Joshua Pavlik Samac

The appellant made a complaint to Serbian Orthodox Church authorities about the respondent, a priest, regarding his involvement in her family law proceedings.

The respondent sued for defamation, and the appellant brought an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding the expression did not relate to a matter of public interest because it was a private grievance not widely disseminated.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the motion judge erred by focusing on the size of the audience rather than the content of the expression, which raised broader concerns about the propriety of priests participating in private litigation.

The matter was remitted to the Superior Court for a full s. 137.1 analysis.

The decision concerns an application by Gordon S. Clarke to assess three accounts rendered by Thomas Mathews Professional Corporation (TMPC) in the context of a retainer for a removal motion.

The court addresses the limitation period for assessment, the existence of special circumstances, the nature and effect of the retainer agreement, and the proper forum for assessment.

The court finds that the accounts should be assessed together, that the retainer was a simple hourly agreement with no cap, and that the Gondosch Parties were not clients of TMPC.

The court orders the accounts to be referred to an assessment officer and stays the related Small Claims Court action.

The plaintiff, Robert Matuk, sought summary judgment against the defendants, James Vannelli and associated corporations, regarding claims stemming from the breakdown of their shareholder relationship in HappyGo Marketing Inc. The court granted partial summary judgment, ruling that Vannelli's effective appropriation of Matuk's shares constituted oppressive conduct under the Canada Business Corporations Act.

The court found Vannelli personally liable to compensate Matuk for the fair market value of his shares as of May 20, 2020.

However, the court dismissed Matuk's claims for breach of contract related to the corporation's dissolution without unanimous consent and alleged non-competition by a new entity.

A trial is required to determine the precise amount of compensation for the oppressive conduct and to adjudicate whether Vannelli breached the non-disclosure covenant regarding intellectual property, and if so, the appropriate remedy for that specific breach.

The Hamilton branch of the Royal Yugoslav Army Combatants’ Association in Canada was embroiled in conflict over its governance and assets.

Following a trial, a judgment set out a process for re-establishing governance, including holding an Annual General Meeting (AGM) and electing a new board.

Rival groups held two separate AGMs.

The motion judge declared the December AGM valid and the November AGM invalid.

The appellant appealed, arguing the motion judge misapprehended evidence regarding compliance with the original judgment.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge's finding that the December AGM complied with the September 1 judgment was premised on a misapprehension of evidence.

The appeal was allowed, neither AGM was declared valid, and a new AGM was ordered to be held on June 22, 2024, with all previous memberships annulled.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their action for delay under Rule 48.14(7)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

They argued the Associate Justice erred by failing to consider contextual factors and made palpable and overriding errors regarding their lack of steps taken and the absence of prejudice to the respondents.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in principle or palpable and overriding errors of fact, noting the appellants failed to provide an acceptable explanation for the delay or demonstrate that the respondents would suffer no non-compensable prejudice.

The defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiff's 2016 action for rent arrears due to delay under Rule 24.01(1)(c).

The plaintiff took no steps to advance the action for nearly five years after the close of pleadings.

The court found the delay to be inordinate and inexcusable, and the plaintiff failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice or provide a reasonable explanation.

The motion was granted, the action was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the defendant.