Pasquale Santini

This costs endorsement addresses the appropriate scale and quantum of costs following the dismissal of the plaintiff Jordan’s claim for fire loss under an insurance policy.

The court rejected the defendants’ request for substantial indemnity costs, finding that the circumstances did not justify such an award.

The court fixed costs at $10,000 for each defendant, inclusive of disbursements, emphasizing proportionality and the absence of scandalous or outrageous conduct.

The court fixed costs following the dismissal of a personal injury action after the Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal (WSIAT) determined the plaintiff’s right of action was removed by statute.

The court considered the conduct of both parties, including delay in bringing the WSIAT application, and awarded the defendants $62,000 in costs on a partial indemnity basis, excluding costs related to the WSIAT hearing and a security for costs motion.

The plaintiffs, John Jordan and William Nielson, sought damages from Commonwell Mutual Insurance Group and Finnegan Insurance Brokers Ltd. regarding a policy of insurance on a hunting camp and outbuildings destroyed by fire in 2018.

The plaintiffs alleged that Finnegan failed in its duty to ensure adequate insurance coverage and acted in bad faith, and that Commonwell improperly closed the file while issues remained.

The defendants moved for non-suit, arguing that replacement insurance was not available for this type of property and that the plaintiffs had been referred to arbitration.

The court granted the summary judgment motions, dismissing the claims against both defendants, finding no credible evidence to support the plaintiffs’ claims and that the settlement cheque issued was appropriate.

The plaintiff was awarded over $1.1 million in damages following a personal injury trial.

The parties appeared before the court to determine the costs of the trial and the calculation of a management fee.

The court found that the plaintiff had made reasonable offers to settle that were more favourable than the judgment, entitling her to elevated costs.

The court awarded the plaintiff $852,528.03 in costs and disbursements, and fixed the management fee at $125,000 based on an annualized sliding scale rather than a fixed percentage.

The plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident when the defendant driver ran a red light and t-boned the vehicle in which the plaintiff was a passenger.

The court found the defendants 100% liable.

The plaintiff, a self-employed jewelry designer, suffered a mild traumatic brain injury, chronic pain, PTSD, and post-concussion syndrome.

The court awarded $1,101,568.55 in total damages, including $225,000 for general damages, $328,402.20 for past and future economic loss, and $489,300 for future care costs, plus a management fee and tax gross-up.

The defendant brought a motion under Rule 49.09(a) to enforce a settlement of the plaintiff's motor vehicle personal injury action.

The plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing she did not clearly authorize her former counsel to settle and abandon her case.

The court found that a settlement was reached and that there were no special circumstances, such as marked inadequacy or collusion, to justify exercising its narrow discretion to refuse enforcement.

The motion was granted, the settlement was enforced, and the action was dismissed without costs.

The appellant insurer appealed a summary judgment that found an "under construction" exclusion clause in a homeowner's policy did not apply to water damage.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the motion judge's finding that whether a property is "under construction" is a question of fact and that the renovations in this case were not sufficient to trigger the exclusion.

The court declined to provide a general definition for "under construction," emphasizing that exclusion clauses are construed narrowly and the insurer bears the burden of proof.

At the outset of a motor vehicle accident trial, the parties sought a ruling on whether section 12 of the Evidence Act, which limits a party to calling three expert witnesses without leave, applies to participant experts and non-party experts.

The plaintiff intended to call four litigation experts and two participating experts, and file numerous medical reports under section 52.

After reviewing the jurisprudence, including Westerhof v. Gee Estate, and the Osborne Report, the court ruled that section 12 applies only to litigation experts retained for the purpose of the proceeding, and not to participant or non-party experts.

Following substantial success on two applications and one motion brought by the insurer, the insureds sought partial indemnity costs of $64,222.72.

The insurer argued the amount was unreasonable and that the parties should bear their own costs or the amount should be significantly reduced.

The court found the issues were important and novel, justifying the insurer's pursuit of them, but held the insureds' claimed costs were excessive.

Applying principles of fairness, proportionality, and reasonableness, the court fixed the insureds' partial indemnity costs at $30,000 for fees, plus disbursements and costs of the submissions, for a total of $42,381.97.

Following a tornado that destroyed or damaged their homes, the insureds and their insurer, Desjardins, disagreed on the value of the losses.

Desjardins brought applications and a motion to stay the insureds' bad faith action pending the completion of the statutory appraisal process.

The court held that an insured's lawyer may act as their appraiser, as appraisers are advocates and need not be impartial, unlike the umpire.

The court also held that insureds may wait to submit a proof of loss based on actual repair costs rather than estimates, provided they act diligently.

The motion to stay the bad faith action was dismissed, as the insurer would suffer no prejudice from parallel proceedings.

The parties appeared to settle the terms of an order following earlier motions regarding an insurance coverage dispute for water damage.

The court agreed with the defendant brokers to add wording dismissing the action against them concerning an inapplicable 'under construction' exclusion.

The court also stayed the disclosure of certain documents pending the insurer's motion for leave to appeal.

Following a costs endorsement, the plaintiffs requested a reconsideration, arguing the court omitted to deal with elements of their discovery requests.

The court declined to reconsider, noting that the costs of the plaintiffs' motions for further discovery were already assessed and regrouped under the production issues in the earlier decision.

The court issued a costs endorsement for multiple motions heard on January 9, 2020, in an insurance dispute.

The plaintiffs were awarded partial indemnity costs against AXA and McLeod for successful production motions, and against AXA for a successful motion regarding the "building under construction" exclusion.

The defendants Irvin Hoffman and Cohen & Lord Insurance Brokers Limited also received partial indemnity costs from AXA for their successful motion on the "building under construction" exclusion.

The plaintiffs were awarded substantial indemnity costs against McLeod and the brokers for their unsuccessful summary judgment motions, as the moving defendants acted unreasonably by failing to adduce sufficient evidence on discoverability.

The court fixed specific amounts for each cost award.

The plaintiffs' property suffered two water damage incidents, leading to claims against their insurer (AXA/Intact), an independent adjuster (McLeod), and insurance brokers (Hoffman and Cohen & Lord).

The court addressed multiple motions: the defendants' summary judgment motions regarding limitation periods and an "under construction" exclusion, and the plaintiffs' motion for better discovery and an informed representative.

The court dismissed the defendants' limitation period arguments (without prejudice to trial), found the "under construction" exclusion inapplicable, and granted the plaintiffs' discovery requests, ordering the defendants to provide better affidavits of documents and an informed representative, and for McLeod to be examined for discovery.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss two actions arising from a motor vehicle accident in Ontario.

The defendant argued that because the deceased and the defendant were residents of Quebec, Quebec's no-fault automobile insurance regime and Civil Code should apply, precluding the tort actions.

The court dismissed the motion, applying the lex loci delicti rule from Tolofson v. Jensen.

The court held that Ontario substantive law applies to torts committed in Ontario, allowing the plaintiffs, including derivative claimants under the Family Law Act, to proceed with their actions.

The appellant, a wastewater user, challenged the respondent municipality's practice of charging wastewater processing fees based on water consumption rather than actual wastewater discharge.

The appellant alleged this violated s. 394(1)(c) of the Municipal Act and constituted unjust enrichment and negligence.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the claim, finding no violation of s. 394(1)(c) and that the municipality's decision was a policy decision immune from civil action under s. 450 of the Municipal Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, agreeing that the municipality imposed a fee based on the use of the service it provided, not in violation of the statutory prohibition.

The defendant, having been successful on a summary judgment motion, sought costs on a substantial or partial indemnity basis.

The plaintiff, the responding party, argued for a lower partial indemnity amount.

The court considered the factors outlined in Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, including the success of the motion, the complexity and importance of the matter, and the principle of proportionality.

While acknowledging the complexity and importance of the issue to the defendant municipality, the court found the time spent by junior counsel to be excessive for what the losing party would reasonably expect to pay.

Costs were ultimately awarded on a partial indemnity basis, significantly reducing the defendant's requested amount.

The plaintiffs (Blairs) brought a motion for leave to amend their Statement of Claim to include claims of negligent misrepresentation and bad faith with resultant punitive damages against The Standard Insurance Brokers Ltd. (Standard).

Standard cross-motioned for summary judgment.

The court focused on the motion to amend, considering whether the amendments constituted new causes of action, if they were statute-barred under the Limitations Act, and if they would cause non-compensable prejudice.

The court found that it was not plain and obvious that the claims for negligent misrepresentation and bad faith could not succeed at trial, and that the discoverability principle applied, meaning the limitation period did not begin until the expert report was received.

The court granted leave to amend the Statement of Claim.

The defendant, The Standard Insurance Brokers Ltd. (Standard), brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' (Blairs') claim.

The Blairs had previously been granted leave to amend their Statement of Claim to include negligent misrepresentation and punitive damages.

The court dismissed Standard's summary judgment motion, finding that there were genuine issues requiring a trial, including significant credibility issues between the Blairs and a co-defendant, and the need for further expert evidence.

The court emphasized that a fair and just adjudication could not be achieved through summary judgment in this case, and awarded costs to the Blairs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The defendant landlord brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' action arising from a fatal residential fire.

The plaintiffs alleged the fire was caused by a faulty electrical socket due to the landlord's negligence.

The defendant argued the plaintiffs lacked evidence to prove causation and relied on the statutory defence for accidental fires under the Fire Protection and Prevention Act.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the eyewitness evidence of a surviving child, combined with a forensic engineer's report, provided a sufficient evidentiary basis to establish a genuine issue for trial.