Pat C. Peloso

Following dismissal of an appeal from a costs assessment arising out of a defamation action commenced under the Simplified Procedure, the court determined the appropriate costs of the appeal.

The responding party sought more than $29,000 in costs relying on an offer to settle and substantial indemnity rates.

The court emphasized the principles of proportionality and the reasonable expectations of the losing party in fixing costs, drawing on appellate authority cautioning against rigid cost formulas.

Finding the matter straightforward and the claimed fees disproportionate, the court fixed costs in line with a reasonable settlement offer previously made by the appellant.

Appeal from an assessment officer’s decision awarding costs following settlement of a defamation action commenced under the Simplified Procedure.

The appellant argued the assessment failed to properly apply proportionality and the reasonable expectations of the losing party.

The court held that the assessment officer appropriately considered the Rule 58.06(1) factors, including the significance of reputational harm and the defendant’s litigation conduct, and reasonably discounted the claimed fees.

The officer’s conclusions reflected no error in principle, and the substantial indemnity costs awarded for the assessment hearing were also upheld.

The appellant appealed a Master's decision dismissing his motion to amend his statement of claim to add two third parties as defendants.

The appellant suffered a spinal injury in a swimming pool accident when he was a minor.

The court considered the transitional provisions and discoverability rules under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court upheld the Master's finding that the appellant did not actually discover his claim against the specific third parties prior to January 1, 2004.

Furthermore, the court held that a minor without a litigation guardian cannot be deemed to have discovered a claim under s. 5(1)(b), as minors are presumed not to know their rights.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants mistakenly delivered heating oil to the plaintiffs' home, which had been converted to natural gas 22 years earlier by the respondents.

The oil was pumped into a decommissioned fill pipe, causing a massive spill and environmental contamination.

The appellants settled the plaintiffs' claim and sought contribution from the respondents for negligently decommissioning the system.

The trial judge dismissed the third-party claim, finding the specific chain of events was not reasonably foreseeable.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred by focusing on the precise manner of the incident rather than the general foreseeability of a mistaken delivery.

The respondents breached the standard of care by failing to permanently plug the fill pipe.

The appellant was injured in two motor vehicle accidents and received weekly income benefits from her insurer.

The insurer terminated her benefits after 156 weeks, and she subsequently lost her job due to accident-related injuries.

She reapplied for benefits and commenced an action more than two years after the initial termination, arguing that section 26(1) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule creates a second limitation period that begins when an insurer refuses a reapplication for further benefits.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that section 26(1) contemplates only one limitation period which begins to run from the insurer's initial refusal to pay the benefits claimed.