Sharoon J. Gill

Ismet Bajcinca, a non-party, brought a cross-motion under Rule 37.14(1) to set aside two cost orders made against him, claiming he did not receive notice of the original motions.

The court found that Bajcinca was properly served with notice of both motions and deliberately chose not to appear, making his claim of insufficient notice implausible.

Consequently, the court dismissed his cross-motion and awarded substantial indemnity costs to the defendants due to Bajcinca's reprehensible conduct, including evading service and abusing the process.

The applicants, Darshan Atwal and Balwinder Kaur Atwal, brought a summary judgment motion to dismiss a counterclaim by Amandeep Singh Manu.

The counterclaim alleged that Balwinder Kaur Atwal owed Amandeep Singh Manu $225,000 for a pizza restaurant interest, which was to be paid by November 20, 2012.

Amandeep Singh Manu claimed a $100,000 payment from Darshan Atwal in 2014 was a partial payment, leaving a balance of $125,000.

The applicants argued the counterclaim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court found the counterclaim was indeed statute-barred as no action was commenced within the two-year limitation period, and the issue was severable from the main action.

The motion for partial summary judgment was granted, dismissing the counterclaim.

The plaintiff mortgagee brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendant mortgagor for default on a $180,000 residential mortgage.

The defendant opposed the motion, arguing that the mortgage funds were advanced to a third party rather than to him directly, and sought to set off his claim against the third party or stay the judgment.

The court granted summary judgment, finding that the funds were advanced to the third party on the defendant's express instructions, equitable set-off did not apply, and the test for a stay of execution was not met.

The applicant and respondent are brothers and shareholders in a corporation that owns a commercial property.

The respondent accepted an offer to sell the property on behalf of the corporation.

The applicant brought an oppression remedy application, alleging he was improperly excluded from management, and sought a certificate of pending litigation (CPL) against the property to prevent the sale.

The court dismissed the motion for a CPL, holding that a shareholder does not have a direct interest in the lands owned by the corporation, which is a requirement for a CPL under the Courts of Justice Act.

The court noted the appropriate remedy would be an injunction.

The applicant sought leave to appeal a costs order made by Sloan J., which fixed costs at $11,190.82 payable personally by the applicant.

The original costs order arose from a motion for directions in an estate matter.

The court applied the strict two-part test for granting leave to appeal under Rule 62.02(4), considering whether there was a conflicting decision on principle or if there was doubt about the order's correctness involving matters of general importance.

The court found no conflicting decision and determined that the costs award, while significant to the applicant, did not raise issues of public importance or access to justice.

Consequently, the motion for leave to appeal was dismissed.

The respondent was successful on a motion and sought costs.

The court noted a history of delay by the applicant and previous findings of contempt of court.

The court fixed costs at 70% of substantial indemnity, ordering the applicant to pay $11,190.82 personally, rather than out of the estate.

The plaintiff, Electromart (Ontario) Inc., brought an ex parte motion seeking extraordinary relief including a Mareva injunction, a Norwich order, a certificate of pending litigation, and the delivery up of electronic devices.

The plaintiff alleged substantial fraud by two former employees, John Henry Fabianiak and Penny Ann Graziotto, and their company, Current Electrical Supply Inc., involving unreported sales and diversion of funds exceeding $300,000.

The court found a strong prima facie case of fraud and inferred a real risk of asset dissipation, granting a 10-day Mareva injunction.

Other requested relief was declined without notice to the defendants.

The applicant brought a motion to enforce a settlement agreement allegedly reached through correspondence between counsel following his termination and a shareholder dispute.

The respondents had offered a settlement that included the return of a specific iPad.

The applicant accepted most terms but stated he did not have the iPad.

The court found that the applicant's response did not constitute an absolute and unqualified acceptance of all essential terms of the offer.

Because the acceptance was not a mirror image of the offer, no binding settlement agreement was formed.

The application was dismissed, with each party bearing their own costs.

The plaintiff's action for damages was dismissed after his vacant house burned down and his insurance claim was denied.

The court determined the costs payable to the successful defendants.

The court fixed costs on a partial indemnity basis at $15,000 for the broker and $5,000 for the insurer, noting the insurer had improperly continued to charge premiums and the broker had poor record-keeping.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking a declaration that the defendant was in contempt of court for failing to comply with an order requiring attendance and full disclosure at a judgment debtor examination.

The defendant argued that his subsequent assignment in bankruptcy stayed the contempt proceedings under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The court held that bankruptcy does not prevent punishment for contempt committed prior to the bankruptcy and relied on prior authority confirming that such proceedings may continue.

After hearing evidence, the court rejected the defendant’s testimony as not credible and found that he deliberately refused to provide candid answers and failed to produce required documents.

The court concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally disobeyed the court order.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking a finding of contempt against the defendant for failing to comply with court orders requiring attendance at an examination in aid of execution and production of documents.

On the eve of the motion, the defendant filed for bankruptcy and argued that the motion was stayed under s. 69.3(1) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The court considered conflicting authorities regarding whether contempt proceedings are barred by a bankruptcy stay.

It held that contempt proceedings aimed at enforcing compliance with court orders are not remedies recoverable in bankruptcy and therefore are not stayed.

Leave was granted for the plaintiff to proceed with the contempt motion.