Greg Roberts

The moving party sought security for costs in relation to pending motions brought by the responding party in bankruptcy and related proceedings.

The court found that there were outstanding unpaid costs awards totaling over $41,000 against the responding party.

While declining to order security for costs, the court imposed a condition that the responding party must pay the outstanding costs awards by a specified deadline or face automatic dismissal of the motion.

The court found that the responding party's arguments deserved consideration on their merits and were not frivolous or vexatious.

The respondent brought a motion seeking recusal of the judge on grounds of reasonable apprehension of bias.

The respondent alleged that the judge made derogatory comments about Indigenous peoples, made ad hominem attacks, directed an unfair motion structure, relied on outdated case law while ignoring a reversal by the same judge, predetermined a paramountcy issue, and intended to benefit the applicant through a solicitor's lien.

The judge dismissed the motion, finding that the allegations lacked merit, were raised well over a year after the impugned conduct, and appeared tactical in nature.

The judge awarded costs to the applicant.

The applicant sought security for costs in relation to a pending motion by the respondent seeking the judge's recusal based on apprehension of bias.

The respondent conceded he had insufficient assets to pay costs.

The court declined to order security on the ground that the recusal motion was frivolous and vexatious, as doing so would effectively prejudge the bias allegation.

However, the court ordered security for costs in the amount of unpaid costs awards previously made against the respondent, to be deposited into counsel's trust account prior to the hearing of the recusal motion.

The Receiver sought an order for discharge and release, approval of its Third Report, statement of receipts and disbursements, and fees.

The Court declined to grant the discharge, citing CBJ’s unauthorized commencement of actions in Ontario and Alberta in breach of the Receivership Order.

The Court found CBJ’s disregard for court orders troubling and noted the lack of contrition or proper procedure to regularize its actions.

The motion for discharge was adjourned to allow for a more complete record and for the Receiver to advise on the value of the Ontario and Alberta actions to the estate.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed Andrew Miracle’s appeal from a summary judgment awarding his former lawyer $2,858,500 in contingency fees and upholding a solicitor’s lien.

The dispute arose from a business conflict between Miracle and his son over “Smokin’ Joe’s,” resolved by arbitration.

The court found that Miracle’s acquisition of the business constituted a “recovery” under the contingency fee agreement, even though he did not receive a cash award.

The court also upheld the enforceability of the contingency fee agreement and the granting of a common law solicitor’s lien, finding no error in the motion judge’s exercise of discretion.

The appellant purchaser appealed a summary judgment finding she breached an agreement of purchase and sale.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the appellant was never in a position to close the transaction.

A one-day error by the respondent in setting the closing date was deemed minor and immaterial to the appellant's ability to complete the purchase.

The moving party, a lawyer, brought a motion for security for costs and security for judgment pending an appeal by his former client regarding unpaid legal fees.

The former client had previously successfully appealed a receivership order on the basis that his on-reserve assets were protected under the Indian Act.

The motions judge found that while the appeal was not frivolous, the former client's history of avoiding payment and lack of cooperation regarding off-reserve assets justified an order for security for costs.

The court ordered $115,026.90 to be paid into court for outstanding costs and appeal costs, but declined to order security for judgment.

This endorsement addresses costs arising from multiple motions and applications.

Andrew Clifford Miracle's applications (vexatious litigant, security for costs, bankruptcy motion) were dismissed.

Glenn Bogue's motions (solicitors' lien, summary judgment) were largely successful.

Rod Gram's summary judgment motion was dismissed, but his motion to dismiss Miracle's counterclaim was granted.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs to Glenn Bogue for his successful motions and to the Receiver for an abandoned motion by Miracle.

The court declined to award substantial indemnity costs, finding Miracle's conduct not egregious enough, and reserved costs between Gram and Miracle.

The appellant, a speech language pathologist, appealed a summary judgment dismissing her action against Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada as statute-barred.

The action sought damages for intentional infliction of economic harm, interference with economic relations, PHIPA retaliation, and conspiracy, stemming from Sun Life's delisting of her services after an audit dispute.

The motion judge found the claim statute-barred under the Limitations Act, rejecting arguments for a rolling limitation period and that the discovery of the claim was contingent on a College investigation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, agreeing with the motion judge's analysis on the limitation period and the appropriateness of summary judgment.

The plaintiff, Michael Cavanagh, brought an action against Enzo Mizzi and others, alleging a verbal "umbrella agreement" under which he was entitled to half of Enzo's shares in two numbered companies holding the "Homewood" properties.

Cavanagh claimed this agreement covered virtually all of Mizzi's real estate projects since 2001.

Mizzi denied the existence of such an agreement, asserting Cavanagh was an employee.

The court found no objective meeting of the minds for the alleged "umbrella agreement" and that its terms were unascertainable.

Despite both parties having credibility issues, the court dismissed the action, finding Cavanagh's claim of a multi-million dollar verbal agreement without documentation to be objectively unsustainable.

This appeal concerned the interpretation of s. 89 of the Indian Act and whether a court could place an on-reserve business into receivership at the instance of a non-Indian creditor.

The Superior Court had found a "commercial mainstream" exception to s. 89, allowing a receiver to recoup profits from the appellant's on-reserve businesses to satisfy a debt owed to a non-Indian lawyer.

The Court of Appeal overturned this, clarifying that the "commercial mainstream" exception applies only to s. 90(1) of the Indian Act (personal property deemed on-reserve) and not to s. 89, which protects all real and personal property of an Indian or band situated on a reserve from seizure by non-Indians, regardless of its commercial nature.

The appeal was allowed, holding that the receiver could not seize on-reserve business profits but could seize off-reserve assets.

This case involved urgent motions concerning the sale of land (Huntmar Lands) by Amazon Land Development Corp. to Lioness Developments Inc., which was complicated by a Caution registered by 2718379 Ontario Inc. ("271") based on an earlier "In Principle Agreement" (IPA) with Amazon.

Corfinancial Corp., Amazon's agent, sought orders to facilitate the sale and remove the caution. 271 and 2587410 Ontario Inc. ("258") brought a cross-motion seeking to block the sale, enforce the IPA, and obtain partial summary judgment, arguing Amazon's termination of the IPA was invalid.

The court found that there were too many disputed facts and credibility issues to grant summary judgment on the validity of the IPA's termination.

However, to preserve the deteriorating equity in the property due to accruing mortgage interest and ongoing power of sale proceedings, the court ordered an interim sale of the Huntmar Lands to Lioness under Rule 45.01(2).

The Caution by 271 and a $1 million mortgage registered by 258/271 were vacated, and the net proceeds of sale were ordered to be paid into court, while Corfinancial's proposed mortgage was not registered.

The defendants unsuccessfully moved for summary judgment.

The plaintiff, Pachino Construction Co. Ltd., sought costs for that motion.

The court awarded substantial indemnity costs of $40,000 to the plaintiff, finding the defendants' position unreasonable and their conduct reprehensible, particularly regarding false information provided by one defendant's wife.

The court ordered the costs to be paid within 30 days, regardless of the ultimate trial outcome.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action for equitable set-off.

The plaintiff sought to set off a $69,000 costs award it owed to the defendants from a previous unsuccessful action against a $416,000 judgment debt owed by one of the defendants to the plaintiff.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that genuine issues requiring a trial existed regarding whether the costs were actually owed to the defendant spouse and whether the claims were so closely connected that it would be manifestly unjust not to allow the set-off.

The applicant brought a motion under Section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms alleging that the delay of approximately four years, nine months, and nine days between his charge and anticipated sentencing constituted an unconstitutional delay.

The applicant was charged with six counts of child pornography offences in November 2011 and was found guilty on two counts in February 2016.

The motion was brought in August 2016, following the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Jordan, which established new presumptive ceilings for trial delay.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while the total delay exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial court cases, the delay was justified under the transitional exceptional circumstances framework established in Jordan, as the parties had relied on the law as it previously existed for the majority of the delay period.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for the appointment of an inspector under s. 161 of the Business Corporations Act to investigate two defendant companies.

The defendants opposed, arguing the plaintiffs lacked standing as they were no longer shareholders.

The court found the plaintiffs had standing based on original share certificates.

The court granted the motion, holding that the companies' failure to provide financial statements prior to 2012 raised an index of suspicion of oppressive conduct, meeting the low evidentiary threshold for appointing an inspector.

The inspector's mandate was limited to issues not statute-barred.

A homebuilder sued a purchaser for breach of an agreement of purchase and sale after the transaction failed to close.

The purchaser had moved into the property under an interim occupancy agreement while the vendor sought a minor zoning variance required due to a setback issue.

The purchaser attempted to reinstate a “time of the essence” clause and set a final closing date, then treated the agreement as terminated when the vendor did not close on that date.

The court held that the purchaser’s notice was ineffective because it imposed new conditions, set an unreasonable closing date, and was motivated by bad faith.

The purchaser repudiated the contract, entitling the vendor to retain the deposits as liquidated damages and recover certain additional amounts under collateral and occupancy agreements.