Ronald D. Davis

The appellants brought an application seeking wide-ranging relief regarding the operation of the respondent gun club and the finances of all three respondents.

The application judge dismissed the application on the basis of lack of standing, a full and final release previously signed by the appellants, and the expiry of the limitation period.

On appeal, the appellants attempted to argue the merits afresh without addressing the application judge's dispositive findings.

The Court of Appeal found no merit to the appeal, holding the release barred the claims and the limitation period had expired, and dismissed the appeal with costs of $22,000 to the respondents.

A law firm appealed an application judge’s decision interpreting a contingency fee retainer agreement and rejecting its claim to a share of damages awarded on appeal.

The client had retained new counsel for the appeal, which resulted in a substantial damages award after an unsuccessful trial.

The firm argued it was entitled to fees under the retainer or alternatively on a quantum meruit basis.

The Court of Appeal held that the retainer expressly limited fee entitlement to damages recovered by settlement or judgment at trial and did not include recovery obtained on appeal.

The court also held that quantum meruit relief was unavailable where the parties had expressly defined the circumstances of payment.

The appeal was dismissed.

An appeal from an arbitrator's decision in a long-running dispute between law firms regarding a Professional Services Agreement.

The appellants challenged the arbitrator's handling of a solicitor-client privilege objection to spreadsheets and her refusal to remove respondents' counsel who received the allegedly privileged documents.

The court upheld the arbitrator's decision to dismiss the privilege motion while reserving the right to reconsider the issue after further evidence, and upheld the decision not to remove counsel.

The court found the arbitrator acted within her discretion and applied the law reasonably to the circumstances.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the appeal of the Attorney General of Canada, setting aside the conditional certification of a class action brought by Andrew Knisley, a veteran, regarding the administration of disability benefits by Veterans Affairs Canada.

The court found that conditional certification is not permitted under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, and remitted the matter for reconsideration of whether an identifiable class exists.

The court also upheld the motion judge’s finding that the claim in negligence disclosed a reasonable cause of action.

Following an appeal in a class proceeding, the parties and the Law Foundation of Ontario made a joint submission regarding costs.

The Court of Appeal ordered the appellants to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal fixed at $30,000 inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their class proceeding for delay under s. 29.1(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

The motion judge found that the appellants failed to file a certification motion record or establish a timetable for steps required to advance the proceeding within one year of commencement.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, confirming that while a contextual approach applies to determining whether a timetable for required steps was established, the one-year deadline is mandatory and no such timetable existed here.

The court also rejected arguments regarding waiver, the availability of a Phoenix order, and the effect of adding a new plaintiff.

The defendants, Michael Slattery and Skylark Holdings Ltd., brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the action against them.

They argued that the plaintiffs had not sustained any damages and had breached the immediate disclosure rule by failing to disclose a partial settlement agreement.

The court dismissed the motion, finding a genuine issue for trial regarding damages due to conflicting evidence on reliance, and determining that the partial settlement did not significantly alter the litigation dynamics to constitute a breach of the immediate disclosure rule.

The respondent, Harrison Pensa LLP, brought a motion to transfer an application from Toronto to London.

The application concerned a dispute over a contingency fee agreement between Aylmer Meat Packers Inc. and Richard Walter Clare (applicants) and Harrison Pensa LLP.

The court considered the factors under Rule 13.1.02(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, finding a significant connection to London, where the contingency fee agreement was drafted and the related trial took place.

The court determined that London was a "significantly better" venue and granted the motion to transfer the proceeding to London.

The defendant, Diamond & Diamond Lawyers LLP, brought a motion to dismiss a class proceeding for delay, arguing that the plaintiffs, William Tataryn and Daya Nand Rajan, failed to comply with section 29.1 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

The court found that the plaintiffs had not taken the required steps towards certification within the statutory deadline of October 1, 2021.

The court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments that their efforts to amend faulty pleadings constituted progress under s. 29.1 or that the defendant had waived its rights.

The court also dismissed the request for a "Phoenix" order, which would allow a new action to be started, deeming it contrary to the policy of s. 29.1.

The action was dismissed.

The applicant sought specific performance of an alleged agreement to purchase the respondents' shares in a corporation involved in the Thai medical cannabis industry.

The court found that the email correspondence between the parties constituted an agreement in principle, but not a binding contract, as essential terms regarding due diligence and disclosure remained unresolved.

However, the court found that a subsequent rights offering proposed by the respondents, which would have significantly diluted the applicant's minority shareholding at a below-market price, was oppressive.

The application for specific performance was dismissed, but the rights offering was permanently enjoined.

The defendants brought a second motion under Rule 21.01 to strike portions of the plaintiff's seventh amended statement of claim, alleging non-compliance with a previous ruling.

The plaintiff brought a cross-motion to add a new plaintiff and new statutory causes of action.

The court granted the motion to strike references to previously discontinued defendants and a claim of fraudulent concealment, finding them improper or insufficiently pleaded.

However, the court dismissed the motion to strike new consumer protection claims and the challenge based on limitation periods, deeming these issues premature for a pleadings motion.

The plaintiff's cross-motion to add a new plaintiff was granted.

The plaintiff requested clarification regarding the scope of an order compelling production of documents.

The court had previously found a joint retainer existed between the plaintiff and the defendant.

The court clarified that as between joint venture parties, communications with the jointly retained lawyer relating to the subject matter of the joint venture are not privileged, even if the communications involved matters where the parties' interests were adverse or concerned withdrawing from the joint venture.

The defendants (Trinity Development Group Inc., Trinity Albert LP, and John Ruddy) brought a motion to compel Capital Sports Management Inc. (CSMI) and Eugene Melnyk to produce documents related to the work of Gowling WLG LLP for RendezVous LeBreton Group (RLG) and the LeBreton Project.

Trinity argued that Gowlings was jointly retained by CSMI and Trinity in relation to the RLG joint venture, or that common interest privilege applied, or that CSMI had waived privilege.

CSMI contended that Gowlings acted solely for CSMI.

The court found that a joint retainer existed between Gowlings, CSMI, and Trinity for the RLG and LeBreton Project from July 23, 2015, to November 23, 2018, based on objective evidence including Gowlings' representation of RLG to third parties, shared instructions, and shared payment of fees.

The court also noted that CSMI's pleading of a fiduciary relationship with Trinity was inconsistent with its claim of privilege.

The motion to compel production was granted, requiring CSMI to produce the requested documents in unredacted form.

The appellant, Georgian Properties Corporation, appealed a summary judgment that dismissed its negligence action against respondent lawyers as statute-barred.

The negligence claim stemmed from the lawyers' work on condominium disclosure documents, mortgages, and a promissory note, which were later found insufficient or oppressive by a lower court.

The motion judge had found the claim discoverable by July 7, 2017, when a judge declined to strike a factum alleging inadequate disclosure.

The Court of Appeal found the motion judge erred in holding that loss occurred when the condominium corporation refused payments, clarifying that loss in solicitor negligence cases turns on the validity or enforceability of documents, not mere non-payment by third parties.

The Court concluded that Georgian Properties did not have sufficient material facts to infer liability against the lawyers until later, given the unusual procedural history and their reasonable expectation of success on the debt instruments.

The appeal was allowed, and the limitation defence dismissed.

The motion concerned the terms of a judicially supervised sale of a limited partnership or its underlying real estate asset, following the respondent's failure to complete a purchase of the applicant's interest as previously ordered by the court.

Key contentious issues included whether the sale should be limited to arm's-length purchasers, the composition and disclosure of a "Floor Amount" (minimum sale price), the applicant's right to a credit bid, the consequences if the Floor Amount was not met, and the appropriate prejudgment interest rate.

The court ruled that both parties could participate in the bidding, the Floor Amount should not include the respondent's capital contributions but should include the applicant's post-default development costs, the Floor Amount should not be disclosed to bidders, and prejudgment interest should be 12% due to the respondent's conduct.

The court also granted a temporary sealing order for the file and reasons until the sale was completed.

This is an appeal from an order dismissing a motion to stay an application in favour of arbitration.

The dispute concerns a cost-sharing agreement between condominium corporations regarding common expenses.

The motion judge found the essence of the claim was oppressive conduct, which he believed was not arbitrable.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the core dispute was the interpretation and application of the reciprocal agreement, which contained a broad arbitration clause.

Citing recent Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence, the Court emphasized that courts should not refuse to stay claims covered by a valid arbitration agreement and that oppression claims under the Condominium Act, 1998, are not exclusively for the Superior Court and can be arbitrated.

The appeal was allowed, and the application was stayed as it related to the issues between the two main condominium corporations.

The applicants sought to transfer an application from the Mining and Lands Tribunal to the Superior Court of Justice under s. 107 of the Mining Act, arguing the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction over patented mining claims and issues of private property and civil rights.

The respondent contended the Tribunal had exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction.

The court found that the Tribunal had at least concurrent jurisdiction, particularly regarding expenditures under s. 181 of the Mining Act, and that the issues fell squarely within the Tribunal's expertise.

The court dismissed the application to transfer the proceeding, emphasizing the Tribunal's specialized knowledge and efficient procedures for such matters.

The third-party solicitors McMillan LLP, Philip Thompson, and Marssa Giahi brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss claims of negligence brought against them by defendants Crosslink Bridge Corp. and Andrew Penuvchev.

The defendants alleged the solicitors failed to warn them of environmental risks associated with purchasing contaminated railway lands.

The court found that the solicitors were not negligent, as their retainers were limited, the clients were sophisticated and had conducted their own due diligence, and the environmental disclosure documents were not provided to the solicitors.

Furthermore, the court found the third-party claims were barred by the expiration of the applicable limitation periods.

The motion for summary judgment was granted, and the claims against the third parties were dismissed.

An appeal of a wrongful dismissal action where the trial judge found just cause for termination based on three incidents of misconduct by a Senior Vice-President and Chief Financial Officer.

The incidents involved: (1) failure to disclose a land flip transaction where the controlling shareholder's group profited $6.5 million; (2) failure to disclose warrant redemption profits to independent directors; and (3) involvement in a tax scheme to mislead the Canada Revenue Agency.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in applying the McKinley test, misinterpreted Advanced Realty and Hodgkinson, and failed to consider condonation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, confirming that fiduciaries owe a duty to disclose conflicts of interest and misappropriation of corporate opportunities.

Developers holding registered title to a parkette appealed a declaration that a municipality was the legal and beneficial owner of the land.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge’s finding that a 1973 subdivision agreement requiring conveyance of the parkette to the municipality superseded an earlier 1972 agreement that included a potential re‑conveyance clause.

The court further held that the land’s administrative conversion to the Land Titles system did not extinguish the municipality’s equitable interest because the developers had actual notice of that interest.

The municipality’s claim was not statute‑barred under the Real Property Limitations Act because it had remained in continuous possession of the park since the 1970s.

In the alternative, the doctrine of dedication and acceptance independently supported municipal ownership after decades of public use.