Pasquale Santini

This costs endorsement addresses the appropriate scale and quantum of costs following the dismissal of the plaintiff Jordan’s claim for fire loss under an insurance policy.

The court rejected the defendants’ request for substantial indemnity costs, finding that the circumstances did not justify such an award.

The court fixed costs at $10,000 for each defendant, inclusive of disbursements, emphasizing proportionality and the absence of scandalous or outrageous conduct.

The court fixed costs following the dismissal of a personal injury action after the Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal (WSIAT) determined the plaintiff’s right of action was removed by statute.

The court considered the conduct of both parties, including delay in bringing the WSIAT application, and awarded the defendants $62,000 in costs on a partial indemnity basis, excluding costs related to the WSIAT hearing and a security for costs motion.

The plaintiffs, John Jordan and William Nielson, sought damages from Commonwell Mutual Insurance Group and Finnegan Insurance Brokers Ltd. regarding a policy of insurance on a hunting camp and outbuildings destroyed by fire in 2018.

The plaintiffs alleged that Finnegan failed in its duty to ensure adequate insurance coverage and acted in bad faith, and that Commonwell improperly closed the file while issues remained.

The defendants moved for non-suit, arguing that replacement insurance was not available for this type of property and that the plaintiffs had been referred to arbitration.

The court granted the summary judgment motions, dismissing the claims against both defendants, finding no credible evidence to support the plaintiffs’ claims and that the settlement cheque issued was appropriate.

The plaintiff was awarded over $1.1 million in damages following a personal injury trial.

The parties appeared before the court to determine the costs of the trial and the calculation of a management fee.

The court found that the plaintiff had made reasonable offers to settle that were more favourable than the judgment, entitling her to elevated costs.

The court awarded the plaintiff $852,528.03 in costs and disbursements, and fixed the management fee at $125,000 based on an annualized sliding scale rather than a fixed percentage.

The appellants appealed a decision refusing to remove the respondent's lawyer as her appointed appraiser in an insurance dispute arising from tornado damage.

The umpire had suspended the appraisal process due to concerns about the appraiser's dual role as counsel in an impending bad faith claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that while the umpire must be impartial, the Insurance Act does not require party-appointed appraisers to be independent or disinterested.

The Court also clarified that the appraisal process is a collaborative valuation mechanism, not an administrative tribunal.

The plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident when the defendant driver ran a red light and t-boned the vehicle in which the plaintiff was a passenger.

The court found the defendants 100% liable.

The plaintiff, a self-employed jewelry designer, suffered a mild traumatic brain injury, chronic pain, PTSD, and post-concussion syndrome.

The court awarded $1,101,568.55 in total damages, including $225,000 for general damages, $328,402.20 for past and future economic loss, and $489,300 for future care costs, plus a management fee and tax gross-up.

The defendant brought a motion under Rule 49.09(a) to enforce a settlement of the plaintiff's motor vehicle personal injury action.

The plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing she did not clearly authorize her former counsel to settle and abandon her case.

The court found that a settlement was reached and that there were no special circumstances, such as marked inadequacy or collusion, to justify exercising its narrow discretion to refuse enforcement.

The motion was granted, the settlement was enforced, and the action was dismissed without costs.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking an extension of time to complete the examination for discovery of the representative of the defendant insurance company.

The defendants opposed the motion, arguing the plaintiff had exceeded the seven-hour limit under Rule 31.05.1 and sought to strike the affidavit sworn by a staff member of the plaintiff's counsel.

The court declined to strike the affidavit, finding it appropriate for a procedural motion.

The court granted the plaintiff an additional 1.5 hours for discovery, noting the complexity of the 17-year business relationship and the conduct of defence counsel, but declined to award costs due to the plaintiff's failure to address time limits in the discovery plan.

The appellant insurer appealed a summary judgment that found an "under construction" exclusion clause in a homeowner's policy did not apply to water damage.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the motion judge's finding that whether a property is "under construction" is a question of fact and that the renovations in this case were not sufficient to trigger the exclusion.

The court declined to provide a general definition for "under construction" emphasizing that exclusion clauses are construed narrowly and the insurer bears the burden of proof.

At the outset of a motor vehicle accident trial, the parties sought a ruling on whether section 12 of the Evidence Act, which limits a party to calling three expert witnesses without leave, applies to participant experts and non-party experts.

The plaintiff intended to call four litigation experts and two participating experts, and file numerous medical reports under section 52.

After reviewing the jurisprudence, including Westerhof v. Gee Estate, and the Osborne Report, the court ruled that section 12 applies only to litigation experts retained for the purpose of the proceeding, and not to participant or non-party experts.

Following substantial success on two applications and one motion brought by the insurer, the insureds sought partial indemnity costs of $64,222.72.

The insurer argued the amount was unreasonable and that the parties should bear their own costs or the amount should be significantly reduced.

The court found the issues were important and novel, justifying the insurer's pursuit of them, but held the insureds' claimed costs were excessive.

Applying principles of fairness, proportionality, and reasonableness, the court fixed the insureds' partial indemnity costs at $30,000 for fees, plus disbursements and costs of the submissions, for a total of $42,381.97.

Following a tornado that destroyed or damaged their homes, the insureds and their insurer, Desjardins, disagreed on the value of the losses.

Desjardins brought applications and a motion to stay the insureds' bad faith action pending the completion of the statutory appraisal process.

The court held that an insured's lawyer may act as their appraiser, as appraisers are advocates and need not be impartial, unlike the umpire.

The court also held that insureds may wait to submit a proof of loss based on actual repair costs rather than estimates, provided they act diligently.

The motion to stay the bad faith action was dismissed, as the insurer would suffer no prejudice from parallel proceedings.

The parties appeared to settle the terms of an order following earlier motions regarding an insurance coverage dispute for water damage.

The court agreed with the defendant brokers to add wording dismissing the action against them concerning an inapplicable 'under construction' exclusion.

The court also stayed the disclosure of certain documents pending the insurer's motion for leave to appeal.

The plaintiff brought a motion to strike the defendants' jury notice in a motor vehicle accident claim, arguing prejudice due to the indefinite suspension of civil jury trials during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court granted leave to hear the motion and took judicial notice of the fact that while a judge-alone trial could be scheduled in the near future, the timeline for resuming civil jury trials was unknown.

Balancing the substantive right to a jury trial against the need for a timely and affordable resolution, the court struck the jury notice but allowed the parties the option to return to court if a jury trial becomes available before the scheduled judge-alone trial.

Following a costs endorsement, the plaintiffs requested a reconsideration, arguing the court omitted to deal with elements of their discovery requests.

The court declined to reconsider, noting that the costs of the plaintiffs' motions for further discovery were already assessed and regrouped under the production issues in the earlier decision.

The court issued a costs endorsement for multiple motions heard on January 9, 2020, in an insurance dispute.

The plaintiffs were awarded partial indemnity costs against AXA and McLeod for successful production motions, and against AXA for a successful motion regarding the "building under construction" exclusion.

The defendants Irvin Hoffman and Cohen & Lord Insurance Brokers Limited also received partial indemnity costs from AXA for their successful motion on the "building under construction" exclusion.

The plaintiffs were awarded substantial indemnity costs against McLeod and the brokers for their unsuccessful summary judgment motions, as the moving defendants acted unreasonably by failing to adduce sufficient evidence on discoverability.

The court fixed specific amounts for each cost award.

The plaintiffs' property suffered two water damage incidents, leading to claims against their insurer (AXA/Intact), an independent adjuster (McLeod), and insurance brokers (Hoffman and Cohen & Lord).

The court addressed multiple motions: the defendants' summary judgment motions regarding limitation periods and an "under construction" exclusion, and the plaintiffs' motion for better discovery and an informed representative.

The court dismissed the defendants' limitation period arguments (without prejudice to trial), found the "under construction" exclusion inapplicable, and granted the plaintiffs' discovery requests, ordering the defendants to provide better affidavits of documents and an informed representative, and for McLeod to be examined for discovery.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss two actions arising from a motor vehicle accident in Ontario.

The defendant argued that because the deceased and the defendant were residents of Quebec, Quebec's no-fault automobile insurance regime and Civil Code should apply, precluding the tort actions.

The court dismissed the motion, applying the lex loci delicti rule from Tolofson v. Jensen.

The court held that Ontario substantive law applies to torts committed in Ontario, allowing the plaintiffs, including derivative claimants under the Family Law Act, to proceed with their actions.

The appellant, a wastewater user, challenged the respondent municipality's practice of charging wastewater processing fees based on water consumption rather than actual wastewater discharge.

The appellant alleged this violated s. 394(1)(c) of the Municipal Act and constituted unjust enrichment and negligence.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the claim, finding no violation of s. 394(1)(c) and that the municipality's decision was a policy decision immune from civil action under s. 450 of the Municipal Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, agreeing that the municipality imposed a fee based on the use of the service it provided, not in violation of the statutory prohibition.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision dismissing his application.

He alleged his former employer, the Ottawa Catholic School Board, failed to accommodate his return to work from a medical leave by improperly requiring him to attend an independent medical examination (IME).

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Tribunal reasonably concluded that the employer had a bona fide reason to question the treating physician's medical information and was justified in requesting an IME.

The Court also upheld the Tribunal's refusal to admit post-application evidence regarding the accommodation process.