeking an interpleader order and a portion of the funds for uncollectible accounts receivable.

The court granted the plaintiffs leave to bring their motion after setting the action down for trial, finding it was an efficient step.

The court held that partial summary judgment was appropriate as the issue could be resolved on uncontested facts.

The court found that the defendants failed to provide the required notice under the escrow agreement, entitling the plaintiffs to the return of the full escrow amount plus interest.

The moving party sought an order compelling the insurer and broker defendants to produce additional documents and deliver a further and better affidavit of documents in an action concerning insurance coverage and alleged breach of the duty of utmost good faith.

The dispute arose after the insurer denied coverage relating to failures of transformers in solar installations, and the plaintiff alleged the defendants conducted an inadequate investigation and acted in bad faith.

The court held that the agency agreement between the insurer and broker, the underwriting file, and the claims and investigation files were relevant to issues of coverage and bad faith and therefore producible.

The court further found that the defendants failed to properly establish claims of solicitor‑client privilege and litigation privilege and ordered more particularized privilege schedules.

The motion was granted and the defendants were ordered to produce the requested documents and communications within 30 days.

The plaintiffs brought a motion under Rule 37.14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to set aside a registrar’s order dismissing their action for delay after they failed to set the action down for trial by the deadline imposed in a status hearing timetable order.

The court applied the contextual approach and the Reid factors governing motions to set aside registrar dismissals, including explanation for litigation delay, inadvertence in missing the deadline, promptness of the motion, and prejudice to the defendants.

The court found the missed deadline resulted from counsel’s inadvertence, the motion was brought promptly, and the plaintiffs had provided satisfactory explanations for brief periods of delay.

Although the limitation period had expired, the plaintiffs rebutted the presumption of prejudice and the defendants failed to demonstrate significant actual prejudice.

The registrar’s dismissal order was therefore set aside and a new timetable imposed.