M. Miller

The accused pleaded guilty to possession of 500 grams of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown sought a penitentiary sentence of three years, less credit for pre-sentence custody and restrictive bail.

The court considered the six years the accused spent on strict bail conditions as a significant mitigating factor, reducing the fit sentence to two years less a day.

Finding the accused posed no danger to the community and had demonstrated significant rehabilitation, the court imposed a 17-month conditional sentence after deducting credit for pre-sentence custody.

The defendant, 1190393 Ontario Limited o/a Phil’s Grandsons Place (PGP), brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' claim arising from an altercation outside its premises.

The plaintiffs alleged PGP was liable for serving excessive alcohol to a co-defendant who assaulted one of the plaintiffs.

The court dismissed PGP's motion, finding that granting partial summary judgment would not be in the interests of justice due to the risk of duplicative proceedings and inconsistent findings, as a crossclaim by the co-defendant against PGP on the same issues would still proceed to trial.

The applicant, Chai Gala-Nyam, sought to stay charges or exclude evidence (drugs and identity documents) seized after a traffic stop, alleging racial profiling by the arresting officer.

The court found that racial profiling, though unconscious, tainted the officer's conduct prior to the stop.

Based on this finding and the Crown's concession, the seized evidence was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The two accused were jointly charged with importing cocaine after arriving at Pearson International Airport from Trinidad and Tobago with over 4.9 kilograms of cocaine concealed in their luggage.

Both accused testified that they believed they were smuggling money, jewellery, or documents for a friend, and had been repeatedly assured that no drugs were involved.

The court found that while the accused's evidence was troubling and not entirely believable, it raised a reasonable doubt as to their actual knowledge.

Furthermore, the Crown failed to prove wilful blindness, as the accused had made some inquiries that lowered their suspicions, and the court was not convinced they deliberately refrained from further inquiries to remain ignorant.

Both accused were acquitted.

The plaintiff underwent a reverse ileostomy surgery.

In the recovery room, a nurse erroneously administered a large dose of Heparin instead of Voluven.

The plaintiff subsequently suffered massive internal bleeding, compartment syndrome, and required further surgeries.

The trial was bifurcated to determine liability.

The court evaluated expert testimony and concluded that the plaintiffs failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that the Heparin caused the bleeding, as the evidence suggested the bleeding originated from blood vessels that spasmed during surgery and relaxed post-operatively.

The plaintiff, a physiotherapist, suffered an electric shock while adjusting a bed at the defendant's clinic.

The defendant admitted liability.

The court assessed damages for the plaintiff's injuries, which included concussion-like symptoms, headaches, migraines, and soft-tissue pain.

The court found that while the plaintiff suffered a serious injury, her condition had improved significantly, allowing her to work full-time and participate in physical activities.

The court awarded $100,000 in general damages, $375,000 for past loss of income, $159,443.14 for future care costs, and additional amounts for special damages, subrogated claims, and Family Law Act claims for her parents, totaling $742,822.73.

Claims for future loss of income were dismissed.

The accused applied for a bail review following a detention order based on the tertiary ground.

The accused proposed a release plan involving house arrest with his parents as sureties and electronic monitoring.

The court found that the combination of the electronic monitoring proposal and the COVID-19 pandemic constituted a material change in circumstances.

The court concluded that a reasonably informed member of the public would not lose confidence in the justice system if the accused were released under strict conditions during a global health crisis, and granted the application for release.

The accused was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by a drug.

The Crown alleged impairment by oxycodone and/or alprazolam based on civilian witness observations of erratic driving, police observations at the scene and during arrest, breath testing showing zero alcohol, a drug recognition evaluation, and toxicology evidence.

The accused testified she consumed the medications as prescribed for chronic pain and anxiety, but had limited recollection of the relevant period.

She alleged she may have been involuntarily drugged by a former partner.

The court found the accused voluntarily consumed the drugs and that her ability to operate the vehicle was impaired by the drugs, resulting in a conviction.

The defendant Colin Bosa brought a motion for an order requiring the plaintiffs, Welhelm Ventures Corporation and John Gregory Aulin, to post $100,000 security for costs on a full indemnity basis.

The plaintiffs opposed the motion.

The court applied Rule 56.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, noting the plaintiffs conceded the initial onus.

However, the motion was dismissed because it was deemed unjust due to significant delay in bringing it (four and a half years after the statement of defence and after the action was set down for trial) and insufficient evidence regarding the quantum and scale of costs sought.

The franchisor (moving party) brought a motion to hold the former franchisees (responding parties) in civil contempt for breaching an interlocutory injunction that required them to immediately shut down their home care businesses.

The court found that while the franchisor's own confusing communications mitigated some of the franchisees' conduct, the franchisees deliberately violated the order by sending communications to caregivers and customers stating their intention to remain in business.

The court held the corporate franchisees and their individual operating minds in civil contempt, reserving the penalty to a future hearing.

A franchisor sought an interlocutory injunction restraining former franchisees from breaching post‑termination obligations and effectively continuing operations, while the franchisees sought an injunction preventing termination of their businesses.

Applying the interlocutory injunction test, the court found a serious issue to be tried and concluded the franchisor had a strong prima facie case that the franchisees breached contractual prohibitions against common ownership and multiple franchise interests.

Both parties demonstrated potential irreparable harm, but the court held the franchisor’s harm to goodwill, reputation, and system integrity—combined with the franchisees’ inability to satisfy damages—tipped the balance of convenience.

The court emphasized the franchisor’s duty to maintain the integrity of its system under franchise legislation and the risk posed by a rogue franchisee operating contrary to contractual obligations.

The applicant sought a declaration that a laneway crossing his property was a private road and an injunction to prevent the respondent municipality from interfering with his use of it.

The municipality argued the road was a public highway and that the applicant was barred from relitigating the issue due to a prior Small Claims Court decision dismissing his trespass claim.

The Superior Court of Justice held that issue estoppel applied, barring the application.

In the alternative, the court found that the road had become a public highway through historical dedication and acceptance by public use and municipal maintenance.

The application was dismissed.

Following a trial on a motion to change child support, the court addressed costs.

The respondent was largely successful in obtaining a reduction in support for multiple years, although not to the full extent requested.

The court found that both parties had engaged in unreasonable conduct: the respondent by understating income in financial disclosure, and the applicant by persisting in allegations of significantly increased income despite contrary evidence and failing to clarify accounting information before trial.

The respondent had made a reasonable offer to settle that closely approximated the eventual order, while the applicant made none.

Costs were awarded to the respondent, including disbursements for the accountant who testified at trial.

The defendant brought a Rule 21 motion to strike portions of the plaintiff’s statement of claim alleging interference with inheritance, conspiracy, alienation of affection, intentional infliction of mental suffering, and negligence.

The court applied the Rule 21 test from Hunt v. Carey Canada Inc. and held that several pleaded causes of action disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

The claim for interference with inheritance was speculative because the alleged loss related to a potential future inheritance from a living parent.

The court further held that the tort of alienation of affection does not exist in Canadian law and that the negligence allegations lacked essential particulars.

Multiple paragraphs of the statement of claim were struck and the plaintiff was ordered to amend the pleading.

The self‑represented plaintiff brought a cross‑motion seeking to amend his statement of claim, consolidate the action with another defamation proceeding, and obtain various procedural relief after the defendant brought a Rule 21 motion to strike portions of the claim.

The court held that the proposed amended pleading did not cure the defects previously identified in the claim, including vague defamation allegations, unsupported negligence claims, and references amounting to an impermissible alienation of affection claim.

The plaintiff also failed to establish that the two proceedings shared sufficient common questions of fact to justify consolidation under Rule 6.01(1).

Most of the requested relief was dismissed, though the parties consented to scheduling the matter to be tried immediately following the related action during the same trial sittings.

Procedural directions were given for documentary discovery, examinations for discovery, and a joint pre‑trial conference.

Following a prior decision allowing the applicant’s application in full and dismissing the municipality’s counter-application, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The applicant sought over $55,000 on a full indemnity basis.

Applying Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the principles governing partial indemnity costs, the court considered the complexity of the issues, extensive affidavit evidence and cross‑examinations, the economic significance of the dispute, and adjustments required for overlapping work, calculation errors, and expert-related disbursements.

The court declined to award full indemnity costs and reduced certain fees and disbursements.

Costs were fixed on a partial indemnity basis in the amount of $38,799.91 payable within 30 days.

The plaintiff brought an action against her disability insurer for long-term disability benefits and aggravated and punitive damages following a motor vehicle accident.

The insurer had terminated benefits after the plaintiff returned to work on a graduated basis and resumed her full salary.

The court dismissed the action, finding that the plaintiff failed to meet the policy's definition of total disability for both her 'own occupation' during the initial 24-month period and 'any occupation' thereafter, as she had maintained employment.

Furthermore, the group insurance policy had been cancelled by the employer before any subsequent claim was initiated, and there was no evidence of bad faith by the insurer.

The accused was charged with assault causing bodily harm to the complainant on December 30, 2007.

The complainant alleged that after an evening of heavy drinking, the accused suddenly lost control, broke items in her home, and then delivered a violent kick to her face, breaking her nose.

The accused denied kicking the complainant and claimed she attacked him first, and he may have struck her nose while defending himself.

The case turned entirely on credibility.

The trial judge found the complainant's evidence reliable despite inconsistencies on peripheral matters, and rejected the accused's version based on his own admissions of wrongdoing to a witness, his failure to protest accusations, and the implausibility of his account when measured against the probabilities.

The accused was found guilty.

The plaintiffs sought declarations that a trail crossing several private properties constituted a public highway, or alternatively an access road protected under the Road Access Act.

The court examined historical evidence, municipal expenditures on maintenance, and longstanding public use to determine the legal status of the roadway.

It held that the road became a public highway through implied dedication and municipal acceptance, applying the principle of “once a highway, always a highway.” The court rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that the road had a 66‑foot width and instead determined the historical roadway width was 1.4 metres.

Barriers placed by neighbouring landowners preventing passage were ordered removed.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ action on a summary judgment motion, the defendants sought costs.

The plaintiffs did not file costs submissions.

The court applied s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, considering factors such as the defendants’ complete success, the plaintiffs’ repeated litigation of the same cause of action, and the reasonableness of the defendants’ bill of costs.

The court found the fees and disbursements reasonable and within the plaintiffs’ expectations given prior similar awards.

Partial indemnity costs were awarded against the plaintiffs.