Terrance Green

A 19-year-old youth was charged with robbery and possession of property obtained by crime arising from a street robbery on March 18, 2017.

The complainant was robbed of his cellphone and other items by four males.

Approximately two hours after the robbery, police found the defendant in possession of the complainant's stolen cellphone.

The defendant testified that he purchased the phone from a stranger named Jabari at a house party.

The court applied the doctrine of recent possession and found the defendant guilty on both counts, rejecting his explanation as implausible and finding no reasonable alternative inferences consistent with innocence.

The accused pleaded guilty to uttering threats to cause death by electronic messaging (Snapchat) directed at the student body of two schools between September and October 2017.

The Crown sought four months custody less pre-trial custody credit, three years probation, a five-year weapons prohibition, and a DNA order.

The defence argued for a suspended sentence with probation, emphasizing the accused's youth (18½ years old), first-offender status, and rehabilitation potential.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with three years probation, finding that pre-trial custody adequately addressed deterrence and denunciation principles, and that rehabilitation and reintegration were paramount given the accused's age and lack of criminal history.

The applicants' initial application was dismissed, leading to a costs endorsement.

The respondent Town sought substantial indemnity costs of $21,547.21.

The applicants argued against costs or for partial indemnity, asserting the issues were valid and counsel's time excessive.

The court, applying Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, determined that the respondent, as the successful party, was entitled to costs on a partial indemnity basis.

Despite delays attributed to the applicants, the court found no conduct warranting substantial indemnity costs under the "reprehensible, scandalous or outrageous" threshold established in Young v. Young.

Costs were fixed at $18,112.80, all-inclusive, payable by the applicants within 30 days.

The applicants sought a permanent injunction to prevent the municipality from removing derelict vehicles and debris from their property pursuant to a property standards order.

The applicants argued that the tenant was not properly served, that the vehicles constituted a legal non-conforming use, and that a Crown Patent exempted the property from municipal regulation.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the property owner was properly served under the Building Code Act, that legal non-conforming use applies to zoning rather than property standards, and that a Crown Patent does not displace valid provincial and municipal legislation.

This is a Dawson Motion brought by multiple defendants in a drug and firearm investigation known as Project Wheeler.

The defendants sought leave to cross-examine the affiant who deposed to the affidavit in support of a wiretap authorization granted by a Superior Court judge.

The defendants challenged two areas: claims about possession of firearms and statements that observations about meetings were indicative of drug trafficking.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the defendants failed to demonstrate how cross-examination would undermine the preconditions for the wiretap authorization and that the allegations of sweeping generalizations and circular reasoning were not relevant to an attack on facial validity in the circumstances presented.

The defendants, a municipality and its by-law enforcement officer, brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of a negligence action arising from enforcement of a property standards by-law.

The plaintiff alleged the officer acted negligently and excessively in ordering removal of materials from his property and entering the land without a warrant.

The court held that municipal officers are immune from liability for acts performed in good faith under the Municipal Act and found no evidence of bad faith or breach of duty of care.

The defendants demonstrated that enforcement steps were authorized by statute and taken in response to a complaint, and the plaintiff failed to provide evidence supporting allegations of misconduct.

Summary judgment was granted dismissing the action.

The defendants moved under Rule 63.02(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure for a stay pending appeal of a trial decision granting the plaintiffs title to a disputed strip of land by adverse possession.

The court applied the three‑part test requiring a serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm, and balance of convenience.

Although the parties agreed the latter two elements were satisfied because the vesting order would render the appeal moot, the court held the appellants failed to demonstrate a serious issue with a reasonable prospect of success.

The alleged errors concerning the adverse possession test, factual findings, and natural justice were unsupported assertions.

The motion for a stay pending appeal was therefore dismissed.

The defendant brought a motion under rule 21.01(3)(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking dismissal of a Superior Court action as an abuse of process.

The plaintiffs had previously commenced substantially the same claim in Small Claims Court, which was dismissed as abandoned.

Rather than moving to set aside the dismissal, the plaintiffs commenced a new action in the Superior Court seeking the same relief.

The court held that allowing the new action to proceed would constitute a collateral attack on the Small Claims Court order and undermine the administration of justice.

The Superior Court proceeding was therefore stayed.

An appeal of a destruction order issued against a dog that had bitten two children in the face, causing catastrophic injuries including near loss of an eye and severe facial lacerations.

The appellant consented to the destruction order at the original hearing but subsequently appealed on multiple grounds, including claims of incompetent counsel, procedural unfairness, and that his consent was invalid due to confusion.

The appellant also presented expert reports post-appeal suggesting the dog could be rehabilitated.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding the consent was informed, voluntary, and unequivocal, and rejecting the expert reports as inadmissible hearsay presented without proper notice to the Crown.

Appeal from convictions under section 28(16) of the Conservation Authorities Act for undertaking development without authorization from the Grand River Conservation Authority on property in the Township of North Dumfries.

The appellants were convicted of creating a laneway and berm through protected wetland without obtaining the required permit.

The appellants challenged the trial court's jurisdiction, the conservation authority's jurisdiction over private property, and alleged incompetence of trial counsel.

The appellate court upheld the convictions and sentences, finding the trial judge's findings of fact were reasonable, the jurisdiction issues were properly addressed, and there was no merit to allegations of counsel incompetence or conflict.

Following dismissal of an application seeking to compel a municipality to reconvey land, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The municipality sought substantial indemnity costs after the applicants commenced a second proceeding seeking essentially the same relief following a dismissed action and expired appeal period.

The applicants argued the earlier decision was affected by the failure to raise a confirmatory municipal by-law.

The court concluded the by-law issue was irrelevant to the core legal question and that the application was unsuccessful, but exercised discretion on costs given the municipality’s conduct and the applicants’ belief that justice had been denied.

Partial indemnity costs and disbursements were awarded rather than the higher amount sought.

A municipality sought a permanent injunction restraining landowners from depositing large quantities of fill on property located on the Oak Ridges Moraine.

The respondents argued the dumping of approximately 300,000 cubic metres of fill constituted a normal farm practice intended to improve agricultural land and therefore was protected from municipal bylaw restrictions under provincial legislation.

The court held that the scale of the fill operation constituted a prohibited site alteration under the Oak Ridges Moraine Conservation Plan and did not qualify as a normal farm practice.

The respondents had also ignored multiple municipal orders and a prior agreement restricting fill placement.

A permanent injunction was granted restraining further site alteration except as permitted under the building permit and applicable bylaws.