6 total
The court affirmed that municipal wastewater fees based on water consumption are statutorily valid.
The appellant, a wastewater user, challenged the respondent municipality's practice of charging wastewater processing fees based on water consumption rather than actual wastewater discharge.
The appellant alleged this violated s. 394(1)(c) of the Municipal Act and constituted unjust enrichment and negligence.
The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the claim, finding no violation of s. 394(1)(c) and that the municipality's decision was a policy decision immune from civil action under s. 450 of the Municipal Act.
The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, agreeing that the municipality imposed a fee based on the use of the service it provided, not in violation of the statutory prohibition.
The court awarded partial indemnity costs to the successful municipality but significantly reduced the quantum due to excessive junior counsel hours.
The defendant, having been successful on a summary judgment motion, sought costs on a substantial or partial indemnity basis.
The plaintiff, the responding party, argued for a lower partial indemnity amount.
The court considered the factors outlined in Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, including the success of the motion, the complexity and importance of the matter, and the principle of proportionality.
While acknowledging the complexity and importance of the issue to the defendant municipality, the court found the time spent by junior counsel to be excessive for what the losing party would reasonably expect to pay.
Costs were ultimately awarded on a partial indemnity basis, significantly reducing the defendant's requested amount.
Municipality's policy to bill wastewater services based on water supplied does not violate the Municipal Act.
The plaintiff sued the defendant municipality, alleging it was overcharged for wastewater services because the municipality billed based on the volume of water supplied rather than the lesser volume of wastewater actually discharged.
The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment.
The court granted the motion, finding that section 394(1)(c) of the Municipal Act, 2001 does not prohibit a municipality from charging for wastewater services based on water supplied, as the municipality actually provided the service and the fee was a reasonable estimate of cost recovery.
The court also held that the municipality's billing method was a policy decision protected by statutory immunity.
Appeal allowed; estate trustee removed pending will challenge litigation due to significant conflicts of interest.
The appellant appealed the dismissal of her motion to remove the respondent as estate trustee of their father's wills pending litigation over the wills' validity.
The appellant challenged the wills, which left the bulk of the multi-million dollar estate to the respondent, citing lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence, and the respondent's conflict of interest in intermingling the family business with his own company.
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred by prematurely deciding the ultimate issue of testamentary capacity and by ignoring the respondent's significant conflicts of interest.
The respondent was removed as trustee pending the litigation, and an independent trustee was appointed.
La requête pour destituer le fiduciaire successoral est rejetée faute de preuve concrète justifiant l'intervention du tribunal.
La requérante a déposé une requête pour destituer l'intimé de son rôle de fiduciaire successoral, alléguant un conflit d'intérêts dû à des modifications importantes au testament du défunt père des parties, qui excluaient la requérante de la distribution des biens principaux.
La requérante a également remis en question la capacité testamentaire du père.
Le tribunal a rejeté la requête, concluant qu'il n'y avait pas de preuve concrète de l'incapacité du testateur ou d'une conduite négligente ou malicieuse de l'intimé, et que le simple conflit familial ne justifiait pas la destitution du fiduciaire.
Second action duplicating abandoned Small Claims case stayed as abuse of process.
The defendant brought a motion under rule 21.01(3)(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking dismissal of a Superior Court action as an abuse of process.
The plaintiffs had previously commenced substantially the same claim in Small Claims Court, which was dismissed as abandoned.
Rather than moving to set aside the dismissal, the plaintiffs commenced a new action in the Superior Court seeking the same relief.
The court held that allowing the new action to proceed would constitute a collateral attack on the Small Claims Court order and undermine the administration of justice.
The Superior Court proceeding was therefore stayed.
