Brendan Clancy

The plaintiff brought an unsuccessful motion for an injunction to prevent a property sale.

The successful defendants sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis, arguing the motion had no reasonable prospect of success.

The court agreed, finding the plaintiff's claim was purely monetary and the injunction was a misguided attempt at pre-judgment enforcement.

The court awarded substantial indemnity costs but declined to award per diem delay costs, noting such losses must be pursued as a counterclaim rather than as costs.

The plaintiff was ordered to pay $24,000 in all-inclusive costs.

The plaintiff, an unsecured creditor, brought an urgent motion for summary judgment to enforce a draft settlement agreement, or alternatively, an interlocutory injunction to prevent the sale of a property by the defendants, or an order that the sale proceeds be paid into court.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the summary judgment relief was not included in the notice of motion.

Furthermore, the proceeds of the sale were entirely consumed by a first mortgage, leaving no funds for the plaintiff.

The court also held that the plaintiff failed to meet the RJR-MacDonald test for an injunction, as he did not establish a strong prima facie case or irreparable harm, given his claim was merely for repayment of a loan.

The appellant employer appealed and the respondent employees cross-appealed from a motion judge's orders awarding wrongful dismissal damages following the dismissal of the respondents without cause after the sale of part of the employer's retail business.

The appeal addressed whether the respondents failed to mitigate damages by refusing comparable employment with the purchaser, and whether damages for employment benefits should be reduced by pension benefits received.

The cross-appeal concerned the calculation of damages for lost Savings Plan contributions.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge did not err in determining the offered employment was not comparable and that pension benefits should not be deducted.

The court allowed the cross-appeal, finding the motion judge erred in calculating Savings Plan contributions at 3% rather than 6%.

The tenant, a law firm, vacated its commercial premises and sought to sublet to a private school.

The landlord refused consent because the lease expressly prohibited use as a school.

The tenant stopped paying rent and brought an application declaring the refusal unreasonable, while the landlord moved for summary judgment for rental arrears.

The court found the landlord's refusal reasonable and granted summary judgment for the arrears, noting the landlord had no duty to mitigate since it had not terminated the lease.

The plaintiff, Design Home Gift and Paper Inc., was largely successful on a motion and sought costs.

The court reviewed the parties' submissions and considered the factors set out in the Rules of Civil Procedure and the case of Boucher v. Public Accountants Council for the Province of Ontario.

The court found the plaintiff's requested costs of $4,512, plus an additional $500 for further submissions, to be reasonable.

The defendants were ordered to pay a total of $5,012 in costs to the plaintiff.

The defendant Colin Bosa brought a motion for an order requiring the plaintiffs, Welhelm Ventures Corporation and John Gregory Aulin, to post $100,000 security for costs on a full indemnity basis.

The plaintiffs opposed the motion.

The court applied Rule 56.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, noting the plaintiffs conceded the initial onus.

However, the motion was dismissed because it was deemed unjust due to significant delay in bringing it (four and a half years after the statement of defence and after the action was set down for trial) and insufficient evidence regarding the quantum and scale of costs sought.

The plaintiff brought a motion to strike the defendant's Statement of Defence without leave to amend and for default judgment.

The defendant admitted to misappropriating funds but claimed her actions were caused by mental distress resulting from the plaintiff's demands that she assist in fraudulent acts.

The court found it was not plain and obvious that the defence could not succeed, but held that the particulars improperly focused on the plaintiff's alleged illegal acts rather than the acts causing the defendant's stress.

The court struck paragraphs 6 to 14 of the Statement of Defence with leave to amend.

A condominium corporation issued a clean status certificate to the respondent when he purchased a unit in 2013.

When the respondent requested a new status certificate in 2016 to market the unit for sale, the corporation noted that the unit layout had been altered without Board consent, contrary to the declaration.

The respondent sought a declaration that the corporation was estopped from noting such matters in the subsequent certificate.

The application judge granted the relief sought, finding the corporation bound by its earlier clean certificate.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that while the corporation is bound by its earlier certificate as against the original purchaser, it is not estopped from disclosing newly discovered matters in subsequent certificates.

The corporation's obligation to disclose material information to prospective purchasers overrides any estoppel argument.

The plaintiff sought clarification of a previous order granting leave to register a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) on 'Phase 2 Lots'.

The court clarified that the CPL should apply only to lots 112 to 150, as registering it on additional lots could jeopardize the defendants' financing arrangements.

Any further amounts owing to the plaintiff could be addressed through damages or a future application for additional security.

The appellants appealed a judgment of the Superior Court finding that their failure to close a real estate purchase transaction was due to their own negligence and that of their lawyers.

The appellants sought to have the Court of Appeal find that the application judge misapprehended or ignored evidence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the application judge's findings and upheld the decision that the appellants would forfeit their deposit and upgrade fees.

The court considered whether the forfeiture was unconscionable, noting that the respondents had resold the property for $240,000 more than the original purchase price, but found the forfeiture was not unconscionable given the appellants' responsibility for the failure to close.

An appeal from a motion judge's order regarding a dispute between adjacent property owners over the use of a jointly-owned private roadway.

The appellant acquired property at 5 Hawthorne and took an assignment of an agreement governing the use and care of the private roadway.

The appellant parked vehicles on the roadway during renovations, which the respondent opposed.

The motion judge held that the agreement clearly prohibited parking on the roadway.

The appellant appealed, raising new arguments about an alleged amendment permitting parking on a brick pad adjacent to the properties.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the motion judge's decision, finding the agreement unambiguous and rejecting the appellant's new arguments.

The plaintiff estates brought a motion for a timetable and to extend the time to set the matter down for trial, which the court treated as a status hearing.

The action, a subrogated claim arising from an oil spill, was delayed following the deaths of both original plaintiffs and procedural missteps in obtaining an order to continue.

The court found the plaintiffs' explanation for the delay passable and concluded the defendants would not suffer non-compensable prejudice, as the insurer had promptly investigated the spill.

The action was stayed pending a proper order to continue, with costs awarded to the defendants.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing its motion to strike out and declare void Personal Property Security Act registrations filed by the respondent.

The appellant argued that without a signed security agreement, the PPSA registrations were invalid.

The Court of Appeal determined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal because the motion judge's order was interlocutory, not final.

The court held that the order did not finally dispose of the real matter in dispute between the parties, which concerned the equipment's deficiencies and the parties' respective obligations, rather than the validity of the security interest itself.

The appeal was quashed with costs, and the appellant was directed to pursue an appeal to the Divisional Court.

The defendant Civita Vitiello brought a motion for summary judgment, arguing the plaintiff's claim was statute-barred due to the expiration of the limitation period.

The central issue was discoverability, specifically when the plaintiff, Marie Leblanc, discovered or ought to have discovered her claim against Civita Vitiello.

The court found that Marie Leblanc had sufficient knowledge or suspicion of Civita Vitiello's involvement by December 2010, and her son's 2014 disclosure did not constitute new information to trigger a fresh limitation period.

The plaintiff failed to demonstrate reasonable diligence in pursuing her claim.

Consequently, the action was dismissed as statute-barred.

Following a successful motion by certain defendant insurers seeking a declaration that their law firm could continue acting despite the arrival of a lawyer who had previously acted for the opposing party, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The unsuccessful party argued that the motion arose from circumstances created by the law firm’s hiring decision and that each party should bear its own costs, or alternatively that the amount sought was excessive.

The court applied the principles governing costs under s.131.1 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, emphasizing fairness and reasonableness rather than strict indemnification.

Although the successful defendants claimed approximately $59,800, the court found that amount excessive for a half‑day motion.

Costs were fixed at $42,000 payable within 30 days.

The defendants brought a motion for a declaration that an ethical screen implemented by their counsel of record was sufficient to prevent the disclosure of the plaintiff's confidential information after a lawyer who previously represented the plaintiff joined the firm.

The plaintiff brought a cross-motion to disqualify the firm due to a conflict of interest.

The court applied the test from MacDonald Estate v. Martin and considered the Law Society's guidelines for ethical screens.

Finding that the firm had implemented timely and comprehensive institutional measures, the court concluded that a reasonably informed person would be satisfied that no use of confidential information would occur.

The defendants' motion was granted and the plaintiff's cross-motion was dismissed.