Pat C. Peloso

The applicants, having been successful on the main application, sought costs of $46,351.88 on a partial indemnity basis.

The respondent argued the claimed amount was excessive, noting its own counsel spent significantly fewer hours.

The court found the applicants' hourly rates reasonable but the total hours claimed high, suggesting potential overlap between senior and junior counsel.

Applying the principles in Boucher and Rule 57.01, the court fixed costs at $40,000 all-inclusive.

The applicants' home was destroyed by a flood and deemed a total loss.

Their homeowners' insurance policy with the respondent included a guaranteed rebuilding cost (GRC) endorsement.

The applicants sought a declaration that the GRC coverage included the increased costs of rebuilding in compliance with conservation authority regulations and building codes.

The respondent argued that such costs were excluded by a clause limiting coverage for increased costs due to the operation of any law.

The court held that the GRC endorsement covered the compliance costs and that the exclusion clause, which was restricted to 'any law', did not apply to rules, regulations, or by-laws.

The court also found that applying the exclusion as interpreted by the respondent would virtually nullify the GRC coverage.

The plaintiffs moved to strike the jury notices delivered by the defendants, seeking a judge-alone trial.

Their primary argument was the uncertainty of trial timing due to the COVID-19 pandemic's suspension of civil jury trials, and alternatively, the cumulative effect of this delay and the complexity of the issues.

The court granted leave to bring the motion, finding that the COVID-19 pandemic constituted a substantial and unexpected change in circumstances, making it "manifestly unjust" to refuse leave.

Applying the principles from *Louis v. Poitras*, the court found that the indefinite suspension of civil jury trials in Ottawa caused sufficient prejudice to the plaintiffs, justifying striking the jury notices.

The court concluded that justice would be better served by proceeding with a judge-alone trial in multi-week blocks, allowing for a more timely resolution.

Following substantial success on two applications and one motion brought by the insurer, the insureds sought partial indemnity costs of $64,222.72.

The insurer argued the amount was unreasonable and that the parties should bear their own costs or the amount should be significantly reduced.

The court found the issues were important and novel, justifying the insurer's pursuit of them, but held the insureds' claimed costs were excessive.

Applying principles of fairness, proportionality, and reasonableness, the court fixed the insureds' partial indemnity costs at $30,000 for fees, plus disbursements and costs of the submissions, for a total of $42,381.97.

Following a tornado that destroyed or damaged their homes, the insureds and their insurer, Desjardins, disagreed on the value of the losses.

Desjardins brought applications and a motion to stay the insureds' bad faith action pending the completion of the statutory appraisal process.

The court held that an insured's lawyer may act as their appraiser, as appraisers are advocates and need not be impartial, unlike the umpire.

The court also held that insureds may wait to submit a proof of loss based on actual repair costs rather than estimates, provided they act diligently.

The motion to stay the bad faith action was dismissed, as the insurer would suffer no prejudice from parallel proceedings.

The plaintiffs, Bruce and Francine Cowley, brought a motion seeking a ruling that the defendants were not entitled to deduct long-term disability (LTD) benefits received by Mr. Cowley from any damages awarded for economic losses.

The plaintiffs argued that the LTD insurer's right of subrogation or the private insurance exception precluded such a deduction.

The court struck the plaintiffs' solicitor affidavits for failing to meet evidentiary standards but proceeded to rule on the legal issues.

The court held that the existence of a right of subrogation, whether equitable or contractual, is a complete bar to the defendants' request for a deduction of LTD benefits from economic loss damages.

The court also found that sections 30(14)-(15) of the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act were not relevant to this determination.

This appeal concerned a priority dispute between two automobile insurers regarding statutory accident benefits (SABS) for two catastrophically injured pedestrians.

The claimants, who had no automobile insurance of their own, were struck by a vehicle insured by the applicant, Economical Insurance Group.

They resided with their daughter and son-in-law, who were insured by the respondent, Desjardins Insurance.

The central issue was whether the claimants were "principally dependent" on their children, which would make Desjardins liable for SABS.

The arbitrator found that the claimants were not principally dependent, as they could meet 81% of their financial needs through savings, government payments, and income from providing child care services to their children.

Consequently, the arbitrator held Economical liable.

The applicant appealed, arguing errors in treating child care payments as income and in applying the dependency rule.

The court dismissed the appeal, upholding the arbitrator's finding that the claimants were not principally dependent, as it was a reasonable conclusion supported by the evidence.

The plaintiff was seriously injured in a motor vehicle accident.

The defendant insurer, State Farm, brought a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the vehicle owner, Ms. Barrett, had given consent for the driver to possess the vehicle, making her liable under the Highway Traffic Act.

Ms. Barrett contended she did not give consent to drive, only to retrieve items from the car.

The court found a genuine issue for trial regarding whether giving keys to retrieve items constitutes "possession with consent" under the Highway Traffic Act, considering the driver's state and the owner's knowledge.

State Farm's motion for summary judgment was dismissed, and Ms. Barrett's request for summary judgment was also denied.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for summary judgment in their direct action against the defendant insurer under s. 132(1) of the Insurance Act.

The plaintiffs had previously obtained a consent judgment against their tenant, who negligently caused a fire while repairing his automobile in the attached garage.

The defendant insurer denied coverage under the tenant's policy, relying on a motorized vehicle exclusion.

The court found that the omnibus exclusions, including the motorized vehicle exclusion, applied to the Tenants Legal Liability coverage.

The court also held that the tenant's maintenance of his vehicle constituted 'use' of a motorized vehicle and that there was an unbroken chain of causation between the maintenance and the fire.

The plaintiffs' claim was dismissed.

Following dismissal of a Rule 21.01 motion seeking determination of whether damages from a motor vehicle accident included aggravation caused by a later soccer-related incident, the court addressed costs of the motion.

The moving party on the underlying motion had been the plaintiff, but the defendant was entirely successful.

The court applied the principle that costs generally follow the result and rejected arguments that entitlement to costs should be deferred to the trial judge or awarded in any event of the cause.

The court found the defendant’s bill of costs reasonable with a reduction of 12 associate hours and fixed partial indemnity costs.

Costs were ordered payable within 120 days.