Terrance Green

The accused was charged with unlawful possession of Fentanyl (two grams), a Schedule I controlled substance, contrary to Section 4(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The Crown sought a custodial sentence of 30 days with two years' probation.

The defence sought a conditional discharge with probation.

The court granted a conditional discharge with two years' probation, finding that despite the seriousness of Fentanyl as an aggravating factor, the exceptional circumstances of the case—including the accused's status as a first offender, his addiction stemming from legitimate medical treatment for serious injuries and medical conditions, his substantial rehabilitation efforts including methadone treatment, his educational advancement, and the jeopardy to his employment prospects—warranted a discharge rather than conviction.

The accused pleaded guilty to two counts of trafficking fentanyl.

The charges arose after undercover purchases of heroin were analyzed and found to contain an unknown amount of fentanyl.

The court considered the serious nature of fentanyl trafficking, the lack of quantitative analysis of fentanyl concentration, and the accused's health challenges including Hepatitis C. The court imposed a sentence of two years less a day to be served at the Ontario Correctional Institute, followed by two years probation, balancing deterrence and denunciation with rehabilitative prospects.

A 19-year-old youth was charged with robbery and possession of property obtained by crime arising from a street robbery on March 18, 2017.

The complainant was robbed of his cellphone and other items by four males.

Approximately two hours after the robbery, police found the defendant in possession of the complainant's stolen cellphone.

The defendant testified that he purchased the phone from a stranger named Jabari at a house party.

The court applied the doctrine of recent possession and found the defendant guilty on both counts, rejecting his explanation as implausible and finding no reasonable alternative inferences consistent with innocence.

The accused pleaded guilty to uttering threats to cause death by electronic messaging (Snapchat) directed at the student body of two schools between September and October 2017.

The Crown sought four months custody less pre-trial custody credit, three years probation, a five-year weapons prohibition, and a DNA order.

The defence argued for a suspended sentence with probation, emphasizing the accused's youth (18½ years old), first-offender status, and rehabilitation potential.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with three years probation, finding that pre-trial custody adequately addressed deterrence and denunciation principles, and that rehabilitation and reintegration were paramount given the accused's age and lack of criminal history.

The applicants applied to the Normal Farm Practices Protection Board for a determination that clear cutting 16 to 35 acres of woodland on their property to establish additional farmland was a 'normal farm practice' exempt from the county's forest conservation by-laws.

The Board found that while the applicants were farmers and the practice was connected to an agricultural operation, clear cutting was not a normal farm practice on this specific site.

The lands were zoned for natural environment protection, contained provincially significant wetlands, and were subject to conservation authority regulations.

The environmental concerns and potential for catastrophic soil erosion outweighed the agricultural interests.

The applicants' initial application was dismissed, leading to a costs endorsement.

The respondent Town sought substantial indemnity costs of $21,547.21.

The applicants argued against costs or for partial indemnity, asserting the issues were valid and counsel's time excessive.

The court, applying Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, determined that the respondent, as the successful party, was entitled to costs on a partial indemnity basis.

Despite delays attributed to the applicants, the court found no conduct warranting substantial indemnity costs under the "reprehensible, scandalous or outrageous" threshold established in Young v. Young.

Costs were fixed at $18,112.80, all-inclusive, payable by the applicants within 30 days.

The applicants sought a permanent injunction to prevent the municipality from removing derelict vehicles and debris from their property pursuant to a property standards order.

The applicants argued that the tenant was not properly served, that the vehicles constituted a legal non-conforming use, and that a Crown Patent exempted the property from municipal regulation.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the property owner was properly served under the Building Code Act, that legal non-conforming use applies to zoning rather than property standards, and that a Crown Patent does not displace valid provincial and municipal legislation.

The OSPCA removed 71 dogs from the appellants' property, alleging they were in distress due to overcrowding, unsanitary conditions, and lack of veterinary care.

The appellants, who operated a dog rescue, appealed the removal, arguing the dogs were healthy and any distress was caused by the OSPCA.

The Animal Care Review Board found that the dogs were indeed in distress due to severe overcrowding, high parasite loads, overgrown contaminants, and untreated medical and dental conditions.

The Board concluded that the removal was necessary to relieve the distress.

The Board ordered the dogs returned subject to strict conditions, including reducing overcrowding, sanitizing the environment, and providing necessary veterinary care.

The appellants were also ordered to pay over $378,000 in veterinary and boarding costs incurred by the OSPCA.

The applicant sought a declaration that a laneway crossing his property was a private road and an injunction to prevent the respondent municipality from interfering with his use of it.

The municipality argued the road was a public highway and that the applicant was barred from relitigating the issue due to a prior Small Claims Court decision dismissing his trespass claim.

The Superior Court of Justice held that issue estoppel applied, barring the application.

In the alternative, the court found that the road had become a public highway through historical dedication and acceptance by public use and municipal maintenance.

The application was dismissed.

This is a Dawson Motion brought by multiple defendants in a drug and firearm investigation known as Project Wheeler.

The defendants sought leave to cross-examine the affiant who deposed to the affidavit in support of a wiretap authorization granted by a Superior Court judge.

The defendants challenged two areas: claims about possession of firearms and statements that observations about meetings were indicative of drug trafficking.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the defendants failed to demonstrate how cross-examination would undermine the preconditions for the wiretap authorization and that the allegations of sweeping generalizations and circular reasoning were not relevant to an attack on facial validity in the circumstances presented.

The appellants appealed a trial decision granting the respondents title to a disputed strip of land between their adjoining properties by adverse possession.

On appeal, the appellants argued for the first time that the finding of adverse possession did not justify granting title to the full width of the 2.03 metres vested by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that the issue of width was not raised at trial, the survey was presented on consent, and there was ample support in the record for the trial judge's finding.

The defendants, a municipality and its by-law enforcement officer, brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of a negligence action arising from enforcement of a property standards by-law.

The plaintiff alleged the officer acted negligently and excessively in ordering removal of materials from his property and entering the land without a warrant.

The court held that municipal officers are immune from liability for acts performed in good faith under the Municipal Act and found no evidence of bad faith or breach of duty of care.

The defendants demonstrated that enforcement steps were authorized by statute and taken in response to a complaint, and the plaintiff failed to provide evidence supporting allegations of misconduct.

Summary judgment was granted dismissing the action.

The applicants sought judicial review of the respondent municipality's decision to revoke their kennel licence, alleging discrimination based on their religious beliefs.

The municipality had revoked the licence following inspections that revealed unsanitary conditions, poor ventilation, inadequate lighting, and a failure to provide necessary veterinary care.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the municipality's decision was reasonable, based on credible evidence of by-law violations, and made following a procedurally fair process.

The applicants failed to meet their onus of proving bias.

The defendants moved under Rule 63.02(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure for a stay pending appeal of a trial decision granting the plaintiffs title to a disputed strip of land by adverse possession.

The court applied the three‑part test requiring a serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm, and balance of convenience.

Although the parties agreed the latter two elements were satisfied because the vesting order would render the appeal moot, the court held the appellants failed to demonstrate a serious issue with a reasonable prospect of success.

The alleged errors concerning the adverse possession test, factual findings, and natural justice were unsupported assertions.

The motion for a stay pending appeal was therefore dismissed.

The defendant brought a motion under rule 21.01(3)(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking dismissal of a Superior Court action as an abuse of process.

The plaintiffs had previously commenced substantially the same claim in Small Claims Court, which was dismissed as abandoned.

Rather than moving to set aside the dismissal, the plaintiffs commenced a new action in the Superior Court seeking the same relief.

The court held that allowing the new action to proceed would constitute a collateral attack on the Small Claims Court order and undermine the administration of justice.

The Superior Court proceeding was therefore stayed.

The appellants appealed an order granting a permanent injunction that restrained them from dumping fill or altering the grade of their property.

They argued the application judge erred in finding their activity was not a 'normal farm practice' and in not deferring to the Normal Farm Practices Protection Board.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the application judge's factual findings were supported by ample evidence and that he had jurisdiction to grant the injunction since neither party had applied to the Board.

An appeal of a destruction order issued against a dog that had bitten two children in the face, causing catastrophic injuries including near loss of an eye and severe facial lacerations.

The appellant consented to the destruction order at the original hearing but subsequently appealed on multiple grounds, including claims of incompetent counsel, procedural unfairness, and that his consent was invalid due to confusion.

The appellant also presented expert reports post-appeal suggesting the dog could be rehabilitated.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding the consent was informed, voluntary, and unequivocal, and rejecting the expert reports as inadmissible hearsay presented without proper notice to the Crown.

Appeal from convictions under section 28(16) of the Conservation Authorities Act for undertaking development without authorization from the Grand River Conservation Authority on property in the Township of North Dumfries.

The appellants were convicted of creating a laneway and berm through protected wetland without obtaining the required permit.

The appellants challenged the trial court's jurisdiction, the conservation authority's jurisdiction over private property, and alleged incompetence of trial counsel.

The appellate court upheld the convictions and sentences, finding the trial judge's findings of fact were reasonable, the jurisdiction issues were properly addressed, and there was no merit to allegations of counsel incompetence or conflict.

Following dismissal of an application seeking to compel a municipality to reconvey land, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The municipality sought substantial indemnity costs after the applicants commenced a second proceeding seeking essentially the same relief following a dismissed action and expired appeal period.

The applicants argued the earlier decision was affected by the failure to raise a confirmatory municipal by-law.

The court concluded the by-law issue was irrelevant to the core legal question and that the application was unsuccessful, but exercised discretion on costs given the municipality’s conduct and the applicants’ belief that justice had been denied.

Partial indemnity costs and disbursements were awarded rather than the higher amount sought.

A municipality sought a permanent injunction restraining landowners from depositing large quantities of fill on property located on the Oak Ridges Moraine.

The respondents argued the dumping of approximately 300,000 cubic metres of fill constituted a normal farm practice intended to improve agricultural land and therefore was protected from municipal bylaw restrictions under provincial legislation.

The court held that the scale of the fill operation constituted a prohibited site alteration under the Oak Ridges Moraine Conservation Plan and did not qualify as a normal farm practice.

The respondents had also ignored multiple municipal orders and a prior agreement restricting fill placement.

A permanent injunction was granted restraining further site alteration except as permitted under the building permit and applicable bylaws.