Matthew Onaemu Tubie

The respondent brought a motion for summary judgment based on the terms of a Separation Agreement dated November 24, 2023, which provided for spousal support of $800 monthly for three years, terminating on August 30, 2024.

The applicant opposed the motion, claiming the parties had orally agreed to extend the support obligation for a full year and that four months of additional payments constituted a variation of the agreement.

The court found no genuine issue for trial and granted the respondent's motion for summary judgment, finding the applicant bound by the terms of the Agreement and that the additional payments were gratuitous.

The court awarded costs to the respondent.

The plaintiff, Community Trust Company, moved for summary judgment on a mortgage.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial, granted judgment for the plaintiff, and ordered the defendants to deliver possession of the property.

The court also awarded costs to the plaintiff.

The defendant brought a motion to set aside a default judgment in a mortgage enforcement action.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the defendant failed to move promptly, did not adequately explain the circumstances leading to the default, and lacked an arguable defence on the merits.

The court also noted that the mortgage had matured, rendering the proposed defence largely moot.

The applicants, a consortium of insurers, sought a declaration that the respondent's (Sahara Restaurant) claim for water damage under a hospitality insurance policy was statute-barred due to the expiry of a one-year limitation period.

The respondent argued that the insurers' ongoing communications constituted promissory estoppel, extending the limitation period, and that its demand for an appraisal suspended the limitation period.

The court found that the insurers had explicitly warned the respondent of the limitation period and that normal dealings did not extend it.

Furthermore, the court held that a demand for appraisal does not suspend the limitation period, requiring an action to be commenced to preserve the claim.

Consequently, the respondent's claim was dismissed as statute-barred, and its application to compel appraisal was also dismissed.

The plaintiff, Maxpro Management Services Ltd., brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendants, Global Transauto Inc., Djamilya Kar, and Mido Salik, for breach of a fuel card agreement and personal guarantee.

The defendants failed to appear for the motion and did not pay previously ordered costs.

The court granted summary judgment, finding no genuine issue for trial regarding the breach of contract and contractual interest.

The court also pierced the corporate veil to hold Mido Salik jointly and severally liable with Global Transauto Inc. and Djamilya Kar, based on his misrepresentations and control over the corporation's actions, despite his denial and Ms. Kar's conflicting affidavit.

This appeal was dismissed as moot following the death of one of the appellants, Mary Zammit.

The parties agreed that Rule 11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure did not apply.

The Public Guardian and Trustee was awarded costs for an unsuccessful stay application brought by Mary Zammit and for the appeal, fixed at $5,000 all inclusive.

Mary Zammit sought a stay of a lower court order that declared her incapable of managing her property, terminated a power of attorney in favour of her daughter Patricia Zammit, and appointed the Public Guardian and Trustee (PGT) as her property guardian.

The Court of Appeal, applying the three-part test for a stay from RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General) and the gloss from Ogden Entertainment Services v. United Steelworkers of America, Local 440, found that the moving party failed to establish a serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm, or that the balance of convenience favoured granting the stay.

The court noted the thoroughness of the motion judge's reasons, which included findings of Mary Zammit's incapacity and Patricia Zammit's breaches of fiduciary duty.

The motion for a stay was dismissed.

The appellants, David, Jacqueline, and Jeremy Kaweesa, brought a motion before the Court of Appeal for Ontario to set aside an order by Paciocco J.A. The prior order had granted security for costs to the mortgagees (Sub-Prime Mortgage Corporation and Elle Mortgage Corporation) in a mortgage enforcement appeal and lifted a temporary stay on a writ of possession.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Kaweesas' motion, finding no error in Paciocco J.A.'s application of the test for security for costs under Rule 61.06(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court upheld the findings that the appeal was frivolous and vexatious and that the appellants had insufficient assets.

The claim regarding the stay was deemed moot as it had expired.

The moving parties (mortgagees and their principal) brought motions in the Court of Appeal for Ontario seeking security for costs of an appeal, lifting a temporary stay of a writ of possession, further security for costs awarded below, and expediting the appeal.

The responding parties (mortgagors/appellants) had appealed a judgment enforcing minutes of settlement and granting a writ of possession, which had been temporarily stayed conditional on tax payments.

The court found the appeal grounds frivolous and vexatious, and the responding parties had insufficient assets.

The court granted security for costs and lifted the temporary stay, finding the responding parties breached the stay condition and that the writ of possession was not automatically stayed.

The motions for further security for costs below and expediting the appeal were dismissed.

The plaintiffs sued airlines for significant losses, including the loss of a traditional title and the death of their daughter, after Lawrence Mpamugo was denied entry to the United States, preventing them from taking their booked flights to Nigeria.

Defendant Delta Air Lines, Inc. moved to dismiss the claims for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The court found that the claims in contract and negligence were not supported by law, as airlines are not liable for passengers' immigration issues, and the Montreal Convention limits liability to damages occasioned by delay in carriage, not denial of entry.

The court dismissed the claims against Delta, allowing only a potential claim for a refund of unused tickets to be transferred to Small Claims Court.

The plaintiffs sought summary judgment for breach of an Agreement of Purchase and Sale (APS) after the defendants repudiated the contract, alleging the vendor lacked mental capacity and that a Power of Attorney (POA) had been revoked.

The court found the APS to be a binding agreement, rejecting the defendants' claims of POA revocation and lack of capacity due to insufficient evidence.

The defence regarding spousal consent was also dismissed.

Partial judgment was granted to the plaintiffs for undisputed legal costs, with a reference ordered to determine additional damages.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice dated February 15, 2019.

The parties agreed that the appeal must be allowed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal but awarded no costs to the appellant, finding that the appellant did not prove forgone income and that the appeal was conceded shortly after counsel was retained without any additional work being performed.

The appellant appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice dismissing her motion to set aside her noting in default and granting default judgment to the respondent.

The appellant argued that the motion judge erred in his assessment of the merits of her defence.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court decision, finding the appeal to be without merit and that there was no basis to interfere with the discretionary decision of the motion judge.

Costs were awarded to the respondent.

The defendant, Toronto Hydro Corporation, brought a motion to dismiss or stay the action due to the plaintiffs' failure to pay approximately $45,000 in interlocutory costs orders.

The court, balancing the interests of allowing a litigant their day in court and enforcing court orders, granted the plaintiffs a final opportunity to comply with the outstanding costs orders.

The action was stayed, and the plaintiffs were ordered to pay the costs in six equal monthly installments, with leave for the defendant to seek dismissal if payments default.

The appellant was charged with 14 offences and convicted of four.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the complainant was not a credible witness.

The court found that the convictions on counts 1, 3, and 13 were not based solely on the complainant's testimony.

The trial judge made no finding of guilt on count 5, and the conviction on that count was set aside.

The appeal was otherwise dismissed.

The Attorney General of Ontario sought a forfeiture order under the Civil Remedies Act, 2001, for $44,215 in Canadian currency seized from a residence associated with a known drug trafficker.

Wrann Gould, the trafficker's father, claimed the money as his life savings, denying its connection to unlawful activity.

The court applied a two-pronged test: whether the currency was proceeds or an instrument of unlawful activity, and if forfeiture was not clearly against the interests of justice.

The court found Mr. Gould's explanations for the cash to be incredible and unreasonable, concluding the money was proceeds or an instrument of unlawful activity.

The court further determined that forfeiture was consistent with the Act's purposes and not "manifestly harsh" or "draconian."

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order enforcing a settlement agreement between the appellant and the respondents.

The settlement released the respondents from all causes of action and claims for damages arising from allegations in action CV-15-541151, with the respondents agreeing not to seek costs.

The appellant contended that she intended to release the respondents from a different, identical action (CV-15-540944) and that the motion judge misapprehended her evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge's findings were supported by the record and that there was no evidence of misrepresentation or incapacity.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment motion decision dismissing their defamation claim based on the description of the deceased as "divorced" on his death certificate.

The appellants argued that since the divorce was not final at the time of death, this description was defamatory.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the words were not capable of being defamatory.

The court also rejected the appellants' motion for fresh evidence and declined to address the issue of whether the matter should have been transferred from estates court to the civil list, finding such discretionary matters better left to the Superior Court.

This ruling addresses the determination of trial costs following an appeal where the Court of Appeal set aside a judgment against the defendants and remitted the costs issue.

The defendants sought substantial indemnity costs, citing an oral settlement offer and the plaintiff's egregious conduct.

The court rejected the claim for substantial indemnity costs, emphasizing the requirement for written offers to settle under Rules 49.02 and 49.13, and noting that while the plaintiff's conduct was egregious, the defendants also contributed to an unhealthy relationship, making it inappropriate to single out one party for enhanced costs.

Applying Rule 57.01 factors, the court awarded partial indemnity costs to the defendants, finding them substantially successful.

Due to discrepancies and unreliability in the defendants' submitted bills of costs, the court based the partial indemnity award on the plaintiff's bill of costs as a reasonable estimate, ordering the plaintiff to pay $25,956 plus HST and $3,637.58 in disbursements.

The appellant, Samir Ibrahim, appealed his convictions for uttering a threat to cause bodily harm and breaching a recognizance.

The appeal argued that the trial court erred in finding that the words uttered by the visually-impaired appellant over a cellphone constituted a threat.

The Superior Court of Justice, sitting as a Summary Conviction Appeal Court, dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings on the words uttered and their interpretation as a threat in context, as well as the appellant's intent to intimidate.