Daniel I. Reisler

Following a jury trial for damages arising from a motor vehicle collision, the plaintiff sought partial indemnity costs.

The court awarded the plaintiff $275,000 in fees, $100,000 in disbursements, and $30,000 for costs incurred in pursuing a SABS settlement that significantly benefited the defendants.

The court denied the plaintiff's claim for litigation loan interest due to insufficient evidence.

The defendants' request for costs under Rule 49.10(2) was dismissed because the plaintiff's judgment exceeded the defendants' offer.

In this personal injury trial, the plaintiffs sought to have the jury quantify damages for past attendant care and housekeeping.

The court denied this request, ruling that such claims were barred due to the male plaintiff's prior settlement of his Family Law Act claim for services provided to his wife, which would result in impermissible double recovery.

Additionally, the court found there was insufficient evidentiary foundation to put these specific questions to the jury, as the plaintiffs failed to provide adequate evidence regarding the hours of services rendered by third parties or the value of non-monetary compensation, and the proposed methodology of valuing damages based on need rather than services actually received was incorrect in law.

The plaintiff, a prominent human rights lawyer, was struck by the defendant's motor vehicle while riding her bicycle.

The defendant failed to discharge the reverse onus under the Highway Traffic Act and was found wholly liable.

The court accepted expert medical evidence that the plaintiff suffered a permanent mild traumatic brain injury (mTBI) and chronic migraines, which effectively ended her legal career.

The court dismissed the defendants' threshold motion, finding the plaintiff sustained a permanent serious impairment of an important function, and awarded substantial damages including $250,000 in general damages, past and future income loss, and future care costs.

The appellants, Michael Taylor and The Manufacturers Life Insurance Company, appealed a judgment declining to enforce a settlement in a motor vehicle accident action.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle or palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's exercise of discretion regarding the enforcement of a settlement under Rule 49.09.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondent.

The plaintiff brought an urgent motion to conditionally strike the jury notice for a trial scheduled to commence on January 17, 2022, due to COVID-19 pandemic developments suspending jury selections.

The defendants opposed the motion.

The court considered factors such as court resources, local pandemic impact, prejudice to parties (especially the plaintiff due to financial implications and case age), and history of adjournments.

The court granted the plaintiff's motion, ordering that the trial proceed without a jury if juries are not being impaneled, and awarded costs to the plaintiff.

The court dismissed a motion for leave to appeal the order of Justice Lemon dated June 22, 2021.

As no costs submissions were received from the parties, no costs were awarded.

The defendant insurer moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action, arguing it was brought outside the one-year limitation period set out in the Insurance Act and the standard automobile insurance policy.

The plaintiff argued the claim was not for breach of contract, but for breach of the insurer's independent duty of good faith, which is subject to the basic two-year limitation period.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that based on the pleadings, the bad faith claim is separate and distinct from a claim under the insurance contract, and therefore falls outside the one-year limitation period.

The moving party sought approval of a settlement dismissing a third party claim without costs.

The court found multiple deficiencies in the motion record, including failure to properly cite the grounds for the motion, failure to include pleadings, and failure to address whether the third party defended the main action, which would trigger the requirement for court approval under Rule 7.08 due to a plaintiff being under disability.

The court also noted the draft order was deficient.

The motion was adjourned with directions to file a proper motion record.

The moving party, Aviva Canada Inc., brought a motion for leave to appeal an order made by Madam Justice O'Brien on September 29, 2020.

The respondent did not appear.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal without costs.

The respondent insurer conducted an independent investigation into auto-collision industry fraud by intentionally damaging vehicles and submitting them to the appellants' body shops.

The respondent sued for fraudulent misrepresentation and other claims, alleging the appellants charged for unnecessary repairs and deliberately damaged vehicles further.

The appellants moved to dismiss the claim under Rule 21 based on the ex turpi causa doctrine and appealed the motion judge's refusal to do so.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding it was not plain and obvious the claim could not succeed.

However, the Court granted the appellants leave to amend their statement of defence to plead ex turpi causa rather than entrapment.

The court apportioned costs between the defendants following a 39-day trial where the plaintiffs were awarded approximately $12 million in damages.

The Jantzi defendants were found 80% at fault for a motor vehicle accident, and All Star Tap & Grill 20% at fault for over-serving alcohol, with the plaintiff Wesley Hummel 25% contributorily negligent.

The Jantzi defendants argued All Star should bear 80% of post-offer costs due to their refusal to settle, while All Star argued costs should follow the trial's liability apportionment (75% Jantzi, 25% All Star after contributory negligence).

The court considered factors under Rule 57.01 and Section 131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act, including offers to settle and policy limits.

Ultimately, the court ordered the Jantzi defendants to pay one-third of the plaintiffs' costs and All Star Tap & Grill to pay two-thirds, based on their respective insurance policy limits ($1 million for Jantzi, $2 million for All Star).

The defendant brought a threshold motion during jury deliberations in a motor vehicle accident trial.

The jury awarded the plaintiff damages for pain and suffering, out-of-pocket expenses, and future health care costs.

The court applied the three-part test from Meyer v. Bright and found that the plaintiff suffered a permanent serious impairment of an important physical function due to chronic pain.

The defendant's threshold motion was dismissed, and the jury's award was upheld subject to statutory deductibles and collateral benefit deductions.

The appellant, a passenger injured in a motor vehicle collision, appealed a trial judgment that resulted in a nil award after the jury verdict of $50,000 in non-pecuniary damages was reduced by a statutory deductible and an advance payment made by the defendants.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's qualification of expert witnesses, aspects of the jury charge, and the costs award.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the merits and the costs appeal, finding that the trial judge properly admitted non-party expert evidence, provided a balanced jury charge, and correctly applied the costs rules given the nil judgment.

This case involved three concurrent motions: Aviva Canada Inc. sought to strike portions of the defendants' statements of defence and counterclaims, while the defendants (1843538 Ontario Inc., Fady Rony Warda, Rony Amanuel Warda, and Michael Wetzel) sought to dismiss Aviva's claim under Rule 21 and Michael Wetzel also sought summary judgment under Rule 20.

The defendants argued that Aviva's claim should be precluded by the doctrine of ex turpi causa and/or as an abuse of process, including a civil equivalent of entrapment, stemming from Aviva's 'sting' operation involving intentionally damaged vehicles and fictitious insurance claims.

The court dismissed the defendants' motions to strike/dismiss Aviva's claim, finding it was not 'plain and obvious' that ex turpi causa or abuse of process applied to prevent Aviva's action for compensatory damages.

Wetzel's motion for summary judgment was also dismissed due to genuine issues for trial regarding liability and damages.

Aviva's motion to strike was granted in part, specifically striking an itemized list of repairs as evidence from Wetzel's pleading and striking allegations of civil entrapment from the Warda defendants' pleading, but otherwise dismissed.

The plaintiff suffered a severe traumatic brain injury in a motor vehicle accident while riding as a passenger in a vehicle driven by the defendant.

Prior to the accident, both the plaintiff and the driver had consumed alcohol at the All Star Tap & Grill House.

The court found the driver 80% liable for the accident due to impaired driving and the commercial host 20% liable for over-serving alcohol and failing to prevent the intoxicated driver from operating a vehicle.

The plaintiff was found 25% contributorily negligent for failing to wear a seatbelt, entering a vehicle with an impaired driver, and encouraging the driver to speed.

The court assessed the plaintiff's damages, including $300,000 for non-pecuniary damages, significant amounts for past and future loss of income, and over $9 million for the cost of future care.

Family Law Act claims were also awarded to the plaintiff's parents and siblings.

The defendants brought a motion to enforce a Rule 49 settlement agreement concerning a motion for particulars and to set aside their noting in default.

The core dispute revolved around the interpretation of the phrase "we will comply with the Rules" regarding the delivery of the statement of defence.

The court found that the plaintiff's understanding (delivery within 20 days under Rule 18) was objectively reasonable, while the defendants' undisclosed intention to bring a motion to strike, which would defer defence delivery, was not within the plaintiff's reasonable contemplation.

Consequently, the court determined that the plaintiff had accepted the defendants' repudiation of the settlement, meaning there was no settlement agreement to enforce.

However, the court exercised its discretion to set aside the noting in default, finding that the defendants had consistently demonstrated an intent to defend and moved promptly.

The motion to enforce the settlement was dismissed, but the noting in default was set aside, with specific terms imposed for future procedural steps.

No costs were awarded due to divided success and tactical conduct by both parties.

The plaintiff, Rosemary Sheldon, succeeded in her personal injury action against the defendant, Manuel Reyna, following a 15-day judge-alone trial.

This endorsement addresses the plaintiff's requests for correction of a damages award for gardening services, prejudgment interest, postjudgment interest, costs on a partial indemnity basis, and an order for periodic payments.

The court confirmed the total judgment amount, awarded prejudgment and postjudgment interest, and granted partial indemnity costs to the plaintiff, with a minor reduction in disbursements.

An order for periodic payments was also made.

During a personal injury trial, the plaintiff's counsel brought a motion under Rule 53.01(3) to recall the plaintiff as a witness after new documents were produced during the cross-examination of the plaintiff's family doctor.

The documents, which had not been disclosed prior to trial, contained notes and handwriting suggesting the plaintiff was attempting to manage her medical case.

The court granted the motion, finding that the interests of justice and trial fairness required giving the plaintiff an opportunity to explain the newly produced documents, and imposed restrictions on counsel's communications with the plaintiff prior to her recall.

On appeal from a trial judgment, the appellant House challenged the trial judge's findings regarding municipal liability for winter road maintenance, apportionment of fault, and the discount rate applied to damages.

The trial judge found that the Township of Wilmot was not liable for the accident despite unanticipated ice formation on Huron Road, as the municipality met its statutory defences under the Municipal Act.

The trial judge apportioned fault equally (50/50) between House as driver and Baird as vehicle owner, whose defective tires contributed to the loss of control.

The Court of Appeal dismissed House's appeal on all three issues and also dismissed Baird's cross-appeal regarding costs.

The appellants appealed a judgment from the Superior Court of Justice rendered by Justice Paul B. Kane following a jury trial.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and awarded the appellants costs of the appeal in the amount of $22,000.

The costs of the trial were reserved to the discretion of the judge presiding over the re-trial.