Martin Raymond Kaplan

The applicants brought a motion for costs following a successful hearing under the Mining Act, alleging the respondent's conduct was unreasonable, frivolous, and vexatious.

The applicants argued that the respondent's failure to call witnesses, aggressive cross-examination, and overall hearing strategy warranted a costs award.

The Tribunal dismissed the motion, finding that while the respondent's strategy was unsuccessful, it did not rise to the level of serious misconduct or bad faith required under Rule 23 of the OLT Rules of Practice and Procedure to justify a discretionary costs award.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Land Tribunal which rescinded a previous order requiring the respondents to contribute over $2 million toward mining development expenses.

The Tribunal had found that an oral agreement between the parties' predecessors established the respondents' interest as a 'free carried, perpetual, non-contributing' interest.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no extricable error of law or palpable and overriding error in the Tribunal's assessment of the evidence and conclusion that a binding oral agreement existed.

The appellants sought to transfer a proceeding before the Mining and Lands Tribunal to the Ontario Superior Court of Justice.

The respondent had commenced the Tribunal proceeding under section 181(2) of the Mining Act to require the appellants to pay their share of expenditures for mining development.

The appellants argued that an alleged oral agreement absolved them of any obligation to contribute and that this contract matter should be adjudicated by the Superior Court as a preliminary issue.

The application judge refused the transfer.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the refusal to transfer, finding that the Tribunal had specialized expertise in mining matters and that section 181(4) of the Mining Act provided the appellants with a procedure to raise their oral agreement defence before the Tribunal.

The appellant appealed a bankruptcy order granted under s. 42(1)(j) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The respondent, a diamond merchant, brought the petition after the appellant failed to pay for diamonds.

The appellant argued the bankruptcy judge erred in finding it had debts with other creditors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the evidence supported the conclusion that the appellant had outstanding liabilities to other suppliers.

The appellants appealed an order allowing a receiver to sell a property free of their leases.

The receiver conceded that the motion judge's statement of the law was overly broad and that equitable considerations should have been weighed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the order, and remitted the matter back to the Superior Court of Justice, noting the appellants were not given a proper opportunity to lead evidence on the equities.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the order of Justice Ground, and remitted the matter to the Superior Court of Justice.

The decision was based on the reasons provided in the companion endorsement in Court File C44279.

Costs were fixed at $4,000 inclusive of G.S.T. and disbursements.

The testator left an estate consisting largely of real property.

The residue was to be kept invested, with the net income paid to his widow for life, and the remainder to his children.

The widow, receiving little income from the real property, sought a direction that the executors convert the real property, relying on the rule in Howe v. Lord Dartmouth.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the rule in Howe v. Lord Dartmouth, which requires trustees to convert wasting or unproductive personalty to deal even-handedly between life tenants and remaindermen, does not apply to real property.

The Court declined to extend the rule to real property, stating that such a change should be left to the legislature.

The widow's claim for notional income was also dismissed as there was no duty to convert the realty.